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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the nature of legal controversies 
generated by technological change, using as an example in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), first successfully used to produce the birth of 
Louise Brown, the world’s first “test tube baby,”1 in 1978.  It 
                                                          
 * Associate in Law, Columbia Law School 2002-2004.  B.Sc. (Hons.), 
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grows out of an earlier essay, which classified the ways in 
which legal and political institutions are called on to adapt to 
technological change, and briefly compared the ability of courts 
and legislatures to do so.2  By exploring different legal and 
political responses to IVF and related technologies in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia and their 
consequences, this article aims to evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of different means of adapting to technological 
change. 
Parts I and II of this article explore the nature of 
technological change and the challenges it poses for law.  
General criticisms of the law’s failure to keep up with 
technological change arise from four classes of problems: (1) 
there may be a perceived need for new laws to ban a technology 
or to limit the way in which it is practiced; (2) technological 
change may reveal latent ambiguities in the law, creating new 
uncertainties; (3) existing rules may be based on explicit or 
implicit assumptions about technological feasibility that are no 
longer reasonable; and (4) existing rules may be over-inclusive 
or under-inclusive with respect to the new technology and 
related conduct.  This four-way classification facilitates an 
understanding of the nature and desirability of legal and 
political responses to technological change. 
Part III sets out the legal responses to IVF in three 
common law countries: the United Kingdom and parts of 
Australia and the United States.  All three countries have 
become leaders in IVF.  However, the birth of Louise Brown, 
which took place in England after United States government 
reluctance to fund IVF research, sparked significant 
controversy in each of these jurisdictions.  Initially, there were 
debates in the media as well as in academia and politics as to 
whether IVF was a “good thing” or ought to be banned.  In all 
three countries, arguments in favor of a ban failed, but residual 
concerns remained.  Most of those concerns were of the first two 
types: first, the possible need for new regulatory laws and 
                                                          
remaining errors. 
 1. Historically, the term “test tube baby” has sometimes been used to 
refer to children conceived with the assistance of artificial insemination and 
other non-IVF techniques. This article uses the term in its narrower sense, to 
refer to children born following an ex utero fertilization procedure, that is, 
fertilization not in vivo (in the body) but in vitro (outside the body, literally “in 
glass”). 
 2. Lyria Bennett Moses, Adapting the Law to Technological Change: A 
Comparison of Common Law and Legislation, 26 U.N.S.W.L.J. 394 (2003). 
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second, the prevalence of uncertainty in the application of 
existing laws.  The jurisdictions considered exemplify different 
responses to these problems. 
Parts V and VI consider and compare these different 
responses to arguments for increased regulation and increased 
certainty.  The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are 
analyzed, from the point of view of both the capacity of that 
approach to resolve the problem identified and its ability to 
withstand ongoing technological change.  My conclusion is that 
to a large extent, the desirability of using a particular 
mechanism not only depends on the circumstances but is also 
contestable.  However, it is possible to devise a general 
framework for considering the desirability of particular 
approaches in specific contexts.  I apply the general framework 
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of different 
responses to two specific issues—the problem of multifetal 
pregnancies resulting from in vitro fertilization and related 
techniques, and uncertainty as to the person entitled to 
exercise control over frozen embryos. 
Our intuition that the law faces problems following the 
introduction of a new technology is correct, and is reflected in 
metaphors of law struggling to keep up.  However, the reflexive 
response that legislation is required to facilitate the law’s 
adaptation to technological change may be wrong; legislation is 
inferior to the alternatives in some circumstances.  In some 
cases, there may be benefits in adopting a “wait and see” 
approach, observing the performance of other mechanisms 
prior to implementing a statutory or administrative regime.  
Awareness of the benefits of these alternatives is important in 
weighing proposals for reform. 
I. THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY 
A. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND OTHER REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Few technologies arrive unannounced and few remain 
unchanged over time.  Technologies are not unaffected by the 
shift from new invention to widely used phenomenon.  The 
development of techniques to facilitate the fertilization of 
human eggs or ova is no exception.3  There is thus no single 
                                                          
 3. See generally JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA ENGLISH, HUMAN IN 
VITRO FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL 
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date on which all legal issues associated with IVF blossomed, 
but there are some significant points along the way, including 
birth of the first IVF baby in 1978, as well as the use of 
cryopreserved, or frozen, embryos and donated ova in 1983.4  As 
the number of people affected by each of these developments 
grew and general awareness of them increased over time, 
political, legal, and professional institutions were urged to 
respond. 
The notion of “test-tube babies” was anticipated in Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World,5 first published in 1932.  At around 
the same time, there were reports of successful fertilization of 
mammalian eggs in vitro.6  By 1969, the same feat had been 
accomplished with human eggs.7  These and similar events 
raised questions about the moral and legal status of a human 
embryo outside its mother’s body.  In fact, one early case in the 
United States, Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital,8 which 
commenced before any human child conceived in vitro had been 
born, raised the issue of tort liability for destruction of a human 
embryo in vitro. 
Despite these early developments and musings, there was 
relatively little public awareness of IVF technology or 
widespread concern about its implications until Louise Brown, 
the world’s first IVF baby, was born in the United Kingdom on 
July 25, 1978.9  Her birth was followed by similar achievements 
in other countries: Candice Reid was born in Victoria, Australia 
                                                          
INNOVATION 1-12 (1993). 
 4. See generally Alan Trounson & Linda Mohr, Human Pregnancy 
Following Cryopreservation, Thawing and Transfer of an Eight-Cell Embryo, 
305 NATURE 707 (1983); Peter Lutjen et al., The Establishment and 
Maintenance of Pregnancy Using In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Donation 
in a Patient with Primary Ovarian Failure, 307 NATURE 174 (1984); Alan 
Trounson et al., Pregnancy Established in an Infertile Patient After Transfer of 
a Donated Embryo Fertilised In Vitro, 286 BR. MED. J. 835 (1983). 
 5. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper & Row 1969) (1932). 
 6. Gregory Pincus & E. V. Enzmann, The Comparative Behavior of 
Mammalian Eggs In Vivo and In Vitro, 62 J. EXP. MED. 665 (1935); Miriam F. 
Menkin & John Rock, In Vitro Fertilization and Cleavage of Human Ovarian 
Eggs, 55 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 440 (1948). 
 7. R.G. Edwards et al., Early Stages of Fertilization In Vitro of Human 
Oocytes Matured In Vitro, 221 NATURE 632 (1969). 
 8. Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18443 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1978) (motion to dismiss denied); Del Zio v. 
Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (CES), 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (motion to set aside verdict denied). 
 9. See generally P.C. Steptoe & R.G. Edwards, Birth After the 
Reimplantation of a Human Embryo, 2 LANCET 366 (1978). 
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in July 1980,10 and Elizabeth Carr was born in Virginia in the 
United States in December 1981.11 
The IVF technique, in its simplest form, involves hormonal 
monitoring and stimulation of the woman producing ova, 
harvesting the ova, mixing them with sperm in a petri dish 
containing a culture medium, waiting for approximately three 
days for embryo development, and then transferring one or 
more embryos,12 back to the woman.  The precise technique has 
varied over time, as IVF practitioners have learned more about 
the process of fertilization and have improved their ability to 
predict which embryos are most likely to lead to a successful 
pregnancy.  One variation, for example, is “blastocyst transfer,” 
whereby embryos are allowed to develop for a longer period of 
time (approximately five days) prior to transfer in an effort to 
increase the chances of successful implantation.13 
Two other important developments were cryopreservation 
of embryos and the use of donated ova.  Embryo 
cryopreservation was developed in Australia (with the first live 
birth in 1985) and quickly moved to the United States.14  
Although the use of donated ova was foreseeable from the first 
days of IVF, the first reported case did not come until 1983.15  A 
more recent variation of ova donation, cytoplasm transfer, has 
been successfully performed in New Jersey.16  In that 
                                                          
 10. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Artificial Conception: In 
Vitro Fertilization, Discussion Paper 15 para. 1.14 (1987), available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/dp15chp1 (last visited Apr. 6, 
2005). 
 11. Walter Sullivan, Test Tube Baby Born in US, Joining Successes 
Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1981, at C1. 
 12. The term “pre-embryos” has been used to distinguish embryos in the 
first 14 days of development.  For convenience, the term “embryo” shall be 
used throughout to refer to the product of fertilization. 
 13. See, e.g., Del Marek et al., Introduction of Blastocyst Culture and 
Transfer for all Patients in an In Vitro Fertilization Program, 72 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 1035, 1035 (1999). 
 14. See generally Trounson & Mohr, supra note 4; Alan Trounson, 
Preservation of Human Eggs and Embryos, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 
(1986); see also Edward F. Fugger, Clinical Status of Human Embryo 
Cryopreservation in the United States of America, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
986 (1989); Richard P. Marrs et al., Successful Pregnancies from Cryopreserved 
Human Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, 156 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1503, 1503 (1987); X.J. Wang et al., The Contribution of Embryo 
Cryopreservation to In-Vitro Fertilization/Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer: 8 
Years Experience, 9 HUM. REPROD. 103 (1994). 
 15. See P. Lutjen et al., supra note 4, at 174, 175. 
 16. Jacques Cohen et al., Birth of Infant After Transfer of Anucleate Donor 
Cytoplasm into Recipient Eggs, 350 LANCET 186, 186-87 (1997). 
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technique, the cytoplasm from a donor’s ovum is injected into 
the ovum of an infertile woman together with the father’s 
sperm.17  It allows an older woman or a woman whose 
mitochondria are defective to be the near-genetic mother of her 
child, the genetic material in the mitochondria being the 
exception.  The technique has raised some ethical concerns, and 
the Food and Drug Administration has determined that further 
use of the technique would require an Investigative New Drug 
(IND) application.18 
There are also procedures that at some time have served as 
alternatives to standard IVF.  An embryo can be washed out of 
a woman’s uterus before it implants and then transferred to 
another woman’s uterus with “embryo flushing.”  In Gamete 
Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT), ova and sperm are injected 
into a woman’s fallopian tube so that fertilization occurs in the 
usual place.19  With Zygote Intra-Fallopian Transfer (ZIFT), the 
ova and sperm might still meet in vitro but be transferred into 
the fallopian tube shortly thereafter.20 The ova’s protective 
layer might be perforated to enhance prospects of fertilization 
with “Zona Drilling” or “Partial Zona Dissection.”21  Finally, 
rather than mixing sperm and ova in vitro, one might inject a 
single sperm into an ovum with “Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm 
Injection” (ISCI) or inject a small number of sperm into an 
ovum with “Sub-Zonal Insemination” (SUZI).22  Standard IVF 
and ISCI are the most commonly used techniques in the United 
States.23 
                                                          
 17. Jason A. Barritt et al., Cytoplasmic Transfer in Assisted Reproduction, 
7 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 428, 429 (2001). 
 18. See Denise Grady, Doctors Using Hybrid Egg to Tackle Infertility in 
Older Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A16; John A. Robertson, Oocyte 
Cytoplasm Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line Intervention, 26 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 211, 213 (1998). 
 19. See Ricardo H. Asch et al., Preliminary Experiences with Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), 45 FERTILITY & STERILITY 366, 366 (1986). 
 20. Paul Devroey et al., Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer as a Successful 
Treatment for Unexplained Infertility, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 246, 246-47  
(1989). 
 21. Jacques Cohen et al., Implantation Enhancement by Selective Assisted 
Hatching Using Zona Drilling of Human Embryos with Poor Prognosis, 7 
HUM. REPROD. 685, 685 (1992). 
 22. Gianpiero Palermo et al., Pregnancies After Intracytoplasmic Injection 
of Single Spermatozoon into an Oocyte, 340 LANCET 17, 17-18 (1992); see also 
Christopher J. De Jonge & Jessica Pierce, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection--
What Kind of Reproduction Is Being Assisted?, 10 HUM. REPROD. 2518, 2518 
(1995) (discussing risks and ethical concerns). 
 23. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2002 ASSISTED 
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All these techniques aim to facilitate of fertilization of 
human gametes in order to enable pregnancy.  Such techniques 
will be referred to generally here as “reproductive 
technologies,” “assisted reproductive technologies,” or “ARTs.”  
There are other, more controversial, techniques that are often 
associated with these technologies.  For example, embryos may 
be destroyed in order to create embryonic stem cells, and 
animals can be cloned, bypassing the need for fertilization of 
gametes.  The current debate revolves largely around the ethics 
of proceeding to create embryonic stem cells or cloned embryos 
at all, or with public funding.  Although technological change is 
continuous rather than discrete, so that any line drawn is 
necessarily arbitrary, this paper focuses on reproductive 
techniques that are or have been generally practiced in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.    
B.  THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The introduction of IVF and the development of related 
techniques are examples of technological change.  There is no 
single accepted definition of technology, and much depends on 
context.  A focus on the consequences of technology might lead 
one to adopt a definition such as: “Technology consists of those 
material objects, techniques and knowledge that allow human 
beings to transform and control the inanimate world.”24  A 
broader definition would include control of the animate world, 
such as: “man’s use of devices or systematic patterns of thought 
and activity to control physical phenomena in order to serve his 
desires with a minimum of effort and a maximum of 
efficiency.”25  Both definitions stress the power of technology to 
effect human control.  On the other hand, an account of the 
historical development of technology might describe 
technological change as a process of knowledge change, 
increasing the ability or potential of a people or society to solve 
problems.26 
While these and similar definitions are useful in the 
contexts in which they are employed, they do not explain why 
                                                          
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND 
FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 1-2 (2004). 
 24. RON WESTRUM, TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF 
PEOPLE AND THINGS 7 (1991). 
 25. RALPH PARKMAN, THE CYBERNETIC SOCIETY 3 (1972). 
 26. See GOVINDAN PARAYIL, CONCEPTUALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS 9, 146 (1999).  
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technological change has captivated and troubled legal 
scholars.  When legal scholars discuss legal issues arising out of 
a new technology, they are rarely concerned with regulation of 
knowledge or problem-solving per se, and only sometimes 
concerned with technology’s effects on the natural world.  
Rather, they generally wish to describe what legal 
consequences do and ought to flow from certain conduct, in this 
case, conduct related to the new technology. 
The focus on conduct is not surprising given the models 
commonly employed for understanding the nature of law.  Hans 
Kelsen described a legal order as a system of norms, where a 
norm is the meaning of an act by which a certain behavior is 
commanded, permitted or authorized.27  For H.L.A. Hart, 
primary rules require people to do or abstain from doing certain 
actions.28  Within these models, technological change increases 
the range of actions that can practically be carried out by 
people living at a particular time.  In vitro fertilization leading 
to the birth of a child has been theoretically possible since the 
dawn of man.  But it was not proved to be a practical possibility 
until 1978, and was probably not even contemplated as a 
possibility before the twentieth century.  In other words, before 
1978 (or perhaps slightly earlier), laws regulating the practice 
of IVF would have made as little sense as traffic rules for 
passenger cars that can move vertically would today.  If IVF 
had remained a single isolated event, as some had initially 
thought it would,29 legal reform would have been similarly 
perceived as unnecessary.30  However, after the technology 
became more widely employed, the perceived need for a legal 
response increased.  Thus, for current purposes at least, one 
can think of technological change as the invention, adoption, 
and diffusion of a new product or process that makes 
practicable new forms of conduct.31 
                                                          
 27. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 4-5 (Max Knight ed., 1967). 
 28. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (1961). 
 29. Seth Mydans, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Aug. 11, 1978, at 76 (quoting 
Soviet physician, Dr. Leonid Persianinov). 
 30. It has often been observed that, unless taken up, invention has little 
social impact.  See, e.g., Knut H. Sørensen, Social Shaping on the Move? On 
the Policy Relevance of the Social Shaping of Technology Perspective, in 
SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, GUIDING POLICY 19, 23 (Knut H. Sørensen & Robin 
Williams eds., 2002). 
 31. There are no clear boundaries between technological and other types 
of change.  For example, the discovery that conduct is safer or more pleasant 
than previously thought increases the probability that people will engage in 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
514 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
C.  IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 
In order to understand how a technology makes possible 
many new forms of conduct, consider the example of IVF.  By 
making possible the fertilization of a human ovum outside the 
body of the mother, IVF technology led to several new 
activities: 
(i)   It allowed some otherwise infertile couples to bear and 
raise a genetically related child.   
(ii)  It created a new field of activity, providing IVF 
services, that could potentially be carried out by people with 
different ranges of knowledge, skill and experience, exercising 
different degrees of care. 
(iii)  By moving an existing entity (the embryo) to a new 
location, it created the possibility of new tests and 
manipulations.  It also increased the ease with which an 
embryo may be destroyed.  It can also, of course, be transferred 
to the uterus of a woman. 
Taking into account techniques associated with IVF: 
(iv) Fertile people may now use IVF, for example to avoid 
birth of a child affected by a genetic anomaly of concern. 
(v)  Embryos may be cryopreserved and stored for an 
arbitrary period of time.  A cryopreserved embryo can be tested, 
manipulated, or destroyed.  It can also be thawed and either 
transferred to the uterus of a woman, allowed to perish, or used 
in research.   
(vi) The woman gestating a child need not be its genetic 
mother.  A woman may undergo ovarian stimulation and have 
her ova removed so that another woman may become pregnant.  
Contracts related to this transaction may be entered into 
(characterizing it as ova donation or surrogacy).  Such contracts 
have the potential to lead to increased commercialization of 
reproduction. 
(vii) Children genetically the product of one generation 
may be born into a different generation. 
(viii) Because a woman’s uterus remains receptive to a 
pregnancy after menopause, post-menopausal women can 
become gestational mothers using ova provided by a younger 
woman. 
                                                          
that conduct.  At the extreme, it might be said that the conduct was not really 
practicable before the discovery (perhaps because people thought it would kill 
them). 
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(ix) More than one embryo can be transferred into the 
uterus of a woman at the same time. 
Each of these new activities can be commanded, prohibited, 
restricted, or authorized by law.  They can also be encouraged 
or discouraged through education, government funding, 
taxation and the potential for civil suits.  As each of these new 
forms of conduct became possible, and came to the attention of 
scholars and decision-makers, it made sense to talk about 
deducing or altering their legal consequences. In addition, 
because ART services can be advertised as well as covered or 
denied coverage under health insurance contracts, questions 
specific to ART might arise in other areas of law as well.32  
II.  NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND CRITICISM OF LAW 
A.  THE NATURE OF CRITICISM 
Scholars examining legal issues posed by technological 
change such as IVF are often critical of the law.  The law is 
frequently accused of containing gaps,33 of being slow or 
outpaced34 and thus lagging behind technology,35 and of 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., Kinzie v. Physician’s Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Okla. 
1987) (insurance); Egert v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1036-38 (7th Cir. 
1990) (insurance); Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 282, 293 (N.Y. 1999) (advertising). 
 33. E.g., Laura A. Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? 
Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation 
on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 CATHOLIC L. 241, 268 (1999) (“Paradoxically, 
absent fully encompassing legislation, and with a body of case law that leaves 
gaps with respect to key issues, the very methods that can create a family can 
also destroy it.”); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parenthood, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
597, 601 (2002) (“Moreover, very few contests between genetic, gestational and 
intending mothers have been resolved in the courts, leaving gaps in the law 
that render unclear the outcome of potential future disputes.”). 
 34. James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues 
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of 
Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 814 (1998) (“the source of the legal 
conundrums discussed here is the inherent inability of law to maintain pace 
with technologically-driven social change.”); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 
Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. 
REV. 1641, 1641 (1984) (“[M]edical advances have outpaced the ability of 
society to accommodate those advances.”); Lynne M. Thomas, Comment, 
Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Abandoned Personal Property: 
Should There Be a Connection, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255, 259 (1997) (“The law, 
however, generally develops at a much slower pace than technology.”); David 
M. Vukadinovich, Assisted Reproductive Technology Law: Obtaining Informed 
Consent for the Commercial Cryopreservation of Embryos, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 
67, 67 (2000) (“Unlike the leaps that technology has taken, the law and public 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
516 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
needing to respond to new technologies36 and address new 
issues.37  Even when the law is not directly criticized, 
technology is seen as challenging law.38  When law is praised, it 
is for responding speedily.39  These metaphors conjure images 
of technology racing ahead of, and perhaps overwhelming, a 
                                                          
policy have been slower to advance.”). 
 35. Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383, 395 (per 
Windeyer, J.) (“Law, marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a 
little”); Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law, 
1 AUST. J. FAM. L. 196, 212 (1987) (“The hare of science and technology lurches 
ahead. The tortoise of the law ambles slowly behind.”); Joseph J. Saltarelli, 
Note, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of 
Preimplantation Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1985) 
(“In recent years, dramatic advances have been made in the technology of 
artificial human reproduction, giving rise to a variety of moral, ethical, and 
legal issues.  The law has, however, constantly lagged far behind science in the 
formulation of workable responses to such breakthroughs.”).  Note also the 
title of Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap 
Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which 
Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 825 (1999). 
 36. Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, the 
Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights and 
Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 261 (1990) (“our legal institutions 
must respond to the challenge of IVF technology”); see also Sheila A. M. 
McLean, Some Legal Aspects of Modern Reproductive Technology, in TOUGH 
CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
147, 147 (Patricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993). 
 37. Sharon M. Steeves, Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal 
Problems Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1046-47 
(1979) (“Neither common law principles nor statutory enactments in the 
majority of states address the legal issues presented by artificial reproductive 
technology.”). 
 38. Robert S. Summers, Law, Technology and Values, in LAW, LIFE AND 
THE IMAGES OF MAN: MODES OF THOUGHT IN MODERN LEGAL THEORY 65, 66 
(Frank Fleerackers et al. eds., 1996) (“Nearly all technological developments 
pose challenges for law and government.”); Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. 
Hynes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed 
Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97, 97 (1990) (“These dynamic 
medical advancements [IVF and cryopreservation] have challenged the legal 
community to keep reins on practices affecting embryos.”); M. Karen 
McCartan, A Survey of the Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy Considerations of 
In Vitro Fertilization, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695 
(1986) (“A rapidly advancing technological civilization challenges a legal 
system which historically has responded to existing problems and seldom has 
anticipated them.”). 
 39. Michael D.A. Freeman, Responding to the Reproductive Revolution: 
Law Reform – Dilemmas and Difficulties, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION 3, 3 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1992) (“The law, both in its 
legislative and judicial forms, has, in most relevant countries, responded with 
some rapidity and vigour to the new territory explored by the exponents of 
assisted conception.”). 
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legal system trapped in the past.  As technologies move more 
rapidly from invention to widespread application,40 so too does 
the speed with which the law must move. 
It is easy to understand the frustration with the law felt by 
these authors.  On occasion, it can seem as if some laws were 
designed for an older world and now outmoded technology.41   
Several types of criticisms of the law can be found in the 
literature on IVF, namely, that law is uncertain, normatively 
undesirable, or nonexistent.  Critics argue, at least in certain 
cases, that technological change creates reasons to change the 
law.  Then authors take the failure to make the sorts of 
changes suggested by them promptly as a sign that the law is 
outpaced by or has failed to respond to technological change.  
The proposals for change can be grouped into the following 
categories (although a single author may propose more than 
one): 
(i) New rules.  We need to regulate certain new forms of 
conduct and new, specially tailored, laws are required to do 
this. In some cases, it may even be appropriate to ban a 
particular technology or particular applications of that 
technology. 
(ii) Uncertainty.  The law is uncertain as it applies to new 
forms of conduct. In other words, it is not clear whether such 
conduct is commanded, prohibited, or authorized.  Existing 
rules need to be clarified. 
(iii) Scope of rules.  Existing rules were not formulated 
with new technologies in mind.  Thus, some rules in their 
current form inappropriately include or exclude new forms of 
conduct. 
(iv) Justification for rules.  Some existing rules are 
explicitly or implicitly based on a premise that no longer exists, 
and are thus no longer justified. 
The list does not include criticisms that are not related to 
technological change.  It is possible (and common) to criticize 
legislatures for enacting a faulty law, a judge for 
misinterpreting the law or for lacking expertise,42 or to blame 
existing rules for contributing to social problems.  Such 
                                                          
 40. RICHARD C. DORF, TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY AND MAN 14 (1974). 
 41. See Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1885, 1888 (2001). 
 42. On the latter, see generally Mark Mansour et al., Regulating 
Biotechnology: Science, Ethics, Law and Governance Meet Head On in the Age 
of Informed Ignorance, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 93, 94 (2003). 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
518 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
criticisms are, however, ongoing and are not affected by the 
introduction or diffusion of a new technology.  Technological 
change is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the 
existence of uncertain, ineffective, and bad laws; yet it is often 
the occasion for them.  In these cases, one might sensibly use 
concepts such as “catching up,” “responding,” and “adapting” to 
describe the process by which problems arising as a result of 
technological change are resolved. 
B.  LIMITING LEGAL RESPONSES 
Sometimes there will be limits on the nature of legal 
changes that might otherwise take place in response to 
technological change.  For example, a law that might otherwise 
be thought beneficial could be unconstitutional.  Even 
unenforceable higher norms, such as those found in 
international law, can play an important role in political 
argument and legal discourse.  In the context of reproductive 
technologies, both actual and hypothetical laws have been 
challenged on the grounds that they restrict procreative liberty, 
an alleged constitutional or international law right. 
1.  International Law 
There is no enforceable principle of international law that 
would prevent a state from prohibiting or restricting the 
practice of IVF or related technologies.  However, reproductive 
rights have been recognized internationally since the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).43  In 
particular, Article 16 provides for the right to marry and found 
a family “without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion” and states that the family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the state.44  These rights and recognitions are 
repeated in Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.45  It is unclear whether these provisions, 
even if enforceable, would do more than prevent a state from 
interfering with a person’s natural coital capacity to 
                                                          
 43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 44. Id. 
 45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (The 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia are all parties to this 
Covenant). 
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reproduce.46  Certainly, they do not require the government to 
assist the infertile with ART.47  Even if these provisions apply 
to the infertile, they may only apply to infertile people who are 
married.48 
2.  European Law 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms49 is, through the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), part of the law of the United Kingdom.  
Article 12 of the Convention is similar to Article 16 of the 
UDHR, providing a right to marry and found a family; as such, 
its scope is subject to similar comments.50 
Article 8 of the Convention may also be relevant to those 
advocating for reproductive rights.  It provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence” and that no public authority can 
interfere with this right except: 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.51 
The broad nature of the exception, in particular the reference to 
protection of morals, may limit the usefulness of this Article for 
those seeking to promote reproductive liberty. 
3.  United States Constitution 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution52 has been held to protect 
certain fundamental rights, including rights related to freedom 
of choice in matters relating to marriage and family life.53  
                                                          
 46. See McLean, supra note 36, at 147, 151. 
 47. Bernard M. Dickens, Reproduction Law and Medical Consent, 35 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 255, 256 (1985). 
 48. See John Murphy, Public Representation and the Legal Regulation of 
Assisted Conception in Britain, in NATURE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 117, 119 
(Patrick O’Mahoney ed., 1999). 
 49. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 155, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 50. Id. art. 12. 
 51. Id. art. 8. 
 52.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (freedom to use 
of contraception within marital relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
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Laws that prohibit or otherwise restrict IVF might be 
unconstitutional if a right to non-coital reproduction were held 
to be fundamental.54  No Supreme Court case deals directly 
with this question, but there are some indications that such a 
right could be found to exist. 
The main case cited to support a right to reproduce, as 
opposed to a right to avoid reproduction, is Skinner v. 
Oklahoma.55  In that case, a state statute provided for 
mandatory sterilization of criminals who had been convicted 
three or more times for particular crimes.56  The statute was 
struck down, but on equal protection grounds.57  However, 
advocates of reproductive rights might point to the language of 
Justice Douglas’s opinion, which described the right to marry 
and procreate as “fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”58  Similar statements include the Court’s 
comment in Meyer v. Nebraska,59 that the liberty guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment included “the right of an individual 
. . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children,”60 and its 
observation in Stanley v. Illinois61 that “[t]he rights to conceive 
                                                          
438, 453 (1972) (freedom to use of contraception by unmarried couples); Carey 
v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (freedom to use 
contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (woman’s freedom to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846 (1992) (woman’s freedom to choose to terminate a pregnancy prior to 
viability); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (freedom to marry a person 
of another race); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (freedom to 
direct the upbringing and education of children); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003) (freedom to engage in consensual adult sodomy); see also 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942). 
 54. Professor John Robertson is a leading proponent of this view. See, e.g., 
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE (1994); John A. Robertson, 
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 
69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]; John A. 
Robertson, Decisional Authority over Embryos and Control of IVF Technology, 
28 JURIMETRICS J. 285 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson, Decisional Authority]; 
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted 
Reproduction, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 20 (2004). 
 55. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 56. Id. at 536-37. 
 57. Id. at 538. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result, but did not 
agree that the equal protection clause was the appropriate rationale.  Id. at 
543-44. 
 58. Id. at 541. 
 59.  262 U.S. 390 (1923) (case concerned right of parents to control the 
education of their children). 
 60. Id. at 399. 
 61.  405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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and raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic 
civil rights of man,’ and ‘rights far more precious . . . than 
property rights.’”62  One can also point to comments in some of 
the Court’s cases involving the right not to reproduce.63 
Some lower courts have dealt with the issue of a right to 
use ARTs more directly.  Federal district courts have 
recognized the right to submit to medical procedures that may 
bring about pregnancy, such as artificial insemination64 and 
embryo transfer.65 
Although there is no Supreme Court precedent precisely on 
point, it seems likely that the Court would classify the right to 
use IVF as fundamental. If this is correct, then laws that 
prohibit or severely restrict the use of IVF would be 
unconstitutional.  
Even if the Constitution protects the right of couples to use 
technologies such as IVF to have children, that right would not 
be absolute.  It could be overridden by a compelling government 
interest.66  The Court has recognized a government interest in 
preservation of a fetus’ potential life and protection of maternal 
health.67  In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court has 
stated that regulation that does not pose an undue burden on 
the protected right is permitted.68  Thus a state could probably 
mandate distribution of literature regarding the risks of IVF 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 651 (internal citations omitted) (case concerned right to raise 
children). 
 63. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (referring to “the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters [including the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child], involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) 
(referring to the right of an individual “without unjustified government 
interference” to make “personal decisions relating to marriage . . . procreation . 
. . contraception . . . family relationships . . . and child rearing and education” 
and declared that “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the 
very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.”). 
 64. Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
 65. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 66. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). 
 67. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973);  Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 878. 
 68. See, e.g.,  Planned Parenthood v. Casey,  505 U.S. at 874-79. 
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generally or particular practices such as the transfer of high 
numbers of embryos, discussed infra in Part V.C.  Further, 
while the government might be compelled to allow ARTs, it 
would not be required to provide funding for such artificial 
reproductive technologies.69 
C.  REASONS TO BAN IVF OR RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
One reason why the law might be accused of falling behind 
technology is that bans are either not being imposed, or are not 
being imposed quickly enough.  For example, one author, in the 
course of criticizing state governments for failing to restrict 
certain ART practices, writes, “[W]ith the ever-changing and 
quick development of new technology, the states, unlike our 
foreign counterparts, are outpaced by science and medicine.”70  
Although few continue to argue that IVF ought to be banned, 
some did argue for a ban when IVF was first introduced. 
By containing new intrinsic possibilities, even in its most 
basic form, IVF also advances certain values.  As artificial 
insemination enabled procreation without resort to sexual 
intercourse, IVF moved the act of fertilization as well as human 
embryos from women’s bodies to the laboratory.  Especially in 
the 1970s and 1980s, this conflicted with many prevailing 
conceptions of the sanctity of human life and the role of women 
in procreation.  The conflict between the values embedded in 
the technology and prevailing or sectoral social values affected 
the willingness of some to accept the technology, and led to 
calls for a ban from various quarters.71  Although many of these 
arguments are now only of historic interest, one can see how 
they gave rise to possible reasons for banning or restricting the 
use of IVF. 
One strand of arguments against IVF comes from 
organized religions.  Although many religions find particular 
aspects of the technology problematic (such as donated gametes 
or surrogacy), Catholic doctrine condemns the entire 
                                                          
 69. See id.; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980); Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 
490, 507-11 (1989); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
 70. Sherri A. Jayson, Comment, “Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman 
Age 18-31 to Help Have Baby. $6,500 plus Expenses and a Gift”: Should We 
Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?, 11 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 287, 299-300 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 71. A similar observation was made with respect to artificial insemination 
in Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close 
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1041-42 (2002). 
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enterprise.72  As well as disapproving of the destruction of 
embryos, the Church opposes the separation of procreation 
from the act of conjugal union, and finds it contrary to notions 
of dignity and equality that the technology places human life 
within the power of technologists.73 
A broader religious complaint, made more commonly 
against techniques such as genetic manipulation than against 
IVF, is that they constitute an illicit attempt to “play God.”  A 
secular version of the same criticism might point to the fact 
that biotechnology gives us power to alter nature without 
endowing us with a sufficient (God-like) understanding of the 
possible consequences.74  In a similar vein, many commentators 
sought to condemn technological interference with reproduction 
on the ground of its unnaturalness.75 For example, Reverend 
William B. Smith, spokesperson for the Archdiocese of New 
York, likened IVF to “switching the marital bed into a 
chemistry set.”76  
There are also concerns about the health of children 
conceived through IVF. In the early days of IVF, some 
commentators considered it unethical experimentation because 
insufficient data existed about the possible negative effects on 
the resulting child.77  There is now more data available on the 
nature of risks to IVF children.  Studies now show only minor 
deviations in birth weight and age, at least where multiple 
births are ignored; furthermore, such deviations may also be 
explained by other factors such as maternal age and 
                                                          
 72. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for 
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation – Replies to 
Certain Questions of the Day (February 22, 1987), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfa
ith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). 
 73. Id. 
 74. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 287 (2003), available at                                             
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). 
 75. See, e.g., Leon Kass, Making Babies – The New Biology and the ‘Old’ 
Morality, 26 PUB. INT. 18, 48-50 (1972) (“the laboratory production of human 
beings is no longer human procreation”). 
 76. The First Test Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58, 69. 
 77. See, e.g., Hans O. Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative 
View, 247 JAMA 3235, 3237-38 (1982); Paul Ramsey, Shall We “Reproduce?” I.  
The Medical Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization, 220 JAMA 1346, 1347 (1972); Leon 
R. Kass, Babies By Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments On 
the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1175-76 (1971). 
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primogeniture.78  While some studies have also suggested that 
IVF children are more likely to suffer from birth defects,79 the 
defects are more likely related to maternal characteristics80 and 
the prevalence of multiple births than to IVF itself.81  While 
possible links between IVF and specific conditions have been 
identified, additional investigation is required before informed 
conclusions can be drawn.82 
In the 1980s, some feminists and feminist groups such as 
the Feminist International Network of Resistance to 
Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE) advocated 
a different set of objections to IVF.83  They raised a variety of 
concerns, including that IVF transfers power away from 
women84 and distracts from efforts to prevent infertility or deal 
with more important health issues.85  Other concerns raised 
                                                          
 78. ALASTAIR G. SUTCLIFFE, IVF CHILDREN: THE FIRST GENERATION 30 
(2002); Med. Research Council Working Party on Children Conceived by In 
Vitro Ferilisation, Births in Great Britain Resulting from Assisted Conception, 
1978-87, 300 BRIT. MED. J. 1229, 1232 (1990). 
 79. See, e.g., Michèle Hanson et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects After 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and In Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 725, 729-30 (2002). 
 80. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 78, at 30-31; T. Bergh et al., Deliveries and 
Children Born After In-Vitro Fertilization in Sweden 1982-95: A Retrospective 
Cohort Study, 354 LANCET 1579, 1583-84 (1999). 
 81. Bergh, supra note 80, at 1583-84; see also Press Release, ASRM Media 
Advisory, ASRM Comments on Release of  Report on Outcomes Study of ART 
Children (Oct. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Press/ART_child_study.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2005). 
 82. See, e.g., A.C. Moll et al., Incidence of Retinoblastoma in Children 
Born After In-Vitro Fertilisation, 361 LANCET 309, 309-10 (2003); Rosie. 
Mestel, Some Studies See Ills for In Vitro Children: Evidence of Increases in 
Eye Cancer and Mental Retardation Needs to be Verified, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 
2003, at A1; see also SUTCLIFFE, supra note 78, at 36 (discussing a study that 
showed a possible link between IVF and increased cancer rates).  See generally 
MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: A SAFE, SOUND FUTURE 
(2004) (discussing need for and design of future research), available at 
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/publications/publications-research_reviews/public-
assisted_reproduction_report.htm (last visted Mar. 29, 2005). 
 83. See generally Resolution from the FINRRAGE Conference, July 3-8, 
1985, Vällinge, Sweden, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE 
AND GENETIC PROGRESS 211-12 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg 
eds., 1987). 
 84. See, e.g., Robyn Rowland, Of Women Born, But for How Long? The 
Relationship of Women to the New Reproductive Technologies and the Issue of 
Choice, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC 
PROGRESS 67, 77, 80 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987). 
 85. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Alternative Modes of Reproduction, in 
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 361, 262-63 (Sherill Cohen & Nadine 
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were that IVF was experimental, onerous, usually unsuccessful 
and possibly dangerous, and that women were coerced or 
misled into bearing the risks and the costs.86 
Some objections to the practice of IVF might, with 
hindsight, be characterized as Luddite objections to the new.  
Overly simplistic analogies fall in this category.87  For example, 
Leo Abse, a British MP, stated that “[t]he issue is how far we 
play God, how far we are going to treat mankind as we would 
animal husbandry.”88  One can always compare a technology 
such as human IVF to its past associations, but the argument 
is meaningless unless the similarities and differences between 
human and non-human reproductive technologies are explored.  
Some objections to a new technology are based on “fear, 
ignorance, prejudice, or raw emotion”89 or are an example of a 
pessimistic attitude towards new things.90 
Both negative reflex reactions and more sophisticated 
objections to new technology generally soften over time.91 For 
example, between 1978 and 1994, acceptance of IVF in the 
United States increased from 60% to 75%,92 and between 1981 
                                                          
Taub eds., 1989); Gena Corea et al., Prologue, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH 
OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC PROGRESS 8 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah 
Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987). 
 86. GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 166-85 (1985); see also 
Gena Corea & Susan Ince, Report of a Survey of IVF Clinics in the United 
States, in MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC 
PROGRESS 133-39 (Patricia Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987). 
 87. See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means for 
Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and Technological 
Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1996) (discussing the misuse of analogy 
in the context of the debate on reproductive technologies). 
 88. The First Test Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58, 69. 
 89. Arthur Caplan, Introduction, in BEYOND BABY M: ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 5-6 (Dianne M. Bartels et al. eds, 1990). 
 90. See E. Donald Elliott, Against Ludditism: An Essay On the Perils of 
the (Mis)Use of Historical Analogies in Technology Assessment, 65 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 279, 281-82 (1991). 
 91. See Tabitha Rowledge, Reproductive Technologies and the Bottom 
Line, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 203, 203 (Elaine Hoffman Baruch et al. eds., 
1988); ALLAN MAZUR, THE DYNAMICS OF TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY 97-98 
(1981); see also ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING 
POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 45 (1989). See generally 
Bernstein, supra note 71, at 1060-71 (analyzing how artificial insemination 
gained social and legal acceptance). 
 92. Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing 
Need for Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 
18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 283-84 (1997) (reporting the results of an attitudinal 
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and 2000, the proportion of Australians who approved of IVF 
for married couples rose from 77% to 85%.93 Eventually, public 
attention turns from thoughts of whether a new technology 
ought to be used to how it ought to be used and what 
consequences ought to flow from its use.  Of course, a 
disastrous event may turn the public’s mind back to the initial 
question. Even where negative reactions merely delay, rather 
than prevent the introduction of a new technology, the 
controversy itself can prove to be beneficial because it may lead 
to greater public awareness and, in some cases, increased 
regulation or oversight. 94 
D.  REASONS TO REGULATE IVF AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
If no decision is made to ban a new technology, a more 
modest desire might be to control its use.95  Failure of political 
institutions to impose such limits may be described as a “legal 
vacuum.”96 
There are various reasons why it might be thought 
desirable to subject a new technology to regulation.  
Sometimes, the mere exercise of centralized control can allay 
public fears as to the direction the technology might otherwise 
take.97  For example, the Warnock Report,98 commissioned in 
the United Kingdom to examine the implications of 
developments in ART, frequently referred to the need to allay 
                                                          
survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates). 
 93. The Roy Morgan Research Centre Finding No. 3359, Vast Majority of 
Australian’s Support Medicare-Funded IVF, But Most Oppose Sperm Bank Use 
By Single Women or Lesbian Couples, THE BULLETIN, Jan. 9, 2001, available 
at http://www. roymorgan.com/news/polls/2001/3359/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2005). 
 94. See generally ALLAN MAZUR, supra note 91, at 126-27. 
 95. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, The New Reproductive 
Possibilities: Seeking a Moral Basis for Concerted Action in a Pluralistic 
Society, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 192, 192-93 (1984). 
 96. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Terry, "Alas! Poor Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: 
The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in 
England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 456 (1986) 
(emphasizing the “legal vacuum” that has allowed embryo research to take 
place outside a regulatory regime). 
 97. See Margaret Brazier, Regulating the Reproduction Business?, 7 MED. 
L. REV. 166, 168 (1999) (referring to the common plea that “something must be 
done” about the reproduction business and that “something” usually takes the 
form of external regulation). 
 98. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION 
AND EMBRYOLOGY, July 1984, Cmnd. 9314 [hereinafter Warnock Report]. 
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public fears.99  The Foreword to the Warnock Report refers to 
the fact that people want “some principles or other” to govern 
the development and use of the new techniques,”100, including 
“some barriers”101 and “some limits.”102  The Conclusion makes 
a similar point, indicating a desire to protect society “from its 
real and very proper fear of a rudderless voyage into unknown 
and threatening seas.”103 Regulation can thus serve a symbolic 
function; the mere existence of limits reassures people that the 
technology is under control.104 
The usual purpose of regulation, however, is to protect 
those affected by the use of a technology.  “Technology 
assessment” refers to the process used to determine the 
effectiveness, safety, and appropriate use of a new 
technology.105 Technology assessment is primarily concerned 
with predicting the future consequences (economic, social, or 
environmental) of technological development.106 Typically, 
harmful consequences are avoided by prescribing the manner 
in which a technology is designed or employed or by 
discouraging its use.107  Such regulation can increase efficacy, 
as well as protect the health and safety of technologists, those 
seeking to benefit from the technology, others in society, and 
even the environment.  Of course, not all technologies will pose 
                                                          
 99. Janet Gallagher, Embryos, Eggs and Fetuses: Anxiety and the Law, in 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 139, 
147 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987). 
 100. MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON 
HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, WITH TWO NEW CHAPTERS BY MARY 
WARNOCK 2 (1985) (emphasis in original). 
 101. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 102. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 103. Id. at 100. 
 104. See McCartan, supra note 38, at 713 (“The goals of policy in the IVF 
arena should emphasize control and containment of present applications and 
procedures.”). 
 105. See, e.g., H. David Banta, Technology Assessment and Infertility Care, 
in TOUGH CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 53, 60 (Patricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993). 
See generally DORF, supra note 40, at 289; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES PANEL 
ON TECH. ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND 
CHOICE 1-19 (1969). 
 106. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES PANEL ON TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 105, at 1-19. 
 107. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative 
Law: A Conceptual Framework 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1256, 1263-73 (1981).  See 
generally Laurence H. Tribe, Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and 
Control of Technology, 9 MINERVA 243 (1971). 
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the same threats; in the case of IVF, the focus of regulation 
tends to be on the effectiveness of the procedure, the health of 
the woman seeking access to IVF, the proper treatment of the 
embryo, and the health of the child born as a result of the 
procedure. 
Not all regulation need be aimed at ensuring health and 
safety; it may be economic in character or may relate to the 
preservation of other interests and values that are less easily 
subjected to utilitarian calculation.108  There is often vigorous 
social disagreement on what values are implicated by 
biotechnologies and their relative importance.  In the case of 
IVF, one frequently hears reference to values such as family, 
community, privacy, and human dignity. In Louisiana, for 
example, restrictive legislation regulating IVF serves the 
symbolic function of classifying an embryo as the moral 
equivalent of a person.109  The perceived need to preserve social 
values or place limits on a technology, as well as the desire to 
maximize its benefits and minimize its harms, are all reasons 
why regulation might be seen as a necessary response to 
technological change. 
E.  REASONS TO ENHANCE CERTAINTY 
The problem of uncertainty in law is pervasive; it will 
never be possible to determine the precise meaning of all legal 
rules so as to be able to answer all legal questions 
unequivocally.  H.L.A. Hart described legal rules as having a 
penumbra of uncertainty, created in part by the open texture of 
language.110  Technological change thus enters onto a stage 
occupied by an already uncertain law.  While it does not create 
the problem of uncertainty, it may exacerbate it by revealing 
latent ambiguities in the law and raising new legal questions 
for which there are no clear answers.  References to technology 
outpacing law can portray the slow pace at which such new 
                                                          
 108. See Derek Morgan & Robert Lee, Assisted Conception in Common Law 
Jurisdictions, in BIOMEDICINE, THE FAMILY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 479, 484-92 
(Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein et al. eds., 2002) (exploring society’s interest 
in the ethical concerns surrounding assisted conception); Cynthia B. Cohen, 
Unmanaged Care: The Need to Regulate New Reproductive Technologies in the 
United States, 11 BIOETHICS 348, 350 (1997) (arguing the validity of social and 
moral concerns associated with the nature of family and value of children). 
 109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 2003). See generally id. §§ 9.121-
133. 
 110. See HART, supra note 28, ch. 7; H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1958). 
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questions are answered.111  In describing the gap between 
technology and the law caused by uncertainty, the terms “legal 
vacuum” and “legal void” are sometimes used.112 
Generally speaking, uncertainties arise when new entities, 
relationships, or activities do not fit easily into existing 
conceptual and legal categories.  Our rules assume the 
existence of “property” (which can be traded or transmitted via 
will) and “persons” (who can own and inherit), and it can be 
difficult to classify new entities such as cryopreserved embryos 
for the purposes of these rules.  Although notions of property 
and persons are inherently contestable, even previously clear 
concepts can acquire more than one meaning.  Prior to the use 
of reproductive technologies, the woman who gave birth to a 
child, necessarily a genetic parent, was its mother (subject to 
rules on adoption). Yet the notion of motherhood harbored 
latent ambiguity, which was revealed once it became possible to 
separate genetic from gestational motherhood.113 
Consider the Tennnessee custody dispute addressed in 
Davis v. Davis.114  Following a divorce, Mary Sue Davis wanted 
to attempt pregnancy with cryopreserved embryos created with 
her eggs and her husband’s sperm; the husband, Junior Davis, 
                                                          
 111. See, e.g., Vukadinovich, supra note 34, at 67; Wendy Dullea Bowie, 
Comment, Multiplication and Division – New Math for the Courts: New 
Reproductive Technologies Create Potential Legal Time Bombs, 95 DICK. L. 
REV. 155, 156, 163 (1990); Michael Booth, Fate of Frozen Embryos Brings NJ 
Again to Bioethics Fore, N.J.L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at 1; NEW SOUTH WALES 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF THE HUMAN TISSUE ACT 1983 (1997) 
(discussion paper), available at 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/csd/llsb/legislation/humantiss.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2005). 
 112. See, e.g., Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and 
the Absurdity of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 610 (1998); 
Laura D. Heard, Comment, A Time to be Born, a Time to Die: Alternative 
Reproduction and Texas Probate Law, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 927, 928 (1986); 
Kelly L. Frey, Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem 
and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 318-19 (1982). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (involving parentage of child born because a couple agreed to have 
an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them transferred to a surrogate); 
Parm Belluck & Adam Liptak, Split Gay Couples Face Custody Hurdles: 
Judges Lack Road Maps for Laws Unintended for Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A18 (concerning a dispute following the breakup of a 
lesbian relationship in which one partner had served as the gestational 
mother and the other as the genetic mother). 
 114.  Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 
1989). 
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wanted to avoid involuntary parenthood.115  The trial court 
could have potentially treated the cryopreserved embryos as 
“children,” whose custody would be determined in the best 
interests of the child or as “property,” in which case they would 
be jointly owned by the parties.116  Trial court Judge W. Dale 
Young found that “human life begins at the moment of 
conception” and that the best interests of the child would be 
served by granting custody of the embryos to Mary Sue.117 
The Davis case was appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee, by which time Mary Sue wanted to donate the 
embryos to another couple.118  The appellate court held that the 
trial court’s decision violated Junior’s reproductive rights, and 
ordered that the parties be given joint control over the 
embryos.119 On appeal from that decision, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court struck a middle ground between the two 
positions.120  Embryos were neither persons nor property, but 
were entitled to special respect because of their potential for 
human life.121  Ultimately, therefore, neither analogy was 
considered appropriate, the court instead resolving the dispute 
by balancing the parties’ interests.122  Prior to Davis v. Davis, 
there was real uncertainty as to how disputes over 
cryopreserved embryos would be viewed. 
Another potential source of uncertainty, peculiar to the 
common law, arises out of the reliance on stare decisis in 
determining the content of common law rules. Where 
technological change makes possible new forms of conduct, 
there will automatically be a difference between the first case 
involving that conduct and all previous cases.  Determining 
whether the new conduct in question is “like” existing forms of 
conduct may be difficult.  Seeking to rely on a precedent will 
often prove futile—a particular judge’s conception of the 
appropriate legal rule is unlikely to clarify the status of conduct 
that was not possible, and possibly not even foreseen, at the 
time. 
                                                          
 115. Id. at *18-20. 
 116. Id. at *9. 
 117. Id. at *9, *11.   
 118.  Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2, *3 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 13, 1990). 
 119. Id. at *2-3. 
 120. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 121. Id. at 597. 
 122. Id. at 603-04. 
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This does not mean that the outcome in every case 
involving the application of a common law rule to new conduct 
will be uncertain. At one extreme, the immateriality of some 
facts is obvious.  At the opposite extreme, there might be a 
perception (whether later proved true or false) that no existing 
rules apply to new forms of conduct merely because they are 
new.  This tendency was evident in some of the earlier 
literature on law and the Internet.123  More common is the view 
that the applicability of at least some old rules to new forms of 
conduct is uncertain. 
F.  REASONS TO REJECT EXISTING RULES 
Law reform may be urged where new technologies alter the 
facts that had justified existing common law and statutory 
rules.124  An example of reform can be found in early cases 
addressing the question of whether artificial insemination of a 
woman with sperm originating from a man other than her 
husband constituted adultery. The first hurdle the law needed 
to address was uncertainty: it was unclear whether artificial 
insemination constituted adultery, that is, whether adultery 
was sexual intercourse outside of marriage or sharing 
reproductive capacity outside marriage.125 A Canadian court 
initially held that adultery was sharing reproductive capacity 
outside of marriage,126 but subsequent cases decided that it was 
sexual intercourse outside of marriage.127  Once that 
uncertainty was resolved, the rationale for the evidentiary rule 
relating conception of another man’s child to adultery was 
undermined.  The rule was therefore abandoned.128 
Because rules may become obsolete, unenforceable, or too 
expensive, the law may be criticized for dealing with new 
technologies “in terms of existing statutes or cases which were 
written at a time when these new modes of reproduction were 
                                                          
 123. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders -- The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.R. 1367, 1367, 1400-02 (1996). 
 124. See generally David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2001–02) (arguing technological change can alter 
facts used to justify existing law, and in such situations the legal system may 
alter existing law). 
 125. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (Ont. 1921). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Bernstein, supra note 71, at 1067; see also MacLennan v. 
MacLennan 1958 Sess. Cas. 105, 113-15 (Scot.). 
 128. See Bernstein, supra note 71, at 1067. 
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not envisioned.”129  As Justice Felix Frankfurter stated, when 
factual assumptions on which a law is premised change, “law 
cannot be static . . . for facts are stubborn and will not yield.”130  
If laws that have lost their reason for being continue in force, 
the law might well be accused of responding too slowly in a 
changing world. 
G.  REASONS TO EXPAND OR CONTRACT EXISTING RULES 
Where a rule is created prior to some technological change, 
it will rarely be drafted with that change in mind.  Such a rule 
may either include within its scope conduct that its creators 
would have (had they thought of it) excluded or exclude conduct 
that would have been included. Most rules are over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive, even in the absence of technological 
change.  A person drafting a rule will need to balance the 
problems of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness against 
other considerations, such as whether the rule as drafted is 
clear and easy to apply.131  We might assume that a competent 
drafter would reach an acceptable (if controversial) balance.  
But the rule may also apply (or fail to apply) to conduct that 
could not have been foreseen at the time of its creation.  A 
better balance might be reached by deliberately excluding (or 
including) that new conduct.  In these cases, technological 
change might argue in favor of amending the rule. 
In the IVF context, consider the following Virginia law, 
enacted in 1984: 
With the exception of hair, blood and other self-replicating body 
fluids, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, to offer to sell, to 
buy, to offer to buy, or to procure through purchase any natural body 
part for any reason including, but not limited to, medical and 
scientific uses such as transplantation, implantation, infusion or 
injection. 132 
At the time that law was enacted, ovum donation was a 
very new technique.  Ova are not self-replicating, and their sale 
therefore fell within the prohibition.  Yet selling ova is not 
necessarily equivalent to selling a kidney because a donor has 
                                                          
 129. Lorio, supra note 34, at 1642. 
 130. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, in LAW AND 
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 6 
(1939). 
 131. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983) (discussing the importance of balancing a rule’s 
transparency, accessibility, and congruency).  
 132. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1991). 
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many more spare ova than kidneys.  In fact, the Virginia law 
was amended in 1991 to exclude transactions in ova.133 
Conversely, rules may fail to include conduct that falls 
within the rule’s rationale.  Many states have laws regulating 
sperm donation and artificial insemination. For example, in 
2001, forty-two states had laws regulating sperm donation.134  
These often include safety regulations requiring testing for 
communicable or genetic diseases, mandatory record keeping to 
avoid sperm switching and create a genetic data resource for 
future children, and special consent requirements.135  Such 
laws should be equally applicable to the practice of ovum 
donation.  Yet, without further amendment, the legislation only 
covers the use of male gametes. 
There are other examples of rules that were criticized for 
being over-inclusive or under-inclusive in light of the use of 
IVF.  Some have argued that stealing embryos ought to 
constitute “theft” despite the limitation in some laws that theft 
only applies to property.136  Many states require insurers to 
cover or offer coverage for particular medical services; and 
many amended their statutes to include IVF.137 
The problem of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness 
is greater with statutes than with common law rules.  This is 
because common law rules are read with greater reference to 
their underlying justifications.138  Consider, by way of example, 
an imaginary rule providing: “Any person driving a carriage led 
by one or more horses who collides with a pedestrian shall be 
liable for the damages so caused irrespective of negligence.”  If 
the source of this rule were a statute, the rule would create a 
                                                          
 133. 1991 Va. Acts ch. 600. 
 134. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GENETICS POLICY REPORT: 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 9-10 (Alissa Johnson & Cheye Calvo eds., 
2001). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally  infra Part V.B.2.a.iii. 
 137. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (Michie 2005); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:10A-116.5, 
432:1-604 (Michie 2003); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m (2003); MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-810 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 47H, ch. 176A, § 8K, ch. 176B, § 
4J (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
17:48-6x, 17B:27-46.1x, 26:2J-4.23 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1751.01 (Anderson 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-
20, 27-41-33 (2003); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.001-007 (Vernon 2004). 
 138. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 174-81 
(1991). 
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regime of strict liability in the circumstances contemplated.  
Even if the purpose of the rule were a concern for pedestrian 
welfare in light of the faster and heavier horse-drawn 
carriages, it would not extend to injury caused by an 
automobile.139  Although the purpose of the statute is 
important in deducing meaning, it cannot extend the meaning 
beyond the limits that words will bear. 
Common law rules are not bound to their words in the 
same way.  There is no single authoritative text for common 
law rules.  Even when a rule is stated in canonical form, the 
rule will not necessarily bind courts according to its terms.  It is 
always open to a later court to create a new exception to the 
rule or extend it by analogy.  If the horse-drawn carriage rule 
were found in the common law, it would likely be extended by 
analogy to new situations when justified by the rule’s 
underlying rationale.  The fact that common law rules can be 
extended or retracted in light of their underlying justifications 
is a crucial advantage when making laws intended to apply in 
the context of rapidly changing technologies.  This is discussed 
further in Parts V.B.4 and VI.A. 
H.  DIFFERING DILEMMAS 
Following technological change, law may confront the 
range of challenges described here.  However, the particular 
challenges that arise will vary by technological change and 
jurisdiction.  In fact, many new technologies pose no challenges 
for law—one does not find lawmakers struggling with the 
implications of the electric can-opener, for example.   
Consider the separation of genetic and gestational 
motherhood introduced by the use of IVF with surrogate 
gestation in two hypothetical jurisdictions.  The first has laws 
expressly stating that the woman who gives birth to a child is 
to be registered as its mother.  In the second, the law contains 
no such explicit statement, presumably because it seemed 
obvious.  The difference was almost an accident since the 
practice in all jurisdictions prior to the use of IVF is identical; 
the woman giving birth to a child is registered as its mother 
(mater est quam gestatio demonstrat).140 
                                                          
 139. There has been some commentary on the question of whether statutes 
might be extended to situations not contemplated at the time of their 
enactment by use of analogy. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and 
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908). 
 140. J.K. MASON & R.A. MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 57 (2d 
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Yet, once genetic and gestational motherhood are 
separated, each jurisdiction is in a different dilemma.  In the 
first jurisdiction, the laws treating the birth mother as mother 
were accidental and were not the result of any balancing of 
interests of a gestational mother and a separate genetic 
mother.  After IVF becomes possible using gestational 
surrogacy, controversy results.  Some may believe that the 
original rule is right and that the gestational mother should be 
registered as the child’s parent, despite the absence of a genetic 
link.  Others may argue that the legal position ought to be 
changed as a result of new technology and that, until the law is 
changed, it is stuck in the past.  Whatever position is taken, all 
groups would agree that the original rule was formulated in the 
context of factual assumptions that are no longer correct.  The 
question of whether a genetic or gestational mother has a right 
to be recognized as the child’s legal parent ought to be resolved 
on its own merits.  In the second jurisdiction, the question is 
one of pure uncertainty, rather than one of existing rules being 
arguably out of date. 
Not only may different dilemmas exist in different 
jurisdictions, but different dilemmas may be perceived in the 
same jurisdiction.  While people may agree that the factual 
assumptions on which a law was formulated have changed or 
that existing rules were drafted without contemplation of new 
technologies, they may disagree as to whether the law should 
be changed.  Those arguing for the law to remain static may 
feel that existing rules are nevertheless justified or that the 
application of an existing rule to new conduct is desirable, even 
if fortuitous.  Others, perhaps rhetorically pointing to the law’s 
inability to keep up with technology, may argue for legal 
change.  Thus, pressure for law reform might be felt more 
strongly in some jurisdictions than in others.  Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to deny that technological change has generated a 
reason to change or clarify the law; what is really in dispute is 
the extent to which this reason is sufficient. 
Where technology does provide a reason to change or 
clarify the law, that reason may fit in more than one of the 
categories set out above.  For example, uncertainty in relation 
to family relationships may itself be a reason to ban or restrict 
the use of certain ARTs.  Alternatively, the fact that an existing 
rule is over-inclusive with respect to new forms of conduct 
                                                          
ed. 1987). 
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might lead some to conclude that it ought to be repealed 
entirely. 
III.  DIFFERENT PATHS – RESPONSES TO IVF 
Although it would be surprising if all common law 
countries subjected IVF to the same laws, it is interesting that 
different jurisdictions have taken widely divergent routes.  The 
three countries discussed here―the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia―are subject to different constitutional 
and regional norms, and differ in their political and legal 
cultures.141  Because of these differences, approaches taken in 
one jurisdiction may be impossible or ineffective in another.142 
But it would be going too far to assume that comparisons 
between these jurisdictions are meaningless.  As will be evident 
from Parts V and VI, these countries also share common 
problems and common goals.  They all have a common law 
system, and state control is exercised in legislative and 
administrative fora.  Despite cultural and political differences, 
each country can still learn from the experience of others—the 
outcomes of differing choices.  The result of the comparison 
may be to question assumptions about the optimum legal and 
political response to technological change. 
This Part briefly describes the legal responses to IVF in 
most of the United States, the United Kingdom, and two states 
in Australia.  Because the discussions in Parts V and VI below 
focus on particular aspects of each regime, only an outline is 
included here. 
A.  UNITED STATES 
American law on IVF is complicated by the fact that it is 
largely state-based.  For example, Louisiana places tight reins 
on the practice of IVF, based on the principle that an in vitro 
                                                          
 141. See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Process of Regulating Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies: What We Can Learn from Our Neighbors – What 
Translates and What Does Not, 45 LOY. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999). See generally 
P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW (1987). 
 142. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 12 (2004) 
[hereinafter REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY], available at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2005). 
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embryo has the same legal status as a person.143  New 
Hampshire also has detailed laws regarding liability, the 
length of time that embryos can be stored in vitro, and patient 
selection.144  Florida prohibits the sale of embryos, mandates 
agreements to provide for disposition of embryos and gametes 
in the event of death or divorce, and states that a child 
conceived after the death of a parent does not inherit.145 
Virginia requires HIV testing for gamete donors, requires 
physicians to provide certain disclosures to patients, and states 
that an ART child born after a decedent’s death may inherit.146 
In addition, many states have laws determining parentage of 
ART children.147  
States have also tended to deal with particular issues 
surrounding ART and IVF. For example, California requires 
consent for embryo and gamete donation;148 Kansas permits 
destruction of embryos;149 Kentucky prohibits the use of public 
facilities for research purposes if embryonic destruction may 
result;150 New Mexico requires that embryos be transferred to a 
woman to avoid clinical experimentation restrictions;151 New 
Jersey deals with questions of inheritance, requiring that an 
heir be in gestation at the time of the decedent’s death;152 
Oklahoma prescribes conditions for egg and embryo 
                                                          
 143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 2000). 
 144. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:12-B:15, B:29-B:31 (2001). 
 145. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 742.17 (West 1997);  FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 873.05 
(2000). 
 146. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-45.3, 64.1-68.1 (Michie 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 
54.1-2971.1 (Michie 2002). 
 147. North Dakota and Virginia have laws based on the UNIFORM STATUS 
OF CHILDREN ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 191 (West Supp. 1999). 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 to 07 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 
2004).  Colorado, Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have laws 
based on the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2000).  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101, 
-106 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-101 to -102, 8-701 to -707 (Supp. 
2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.101-102, 160.701-763 (Vernon 2002 & 
Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-011, 26.26.700-740 (Supp. 
2004); WYO. STAT. ANN §§ 14-2-401 to -402, 14-2-901 to -907 (Michie 2003).  
Florida and Illinois make provision for gestational surrogacy agreements. FLA. 
STAT. ANN. ch. 742.11-17 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 
47/1-47/75 (West 2004). Many more states have laws dealing with pre-IVF 
issues such as sperm donation. See infra note 559. 
 148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (West 1999); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2005). 
 149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2002). 
 150. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie 2002). 
 151. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (Michie 2003). 
 152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2004). 
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donation;153 and Pennsylvania requires that certain IVF 
statistics be reported.154  Many states have laws, often tied in 
with laws regulating abortion, that restrict what can be done 
with in vitro embryos.155  Further, some states have laws 
requiring certain insurers to provide or offer coverage for 
IVF.156 
There are various theories that attempt to explain the lack 
of federal legislation on IVF, including constitutional 
restrictions on government action, deference to medical 
practitioners, anti-regulation and free market ideology, and 
entanglement with the contentious abortion debate.157  Yet, 
despite knowledge of these factors, many had predicted that 
legislation would be passed,158 and there has been some public 
demand for regulation.159 
                                                          
 153. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554-556 (West  Supp. 2004). 
 154. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 2000). 
 155. See 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (West 2002) (prohibiting killing any 
unborn child, defined as an “individual of the human species from fertilization 
until birth”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 2004) (prohibiting  the 
use, transfer, or distribution of in utero and ex utero fetuses for 
experimentation); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law. Co-op. 2004) 
(prohibiting research on a fetus, defined to include embryos); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2004) (prohibiting non-therapeutic research on 
embryos); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266–.2691 (West 2003) (providing for 
various offenses against unborn children, defined to be “the unborn offspring 
of a human conceived, but not yet born”), MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421, 422 
(West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting research on a living human conceptus, 
defined to include human organism from fertilization through the first 265 
days thereafter); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, -3, -5 (Michie 2003) (prohibiting 
research on a fetus, defined as the product of conception); N.D. CENT CODE 14-
02.2-01 (2004) (prohibiting research on a fetus “before or after expulsion from 
its mother’s womb”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203, 3216 (West 2000) 
(prohibiting non-therapeutic research on an unborn child, defined as a human 
from fertilization until live birth); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (2002) (prohibiting 
research on a live fetus, defined to include an embryo); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 
34-14-16 to -20 (Michie 2004) (prohibiting research on an embryo, defined to 
include in vitro embryos from the single-celled stage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
310 (2003) (prohibiting research on live unborn children; held 
unconstitutionally vague in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1502 (10th 
Cir. 1995)); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting 
destruction of an unborn child, defined as a human being from conception 
until live birth). 
 156. See supra note 137. 
 157. See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands: The Regulation of Human 
Reproduction in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 143, 143 (Sanford N. Katz et al. 
eds., 2000); REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 8-12. 
 158. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 54, at 427. 
 159. See, e.g., Guidelines Sought on Fertilization, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1984, 
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The history of IVF provides another explanation for the 
lack of federal government involvement.  In the late 1970s, the 
Carter administration appointed an Ethics Advisory Board to 
consider issues of research involving human IVF.  Federally 
funded embryo research had to be reviewed by the Board before 
it could proceed.160  The Board issued a report on May 4, 1979, 
concluding that it was acceptable from an ethical standpoint to 
undertake and fund research involving human IVF and embryo 
transfer subject to various qualifications.161  On the moral 
status of the embryo, the Board concluded that “the human 
embryo is entitled to profound respect; but this respect does not 
necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights 
attributed to persons.”162  The Board recommended that a 
model or uniform law be drafted dealing with the legal status of 
children born as a result of IVF.163 
However, the Board’s funding was denied under the 
Carter, Reagan, and first Bush administrations. Because 
federally funded research in this area had to be approved by 
the Board, the lack of Board funding created a de facto ban on 
such research. This Board approval requirement was removed 
in 1993.164 
In 1994, the Human Embryo Research Panel, an advisory 
panel within the National Institutes for Health, endorsed 
funding for embryo research as well as embryonic stem cell 
research.165  While President Clinton approved the Panel’s 
overall recommendation on human embryo research, he 
prohibited the use of federal funding for the creation of 
embryos to be used in research.166  However, in 1995 and 
subsequent years, Congress has attached a rider to its 
appropriations bill, effectively precluding all funding for 
                                                          
at D23; Pressure to Regulate In Vitro Fertilization Grows as Demand Rises, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1988, at B7. 
 160. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1993). 
 161. Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human 
In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,056 (June 
18, 1979). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 35,058. 
 164. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-43, § 121, 107 Stat. 122, 133 (1993). 
 165. 1 NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO 
RESEARCH PANEL xvi – xviii (1994). 
 166. See John Schwartz & Ann Devroy, Clinton to Ban U.S. Funds For 
Some Embryo Studies, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1994, at A1. 
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embryo research by the NIH.167  The debate has since moved on 
to questions involving embryonic stem cell research.168 
It is both the lack of legislative intervention and private 
nature of IVF practice and research that gives the area a “Wild 
West” image.169  The National Conference of State Legislatures, 
for example, complains, “[A] substantial portion of research and 
innovative therapy in reproductive medicine need not be 
subject to peer review, may not conform to current standards 
for informed consent, and may be offering services that have 
never been fully evaluated for safety and efficiency.”170  
Jonathan Von Blerkom, co-director of the Reproductive 
Genetics In Vitro, a Denver clinic, similarly commented that 
“[t]hings are done in this field that would never, ever be done in 
any other field of medicine without review or without big 
studies that look at efficacy or safety.”171 
The only direct federal regulation of IVF is found in the 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,172 
which effectively came into operation in 1996, when the 
Department of Health and Human Services began to fund its 
implementation.173  There are two parts to this Act―reporting 
and certification.  The reporting requirement, which is now in 
operation, institutes a system of centralized annual reporting 
on pregnancy success rates.174  The success rates are published 
along with a list of clinics that fail to disclose their pregnancy 
success rates in accordance with the regulations.175  Not all 
                                                          
 167. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 
§ 510 (2004). 
 168. See Dep’t of Health and Hum. Services, Fact Sheet (July 14, 2004), at  
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040714b.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2005). 
 169. See Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation 
of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227, 228 
(2001). 
 170. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 134, at 28. 
 171. Tracy Weber & Julie Marquis, In Quest for Miracles, Did Fertility 
Clinic Go Too Far?, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at A1. 
 172.  42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (2000). 
 173. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap 
Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which 
Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 844 (1999). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1; see also Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates 
from Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310 (Sept. 
1, 2000). 
 175. Id. § 263a-5. 
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clinics comply with the reporting requirement,176 and the 
President’s Council on Bioethics177 has suggested stronger 
penalties for noncompliance.178  The Act also directs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop a model 
program for the certification of embryo laboratories to be 
carried out by the states,179 which was done in 1999.180  To 
date, the model program has not been adopted in any state.181 
IVF clinics are also affected by more general regulations.  
For example, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement 
Amendments of 1988 amended the Public Heath Service Act182 
to require the certification of “laboratories,” which includes 
facilities that examine “materials derived from the human body 
for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or 
assessment of the health of, human beings.”183  ART facilities 
are not covered by this definition, but the Act does apply to 
andrology and endocrinology tests performed at these 
facilities.184  Requirements under the Act are confined to issues 
of quality control, and states may obtain an exemption from the 
Act if they adopt more stringent laboratory certification 
requirements.185  The Food and Drug Administration also 
exercises jurisdiction over facilities donating, processing, or 
storing of sperm, ova, and embryos through its power to 
                                                          
 176. In the report for 2002, 391 clinics reported data in compliance with 
the Act, and 37 clinics were listed as non-reporting (meaning that their data 
were not reported or that verification was not provided by the clinic medical 
director). See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 
23, at 5-6, 509-10. 
 177. The President’s Council on Bioethics is a Presidential advisory 
committee established by Pres. George W. Bush under the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act “to advise the President on bioethical issues that may emerge 
as a consequence of advances in biomedical science and technology.” Exec. 
Order No. 13,237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
 178. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 210-14. 
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2. 
 180. Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification 
Act of 1992 – A Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 
64 Fed. Reg. 39,374, 39,382 (July 21, 1999). 
 181. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 50. 
 182. Pub L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a (2000)). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a). 
 184. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 63.  However, 
these tests are not covered by the Act when undertaken as an adjunct to the 
performance of ART services.  Id. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(p)(2). 
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prevent the spread of communicable disease and its power to 
regulate drugs, devices and biological products.186  In addition, 
the manufacture of certain devices related to the practice of 
IVF is regulated.187 
Various bodies have considered legislative responses to 
issues raised by IVF and other reproductive technologies.  The 
now defunct Office of Technology Assessment published 
Infertility: Medical and Social Choices in 1988, setting out 
issues raised by the technology.188  More recent official analyses 
of the issues related to reproductive technologies can be found 
in the work of the President’s Council on Bioethics.  Although 
all of the reports issued by the President’s Council touch on 
issues related to the practice of IVF,189 the most relevant is the 
recent report entitled Reproduction & Responsibility: The 
Regulation of New Biotechnologies.190  The New York State 
Task Force on Life and the Law has also issued an influential 
report.191 
The absence of formal government regulation does not 
mean that IVF is necessarily the Wild West of medicine.  
Various professional groups have imposed extra-legal 
standards relating to professional qualifications and the 
manner in which procedures ought to be carried out, as well as 
opinions on what is and is not acceptable.  The bodies that 
currently articulate standards for the practice of IVF in the 
United States are: 
-American Medical Association (AMA).  The AMA’s 
House of Delegates maintains a code of conduct consisting in 
part of nine Principles of medical ethics.192 In addition, the 
                                                          
 186. See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; 
Establishment Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5452-53 (Jan. 19, 
2001).  
 187. 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.6100-.6190 (2004). 
 188. See Princeton Office of Technology Assessment Website, at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005),  
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2005) (describing the legacy of the OTA and providing the text of the report). 
 189. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY (2002); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING 
STEM CELL RESEARCH (2004); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 
74. 
 190. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142. 
 191  N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY 170 (1998). 
 192. AM. MED. ASSOC., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, available at 
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AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs publishes its 
current opinions on how the code applies to specific issues in 
medicine.193  These include opinions relevant to the field of 
reproductive medicine.194 
-American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM), formerly the American Fertility Society. ASRM 
describes itself as a voluntary, non-profit organization 
established “for the advancement of the art, science, and 
practice of reproductive medicine.”195 The Practice Committee 
and Ethics Committee of the ASRM issue guidelines on 
particular topics.196  None of these are mandatory, although 
they are very influential. The ASRM has also adopted a 
Reproductive Laboratory Accreditation Program in conjunction 
with the College of American Pathologists.197 
-Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(SART).  SART describes itself as “the premiere organization 
of professionals dedicated to the practice of ARTs in the United 
States.”198  SART has 370 members, representing over 95% of 
clinics practicing ART.199  SART members must report their 
success rates annually in accordance with federal law (in fact, 
they have been required to report their success rates since 
1987),200 allow inspections, and run or use accredited 
                                                          
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2005). 
 193. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics: 
Current Opinions, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4325.html 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 194. See E-2.055: Ethical Conduct in Assisted Reproductive Technology, at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4325.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2005). 
 195. ASRM Website, at http://www.asrm.org/mission.html (last visited Feb. 
3, 2005). 
 196. See id., at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Practice/practice.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2005), http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/ethicsmain.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 197. See College of American Pathologists Website, at 
http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/laboratory_accreditation/lap_info/specialty.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
 198. SART Website, at http://www.sart.org/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 
20, 2005). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Med. Research Int’l et al., In Vitro Fertilization / Embryo Transfer 
in the United States: 1987 Results from the National IVF-ET Registry, 51 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 13 (1989). There are also retrospective reports for 1985 
and 1986. Med. Research Int’l & Am. Fertility Soc’y Special Interest Group, In 
Vitro Fertilization / Embryo Transfer in the United States: 1985 and 1986 
Results from the National IVF/ET Registry, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 212 
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embryology laboratories.  Members of SART are also obliged to 
comply with ASRM and SART guidelines, with loss of 
membership as the penalty for non-compliance. As of 2001, this 
penalty had never been imposed.201  SART also organizes the 
National Coalition for Oversight of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, which brings together representatives from various 
government agencies and professional, legal, and consumer 
groups to discuss mutual issues.202 
-American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG). Although IVF practitioners need not 
join ACOG, many choose to join both ACOG and the Society for 
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, an organization 
comprised of practitioners certified by the American Board of 
Gynecologists in Obstetrics and Gynecology and the 
subspecialty of Reproductive Endocrinology.203  Membership in 
these organizations is limited to those satisfying certain 
professional requirements.204  Those who do join ACOG may be 
expelled for failure to comply with ACOG’s rules and ethical 
guidelines.205 
Although compliance with ASRM, SART, and ACOG 
standards is not generally compulsory, it may be required in 
particular circumstances.  Some health insurance contracts 
that cover the cost of IVF for patients, for example, limit 
coverage to IVF performed by members of organizations such 
as SART or to procedures complying with guidelines issued by 
ACOG or ASRM.  The reason for this limitation can often be 
found in state insurance requirements.206  However, a person 
with resources and the willingness to travel can obtain 
treatment deemed unethical by the relevant professional 
societies.  Also, many of the guidelines are themselves worded 
                                                          
(1988). 
 201. Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Jean Cohen, IFFS Surveillance 01, 76 
FERTILITY & STERILITY S5, S10 (2001). 
 202. SART Website, at http://www.sart.org/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 
20, 2005). 
 203. See SREI Website, at http://www.socrei.org/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2005). 
 204. See id.; ACOG Website , at 
http://www.acog.org/departments/dept_notice.cfm?recno=22&bulletin=2635 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
 205. See ACOG Website, at http://www.acog.org/from_home/acogcode.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
 206. Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas all limit their 
insurance requirements to services provided at clinics complying with 
professional codes of practice.  See supra note 137. 
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as advice rather than mandatory requirements.207  The 
President’s Council on Bioethics has recommended 
strengthening the enforcement of such professional 
requirements.208 
B.  UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom was where the first IVF child was 
born, and it was among the first countries to consider the 
ethical and legal implications of IVF.  Policies were devised by 
the Medical Research Council as early as March 1979.209  In 
July of 1982, the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology was commissioned.210  Its charge 
was to consider recent and potential developments in medicine 
and science related to human fertilization and embryology; to 
consider what policies and safeguards should be applied, 
including consideration of the social, ethical, and legal 
implications of these developments; and to make 
recommendations.211  Dame Mary Warnock was appointed 
chair of the Committee and its final report, published in July 
1984, became known as the Warnock Report.212  While the 
Report was being prepared, other organizations offered 
guidelines.213  The Warnock Report concluded that IVF was an 
acceptable technique that had passed the research stage and 
become an “established form of treatment for infertility.”214 It 
recommended the establishment of a statutory licensing 
scheme for IVF practitioners, to be administered by a statutory 
authority.215  As an interim measure, in 1985 the Medical 
Research Council and the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists formed a Voluntary Licensing Authority (from 
                                                          
 207. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 186. 
 208. Id. at 192. 
 209. See GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 15. 
 210. Warnock Report, supra note 98, at 1.2. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Med. Research Council (UK), Research Related to Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, 285 BRIT. MED. J. 1480 (1982); British Med. 
Ass’n, Working Group on In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Replacement and 
Transfer, Interim Report on Human In Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo 
Replacement and Transfer, 286 BRIT. MED. J. 1594 (1983); Royal Coll. of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Report of the RCOG Ethics Committee on In 
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Replacement or Transfer (1983), discussed in 
GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 27-31. 
 214. Warnock Report, supra note 98, at 5.15. 
 215. Id. at 13.3. 
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1989, renamed the Interim Licensing Authority) to regulate the 
practice of IVF, including licensing IVF centers.216  The 
Warnock Report was debated in the House of Commons and 
House of Lords soon after its release,217 but it was not until 
December 1986 that the government published a Consultative 
Paper,218 followed by a White Paper in November 1987.219 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (“UK 
Act”),220 which largely implemented the recommendations in 
the Warnock Report, was introduced in 1989, passed by a free 
vote, and received Royal Assent a year later.  The UK Act 
creates three levels of control over IVF and other reproductive 
technologies.221  The first level, the Act itself, directly prohibits 
certain procedures, namely keeping or using an embryo after 
the appearance of the primitive streak,222 placing a human 
embryo in an animal, and replacing the nucleus of the cell of an 
embryo.223  It also instructs practitioners to take account of the 
interests of the child to be born, including its need for a father, 
and to offer counseling.224  The second level consists of 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State for Health 
which, depending on the subject area, either must be placed 
before Parliament and subjected to the possibility of 
annulment, or else must receive positive parliamentary 
approval.225  The third level covers the responsibilities of the 
                                                          
 216. Frances Price, Establishing Guidelines: Regulation and the Clinical 
Management of Infertility, in BIRTHRIGHTS: LAW AND ETHICS AT THE 
BEGINNING OF LIFE 37, 38-39 (Robert Lee & Derek Morgan eds., 1989). 
 217. See Douglas Cusine, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 193-96 (1988). 
 218. See LEGISLATION ON HUMAN INFERTILITY SERVICES AND EMBRYO 
RESEARCH: A CONSULTATION PAPER, 1986, Cm. 46.  This paper suggested 
three alternatives for the control of IVF and related research: (1) a statutory 
authority as recommended in the Warnock Report; (2) licenses issued by the 
Secretary of State for Health, as suggested by some pro-life groups; and (3) 
self-regulation, along the lines of the Voluntary Licensing Authority.  See id. 
at 9-13. 
 219. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND SOC. SEC., HUMAN FERTILISATION AND 
EMBRYOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGISLATION, 1987, Cm. 259. 
 220.  Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990 (U.K.). 
 221. See R (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 
692 at [4]. 
 222. Deemed to have occurred before the “end of the period of 14 days 
beginning with the day the gametes are mixed, not counting any time during 
which the embryo is stored.”  UK Act § 3(4). 
 223. See id. §§ 3(3)(b), (d). 
 224. See id. §§ 13(5), (6). 
 225. See id. § 45. 
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), a non-
departmental public body226 reporting to the Secretary of State 
for Health.  The members of HFEA are appointed in accordance 
with the requirements set out in Schedule One of the UK 
Act.227 These provisions are designed to ensure that HFEA 
includes, but is not controlled by, medical practitioners and 
those involved in the infertility industry.228  HFEA’s role is to 
license clinics and research centers, including imposing license 
conditions, to advise the Secretary of State if called upon, to 
issue directions on certain matters, and to prepare and update 
a Code of Practice.229  The Secretary of State and Parliament 
have some opportunity to monitor HFEA’s activities: the 
Secretary and Parliament are presented with an annual 
report230 as well as an auditor’s report,231 and the Code of 
Practice must be approved by the Secretary of State and laid 
before Parliament.232 
The UK Act regulates IVF by limiting what activities may 
be licensed and controlling the behavior of licensees.  It 
provides for three categories of licenses―treatment, research, 
and storage.233  An application for a license is handled by a 
licensing committee, which is a subcommittee of HFEA.234  An 
application for a license is followed by an inspection of the 
premises.235  Interim inspections continue to take place 
annually with additional spot checks, and the license must be 
renewed every three years.236  It is possible to appeal to HFEA 
from the decision of a licensing committee on the merits,237 and 
there is also the possibility of judicial review to correct an error 
of law.238 
                                                          
 226.  HFEA is nominally independent of the public service but relies upon 
government funding. 
 227. See id. § 5; see also id. sch. 1, para. 4. 
 228. See id. sch. 1, para. 4. 
 229. See UK Act, §§ 8, 9, 11, 23, 25. 
 230. See id. § 7(1). 
 231. See id. § 6(3). 
 232. See id. § 26(4). 
 233. See id. § 11. 
 234. See id. § 9. 
 235. See UK Act § 9(7). 
 236. See HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., THIRTEENTH 
ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2003/04, at 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/HFEAPublications/AnnualReport/ (last visited Mar. 
28, 2005). 
 237. See UK Act § 20. 
 238. See id. § 21. 
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The first Code of Practice was published in 1991, with 
subsequent editions in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2003 (the 
sixth edition came into effect in March 2004).  These revisions 
were necessary to address practical problems, new procedures, 
new information, and changing legal requirements.239  Section 
25(6) of the UK Act provides that, although a failure to observe 
a provision of the Code of Practice does not create liability, it 
may be taken into account by a licensing committee considering 
whether there has been a failure to comply with the conditions 
of a license or whether a license ought to be varied or revoked. 
The current edition of the Code includes both requirements 
and statements of proper conduct.240  Breaches of the Code 
must be promptly reported to HFEA.241  The Code of Practice is 
significantly more detailed than the Voluntary Licensing 
Authority guidelines it replaced.242  According to a survey 
published in 1994, clinics are generally satisfied with the 
system of licensing and the Code of Practice.243 
The Public Health Minister announced in January 2004 
that the Department of Health will begin to review the UK Act, 
followed by full public consultation in 2005.244  The reasons 
given for the review included the need to ensure that “the Act 
remains effective in the 21st century,” and was said to be in 
response to, inter alia, new procedures and technologies as well 
as changing public perceptions of assisted reproduction.245  It is 
likely that HFEA will eventually be merged with the Human 
Tissue Authority, as established under the Human Tissue Act 
                                                          
 239. Lynn Hagger, The Role of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, 3 MED. L. INT’L 1, 5-6 (1997). 
 240. See HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF 
PRACTICE 12 (6th ed. 2003). 
 241. See id. para. 2.25. 
 242. The first Code of Practice was forty pages, compared with four pages 
of guidelines.  See GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 116. 
 243. See B.A. Lieberman et al., The UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 – How Well is it Functioning?, 9 HUM. REPROD. 1779, 
1779 (1994) (73% of clinics reported that they were satisfied with the system of 
licensing and 78% felt that the Code of Practice was working well). 
 244. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REVIEW OF THE HUMAN FERTILISATION AND 
EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990 (2004), available at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/HealthAndSocialCareTopics/Assiste
dConception/AssistedConceptionGeneralInformation/AssistedConceptionGene
ralArticle/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4069149&chk=MSMizC (last visited Jan. 31, 
2005). 
 245. Id. 
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2004.246 
Professional organizations in the United Kingdom also 
have a role in monitoring the practice of IVF and related 
technologies.  For example, the Association of Clinical 
Embryologists, representing over 90% of embryologists in the 
UK,247 maintains a Code of Conduct, and members are required 
to sign a form stating their willingness to comply.248  The Code 
contains laudable, but general, goals such as safeguarding 
patient interests and exercising due care.249   Non-compliance 
with the code may constitute professional misconduct and 
entail loss of registration as a clinical embryologist.  The Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists also publishes 
clinical guidelines on the assessment and treatment of 
infertility problems.250  This offers advice on what are best 
practices, but does not constitute a mandatory code.251  
Presumably because of extensive government regulation, 
professional bodies have been less involved in the oversight of 
IVF in the United Kingdom than in the United States and 
Australia.252 
C.  NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA 
Like the United States, Australia has a federal system in 
which the regulation of medical practice is generally left to the 
states.  Jurisdiction over the determination of parental rights is 
split, with the federal government having power to determine 
such rights only in the context of divorce or matrimonial 
causes.253  Determination of parental rights for all purposes 
                                                          
 246. Human Tissue Act, 2004 (U.K.); HUMAN FERTILISATION AND 
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, supra  note 236, at 12. 
 247. Press Release, Association of Clinical Embryologists, available at 
http://ace.ivf.net/ace/press.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 248. ASS’N OF CLINICAL EMBRYOLOGISTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT FOR CLINICAL EMBRYOLOGISTS (2d ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.ace.ivf.net/ace/coc2004.doc. (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 249. See id. 
 250. NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR WOMEN’S AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH, 
CLINICAL GUIDELINE, FERTILITY – ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE 
WITH FERTILITY PROBLEMS (Feb. 2004), available at 
http://www.rcog.org.uk/resources/Public/Fertility_full.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 
2005). 
 251. See id. at 1. 
 252. See Martin H. Johnson, Should the Use of Assisted Reproduction 
Techniques be Deregulated?: The UK Experience: Options for Change, 13 HUM. 
REPROD. 1769, 1774-75 (1998). 
 253. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. 1, pt. V, § 51(xxii). 
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therefore requires both state and federal legislation.  The 
federal Family Law Act includes a section regarding parentage 
of children born as a result of artificial conception 
procedures.254  The provisions of that section only apply if in 
accord with state law.  In New South Wales, the Status of 
Children Act 1996 is the relevant law.255  Reading the two acts 
together, a child born to a married woman as a result of 
fertilization procedures such as IVF carried out with the 
consent256 of both spouses is presumed to be a child of the 
woman and her husband.257  The same applies for co-habiting 
unmarried heterosexual couples.258 
There is no comprehensive state regulation of IVF in New 
South Wales.  This is not for lack of consideration.  In October 
1983, the Attorney General of New South Wales asked the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission to inquire into and 
report on the need to make laws with respect to ART.259  The 
Commission issued a Discussion Paper in 1987 and its final 
report in 1988.260  Compared to the Warnock Committee in the 
United Kingdom, the Commission expressed greater confidence 
in the possibility of professional self-regulation and greater 
doubt about the benefits of legislative schemes, in part because 
of their tendency to become “almost immediately obsolete.”261  
The recommended approach was to deal with matters of 
“fundamental importance” in legislation and to establish an 
                                                          
 254. See Family Law Act, 1975, § 60H (Austl.) (as amended by the Family 
Law (Amendment) Act, 1987, § 24 (Austl.) inserting § 60H, titled “Children 
Born as a Result of Artificial Conception Procedures,” into the Family Law 
Act). 
 255. See Status of Children Act, 1996 (N.S.W.). 
 256. Consent is presumed. See id. § 14(5); Family Law Act, 1975, § 60H 
(Austl.). 
 257. See Status of Children Act, 1996, § 14(1) (N.S.W.); Family Law Act, 
1975, § 60H (Austl.). 
 258. See Status of Children Act, 1996, § 14(6) (N.S.W.); Family Law Act, 
1975, § 60H(4) (Austl.). 
 259. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REP. NO. 58, 
ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION xv-xvi (1988), available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R58toc (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005). 
 260. See id. 
 261. Id. at 2.17, 4.1.  Similar sentiments were expressed by the then-Law 
Reform Commissioner.  Russell Scott, Experimenting and the New Biology: A 
Consummation Devoutly to be Wished, in 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS (Sydney 1986), cited in Helen Szoke, The Nanny 
State or Responsible Government?, 9 J.L. & MED. 470, 476 (2002). 
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independent body that would operate similarly to HFEA.262  
However, no legislation along the lines recommended by the 
Commission was enacted. 
A national approach to regulation was suggested by the 
Family Law Council of Australia in 1985.263  The Council 
suggested establishing a national body to advise federal and 
state governments as well as the community on the 
implications of reproductive technologies and develop ethical 
and practice guidelines.264  No such body was established, 
although a National Bioethics Consultative Committee was set 
up and it produced a number of reports on bioethical issues.265  
Eventually, the Australian Health and Welfare Ministers 
decided at a joint meeting to transfer responsibility for advising 
on bioethical issues to the National Health and Medical 
Research Council (NHMRC), a statutory authority266 operating 
as the major funding body for medical research in Australia.267 
The regulation of IVF is thus left to non-mandatory 
guidelines.  The Fertility Society of Australia began issuing 
standards for the practice of reproductive medicine in 1986, 
with the publication of the Code of Practice for Centers using 
Assisted Reproductive Technology.  In 1987, it established the 
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC), 
allocating to it the responsibility for recommending changes in 
the Code as required, reviewing applications for accreditation, 
monitoring compliance with the Code, encouraging good 
practice among clinics, and publishing lists of accredited 
clinics.268  Some practices, such as transferring a human 
                                                          
 262. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REP. NO. 58,  supra 
note 259, at 4.2-4.10 (1988). 
 263. See FAMILY LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., CREATING CHILDREN: A 
UNIFORM APPROACH TO THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA (1993).  The Family Law Council’s role is to advice 
the Attorney-General of Australia on matters related to family law.  See 
Family Law Act, 1975, § 115 (Austl.). 
 264. See FAMILY LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., CREATING CHILDREN: A 
UNIFORM APPROACH TO THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA 107 (1993). 
 265. H.W. Gordon Baker, Problems with the Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology: A Clinician’s Perspective, 9 J.L. & MED. 457, 468 
(2002). 
 266. See National Health and Medical Research Council Act, 1992 (Austl.). 
 267. Helen Szoke, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: The 
State of Play in Australia, in CONTROVERSIES IN HEALTH LAW 240, 243 (Ian 
Freckelton & Kerry Petersen eds., 1999). 
 268. FERTILITY SOC’Y OF AUSTL., REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
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embryo to an animal uterus, are described as “not acceptable” 
in the RTAC Guidelines.269  RTAC conducts regular audits to 
monitor compliance with the Guidelines and reviews 
accreditation periodically (clinics are normally accredited for 
three years).270  RTAC also requires that accredited clinics 
comply with guidelines issued by the NHMRC.271 
The NHMRC guidelines, like the RTAC guidelines, are not 
mandatory. The first NHMRC statement on IVF was published 
in 1982.272  Following public consultation, the NHMRC 
published Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology in 1996.273  Although focused primarily on research, 
the Guidelines also addressed innovations in clinical practice, 
as well as ordinary clinical issues such as consent, counseling, 
and record-keeping.274 As in the RTAC guidelines, some 
practices were described as “ethically unacceptable” and 
“prohibited.”275  The NHMRC required that those offering 
reproductive technology services also obtain accreditation from 
RTAC and comply with RTAC guidelines.  A revised set of 
guidelines, with greater emphasis on clinical issues, was 
released in 2004.276 
In 2002, two federal statutes, the Research Involving 
Human Embryos Act, 2002 (Austl.) and the Prohibition of 
Human Cloning Act, 2002 (Austl.), were enacted. They have 
been either adopted or mirrored in state law.  The former Act 
regulates the use of “excess ART embryos,”277 and in particular 
                                                          
ACCREDITATION COMMITTEE, CODE OF PRACTICE FOR CENTRES USING 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 4 (2002). 
 269. See id. at 11. 
 270. See id. at 12. 
 271. See id. at 11. 
 272. NAT’L HEALTH AND MED. COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 4: STATEMENT ON IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (Sept. 3, 1982). 
 273. NAT’L HEALTH AND MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (1996), available at 
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/rescinded/pdf/e28.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 274. Id. at iv. 
 275. Id. at 15. 
 276. AUSTRALIAN HEALTH ETHICS COMM., NAT’L HEALTH AND MED. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH, DRAFT 
FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2004), available at 
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/e56syn.htm (last visited Apr. 
7, 2005). 
 277. Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 145, 2002, § 9 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.health.gov.au/nhmrc/embryo/pdf/embryact.pdf (last 
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research on such embryos.278 Such use must be licensed unless 
it is one of a number of specified uses ordinarily carried out in 
the course of clinical practice.279  The latter Act prohibits the 
creation of a human embryo clone for any purpose as well as 
various other activities, some of which had already been 
banned.280 
The cooperation between state and federal governments on 
legislation relating to cloning and research on embryos was the 
result of agreement reached by the Council of Australian 
Governments.281  This Council also considered the possibility of 
a uniform approach to the regulation of ARTs.282  On April 5, 
2002, it agreed that national consistency could be achieved 
largely through the existing reliance on professional self-
regulation through RTAC.283 
Although RTAC accreditation and compliance with RTAC 
and NHMRC guidelines are not mandatory, there are strong 
incentives for compliance. For example, only clinics accredited 
by RTAC can access drugs through the government-funded 
program284 and only clinics complying with NHMRC guidelines 
                                                          
visited Apr. 7, 2005).  This term is defined to refer to those embryos created in 
the course of treatment that beyond the reproductive needs of the woman or 
couple for whom they were created.  
 278. Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 22, 2003, §§ 3, 5  (Austl., 
N.S.W.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pastereg/3/1783/top.htm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 279. Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 145, 2002, § 10 (Austl.), 
available at http:// http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/embryo/pdf/embryact.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005).  As discussed in the text accompanying notes 288 and 
289 infra, some of these activities are only exempt if carried out by an 
infertility center accredited by RTAC. 
 280.  Id. at §§ 13-23; Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 22, 
2003, §§ 8-18 (Austl., N.S.W.), available at 
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pastereg/3/1783/top.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2005); Gene Technology Act, No. 169, 2000, §§ 192B-D (Austl). 
 281. The Council of Australian Governments comprises the Prime 
Minister, the Premier of each state, the Chief Minister of each territory, and 
the President of the Australian Local Government Association. 
 282. Communique, Council of Australian Governments’ Meeting, June 8, 
2001, available at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/080601/index.htm#cloning 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 283. Communique, Council of Australian Governments’ Meeting, Apr. 5, 
2002, Attachment:  Arrangements for Nationally-Consistent Bans on Human 
Cloning and Other Unacceptable Practices, and Use of Excess Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ART) Embryos,  paras. 11-13, available at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/050402/cloning.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
 284. Szoke, supra note 267, at 244. 
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can receive public research funds.285  Further, failure to comply 
with guidelines may have consequences in a tort action or an 
action for breach of employment contract286, and may create 
adverse publicity.287 More recently, the Research Involving 
Human Embryos Act, 2002 (Austl.) has created additional 
incentives for clinics to obtain RTAC accreditation.  For 
example, the use of excess embryos that are not biologically fit 
for implantation for diagnostic purposes and the reproductive 
use of donor embryos are only exempt from the licensing 
requirements in the Act if carried out by an RTAC-accredited 
clinic.288 More importantly, it is an offence to intentionally 
“use” a human embryo that is not an “excess ART embryo” 
outside the body of a woman except for a purpose relating to 
the treatment of a woman carried out by an RTAC-accredited 
clinic.289 It is unclear what constitutes “use” of an embryo 
outside the body of a woman, but if preparing an embryo for 
transfer to a woman were to constitute “use,” the new law 
would effectively require that all IVF clinics be accredited by 
RTAC.290 
In 2003, the New South Wales Health Department 
released a draft Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 
following public consultation beginning in 1997.291  The 
                                                          
 285. National Health and Medical Research Council Act, No. 255, 1992, § 
51(3) (Austl.).  This provides that recipients of government funds must comply 
with NHMRC guidelines that relate to the ethical conduct of medical research 
involving humans. Paragraph 11 of the NHMRC NATIONAL STATEMENT ON 
ETHICAL CONDUCT IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS (1999) specifically refers 
to the NHMRC ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY (1996). 
 286.  At least where the employment contract requires the employee to 
comply with NHMRC and/or RTAC guidelines. 
 287. Loane Skene, An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 31, 47-48 (2000). 
 288. Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 145, §§ 10(2)(d), (e) 
(2002) (Austl.), available at http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/embryo/pdf/embryact.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005).  These provisions came into force on June 19, 2003.  
They came into force under New South Wales law on Oct. 1, 2003. N.S.W.  
Government Gazette No. 154, Sept. 26, 2003, at 9522. 
 289. Research Involving Human Embryos Act, No. 145, 2002, § 11 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/embryo/pdf/embryact.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2005). 
 290. Id. 
 291. NEW SOUTH WALES DEP’T OF HEALTH, DISCUSSION PAPER: REVIEW OF 
THE HUMAN TISSUE ACT, 1983 (1997), available at 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/csd/llsb/legislation/artqxd.pdf (last visited Apr. 
7, 2005); NEW SOUTH WALES DEP’T OF HEALTH, CONSULTATION DRAFT BILL: 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY BILL (Dec. 2003), available at 
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Department concluded that: 
a combination of health professional and private health facility 
regulation with significant self-regulation, has been effective in 
respect of many of the clinical aspects of ART. However a range of 
issues relating to the social and ethical aspects of ART were identified 
as needing to be addressed through specific legislation.292 
The draft Bill provides for the registration of practitioners and 
allows the Director General of the Department of Health to 
prohibit persons from carrying on a business that provides ART 
services “if there are reasonable grounds to do so” and, in 
particular, if the person has breached relevant legislation.293  
There is a separate requirement that treatment be provided by, 
or under the supervision of, a medical practitioner.294  Other 
parts of the Bill deal with surrogacy, infection control 
standards, the requirement that counseling be made available, 
the provision of information to patients and gamete donors, 
requirements for the consent of gamete providers, and 
establishment of a central gamete donor register to allow 
gamete donors and their offspring to find out select information 
about each other.295 
D.  VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
At approximately the same time as the Warnock 
Committee was considering issues related to reproductive 
technology in the United Kingdom, a similar committee was 
considering the same issues in Victoria.  Known as the Waller 
committee,296 this group worked between May 1982 and August 
1984.  It issued an interim report in 1982, unanimously 
agreeing that IVF for married couples with their own gametes 
was ethically acceptable.297  The report seemed to take for 
                                                          
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/csd/llsb (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 292. NEW SOUTH WALES DEP’T OF HEALTH, INFORMATION GUIDE, 
CONSULTATION DRAFT: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY BILL, § 1.1 
(2003) available at 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/csd/llsb/legislation/Informationguide.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 293. CONSULTATION DRAFT BILL, supra note 291, at pt. 2,  div. 1, cls. 7, 59. 
 294. Id. at cl. 11. 
 295. Id. at pts. 2-5. 
 296. Its official title was the “Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical 
and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization.” 
 297. VICTORIAN GOV’T COMM. TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILISATION: INTERIM REPORT para. 
5.5 (Sept. 1982), reprinted in PETER SINGER AND DEANE WELLS, MAKING 
BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CONTRACEPTION 192-93 (1984). 
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granted the notion that any restrictions on the practice of IVF 
ought to be contained in legislation, as opposed to 
administrative or professional requirements.298  A second 
report regarding donor gametes was published in 1983.299  The 
third and final report was published in 1984, dealing with 
further procedures, including cryopreservation of embryos, 
embryo experimentation, and surrogate motherhood.300 
In 1984, two companion bills were passed by the Victorian 
Parliament: the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act301 and the 
Status of Children (Amendment) Act.302  The latter concerns 
parentage of children, and corresponds roughly to the 
equivalent New South Wales provisions.303  The former, later 
amended by the Infertility (Medical Procedures) (Amendment) 
Act, 1987, came into force in stages between 1984 and 1988.  
This Act was the first legislation regulating IVF and related 
techniques in the world.304  It largely followed the 
recommendations of the Waller committee.  The Act prohibited 
cloning and cross-fertilization between human gametes and 
animal gametes.305  IVF itself was permitted, but only if carried 
out by approved hospitals on married couples306 who were 
either infertile or at risk of passing on a genetic disease, 
consented to the procedure, and received counseling.307 
                                                          
 298. Id. at par. 5.10.2; Louis Waller, Australia: The Law and Infertility – 
the Victorian Experience, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION 17, 20 
(Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1992). 
 299. VICTORIAN GOV’T COMM. TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILISATION: REPORT ON DONOR 
GAMETES IN IVF (Aug. 1983), reprinted in PETER SINGER AND DEANE WELLS, 
MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CONTRACEPTION 194-96 (1984). 
 300. VICTORIAN GOV’T COMM. TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILISATION: REPORT ON THE 
DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (Aug. 1984) 
reprinted in PETER SINGER AND DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF CONTRACEPTION 196-97 (1984). 
 301.  Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, No. 10,163, 1984 (Austl., Vic.). 
 302. Status of Children Act, No. 8602, 1974 (Austl., Vic.).  
 303. Current Victorian provisions are in the Status of Children Act, No. 
8602, 1974, §§. 10A-10F (Austl., Vic.). 
 304. Price, supra note 216, at 38. 
 305. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, No. 10,163, 1984, §§ 6(1), 6(2) 
(Austl., Vic.). 
 306. There was an exception for unmarried, cohabitating heterosexual 
couples who had already commenced treatment. Id. § 3(2). This type of 
limitation has been held to be contrary to federal anti-discrimination law and 
therefore invalid. McBain v. State of Victoria (2000) 1009 FCA 116, 123. 
 307. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, No. 10163, 1984, §§ 10-13  
(Austl., Vic.). 
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In 1995, a replacement Act was passed, the Infertility 
Treatment Act.308  The direct prohibitions in that Act are 
broader than those in the 1984 Act.309 It also created 
mandatory requirements in relation to gamete and embryo 
storage, record keeping, and confidentiality.310  As in the earlier 
legislation, access to IVF was restricted,311 and consent and 
counseling were made mandatory.312 Breach of the Act’s 
requirements can lead to criminal penalties.313 In addition, the 
1995 Act established a system of approvals of those carrying 
out the procedures and licenses of the premises where the 
procedures are carried out.314 
The 1995 Act also established the Infertility Treatment 
Authority (ITA) to administer the licensing and approvals 
systems under the Act, including formulating license 
conditions.315  One licensing condition imposed by ITA is a 
requirement that licensed centers be accredited by RTAC.316  
The licensing process is undertaken simultaneously with the 
RTAC accreditation process; RTAC addresses technical, 
scientific, and clinical matters and the ITA looks at legal 
compliance.317 
Compared to the regime in the United Kingdom, however, 
the Minister of Health and the ITA have relatively little power 
to keep the legislation up to date.  In Victoria, regulations must 
relate to one of a number of topics itemized in the Act.318  The 
regulations power in the United Kingdom is broader; for 
example, regulations can prohibit or require licenses for 
conduct not mentioned in the Act.319  
                                                          
 308.  Infertility Treatment Act, No. 63, 1995 (Austl., Vic.). 
 309. Id. at pt. 5, div. 1. 
 310. Id. at pt. 5, div. 2, and pt. 7. 
 311. Id. at pt. 8. 
 312. Id. at pt. 8, div. 2 and pts. 9, 11. Additional consent requirements exist 
when donor gametes are used. 
 313. Id. at pt. 8, div. 5 (establishes that violations result in “480 penalty 
units or 4 years imprisonment or both”). 
 314. Infertility Treatment Act, pt. 8. 
 315. Id. at pt. 9, div. 1. 
 316. INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTH., CONDITIONS FOR LICENCE: 
APPLICATIONS FOR LICENCES BY HOSPITALS AND DAY PROCEDURE CENTRES 2.1 
(5th ed. 2004), available at http://www.ita.org.au (last visited Apr. 7, 2005) 
(referring to provisions of section 93 of the Infertility Act (1995)). 
 317. INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 9, available 
at http://www.ita.org.au (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 318. See Infertility Treatment Act, No. 63, 1995, pt. 13, § 165 (Austl., Vic.). 
 319.  Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990, §§ 3(3)(c), 
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E.  TYPES OF RESPONSES 
Each of the jurisdictions discussed here has adopted a 
different response to the issues raised by IVF.  Throughout 
most of the United States, there is little legislation aimed at 
controlling the practice of IVF.  Federal legislation is primarily 
used to correct perceived market flaws, for example by 
centralizing the collection of information and comparing the 
performance of IVF clinics.320  A few states, such as Louisiana, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Virginia have laws 
prescribing the manner in which IVF procedures must be 
carried out.321  More pervasive than legislation are guidelines 
provided by professional associations.  New South Wales is 
similar, except that there are greater pressures on clinics to 
comply with RTAC guidelines. 
Two jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and Victoria, have 
introduced legislation with the goal of regulating IVF.  A 
significant difference between the two Acts is the extent to 
which the legislature intends its instructions to apply directly 
to private parties, rather than through an administrative 
body.322  The UK Act contains a broader regulations power and 
grants more discretion to HFEA.  
The legal uncertainties arising with the introduction of 
IVF have also been dealt with differently in each jurisdiction. 
In some parts of the United States, for example, there are laws 
clarifying who may exercise control over embryos, parentage of 
an IVF child, and the circumstances in which an IVF child can 
inherit.323  The overall result is patchy, with some jurisdictions 
resolving issues legislatively, and most other jurisdictions 
relying on the courts to resolve the issues as they arise.  In 
Australia, issues surrounding parentage of IVF children are 
resolved for some, but not all, situations and many new 
                                                          
4(2)-(4), sch. 2, para. 1(g) (U.K.).  
 320. On the use of compulsory reporting as a form of regulation in the 
health care context, see generally William M. Sage, Regulating Through 
Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1701 (1999). 
 321. See supra notes 143, 144, 153 and accompanying text. 
 322. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381 (1989) (Rubin explains that “within the category of 
external statutes [statutes addressing the behavior of private parties], there is 
an enormous variation in the extent to which the legislation specifies the 
effects on private parties that it wants the implementation mechanism to 
produce.”). 
 323. See supra notes 143-155 and accompanying text. 
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questions remain unanswered.  The United Kingdom has 
sought to resolve uncertainties surrounding parentage, 
inheritance and control of embryos by legislation. 
IV.  COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
As a result of decisions made at the legislative level, the 
regulation of IVF and the resolution of uncertainties arising in 
its wake have taken place in different institutions in each of 
the jurisdictions described in Part III above. Thus legislatures, 
administrative agencies, professional societies, and courts have 
had different roles in determining how IVF is practiced and in 
answering legal questions posed by IVF-related conduct. 
Various schools of thought have emerged on the proper role 
of legislators, administrators, and judges in the development of 
the law.  The “legal process” school attempted to document the 
function of each institution in the legal system based on its 
area of competence.324 Although this movement has fallen out 
of favor following criticism from law and economics and critical 
legal studies scholars, the idea of comparing decisional 
institutions has not.325 
Nevertheless, in the context of urging the law to adapt to 
technological change, comparisons between institutions are 
usually made fleetingly and are overwhelmed by the 
substantive issue.  Thus, the discovery and use of a new 
product or process is frequently followed by commentary 
identifying new ambiguities or criticizing the content or scope 
of existing law.326  Rarely is there any detailed discussion of the 
means by which the law ought to be changed, and proposals for 
reform usually assume that legislation or the establishment of 
an administrative body provide the best means of resolving the 
problem identified. 
At least one commentator has observed that legislative 
reform can sometimes cause as much harm as good.  In his 
book, Limits,327 Roger Dworkin undertook a detailed 
                                                          
 324. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William 
N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tentative edit., 1958). 
 325. See Edward L. Rubin, Commentary: The New Legal Process, the 
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1393, 1403-04 (1996). See also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 915 (2003). 
 326. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
 327.  ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
560 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
comparison of legal responses to bioethical questions in the 
rapidly advancing fields of biology and medicine.328 Dworkin 
explored the dangers of relying on constitutional law or 
legislation rather than allowing time for common law evolution 
in response to bioethical issues such as those arising out of 
sterilization techniques, assisted reproduction, and the 
availability of genetic information. He concluded that “[g]iven 
our present legal institutions and any that seem likely to 
emerge, the soundest response to a social issue posed by 
biomedical advance is to begin by assuming that no legal 
response is necessary” and that “[i]f a legal response to a 
problem is necessary, the common law should be the 
presumptive first-line response.”329  The legislature and 
government should only intervene where “a real problem exists 
that the common law is demonstrably incapable of dealing 
with.”330 
Dworkin’s conclusions are expressed broadly, 
encompassing all the temptations that a government might 
have to intervene.  However, it is not that simple.  For a start, 
legislation, the common law, and the market are “imperfect 
alternatives”; each has disadvantages that make it unsuitable 
in some situations.331  Further, it is not necessarily the case 
that the same institution provides the best solution for each of 
the four types of challenge the law faces following technological 
change. Nevertheless, there are some general factors to 
consider in evaluating the capacity of different institutions to 
resolve the sorts of problems brought about by technological 
change. 
A.  PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST GROUP CONFLICT 
Any claim that the law needs to change in a particular way 
following technological change is contestable.  Part II explained 
how technological change can generate reasons to implement a 
ban, regulate new practices, resolve uncertainty, repeal 
existing rules, or alter the scope of existing rules.  Whether 
these reasons will persuade and override arguments that 
change is unnecessary or counterproductive will depend on the 
                                                          
DECISION MAKING (1996). 
 328. See generally id. 
 329. Id. at 169-170. 
 330. Id. at 170. 
 331. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
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specifics.  Various scholars are likely to take different positions 
on whether and how the law ought to adapt.  In the real world, 
interest groups will inevitably take different positions. 
For example, the possibility of IVF raises the question of 
whether it ought to be banned, restricted, discouraged, or 
encouraged with government funds.  At least in the 1970s and 
1980s, arguments were made in favor of each of these positions, 
and these arguments appealed to different social groups.  Some 
religious conservatives supporting a ban on IVF expounded 
arguments against unnatural reproduction and destruction of 
embryos; radical feminists generally came down on the same 
side, but for different reasons; libertarians favored non-
interference; and other groups, such as the infertile and 
infertility specialists had a more personal interest in the 
debate. 
Where a new technology challenges interests or values, 
some or all groups may seek to bring their arguments to the 
attention of legislators. Where the issue at stake is within the 
power of an administrative agency or a court, individuals and 
groups with a personal or philosophical stake may, to the 
extent permitted, present their views to that body.  It is 
therefore impossible to compare institutions without 
considering the manner in which they are likely to be 
influenced by competing interest groups. 
The influence of different interest groups is difficult to 
measure precisely.  In general, however, the greater the 
participation by people with a particular viewpoint in a 
decision-making process, the more likely it is that viewpoint 
will prevail.332  This is because all decision-making processes 
rely, directly or indirectly, on the involvement of outsiders for 
their information.  The effect of participation on outcomes is 
perhaps even stronger when the subject matter is technical; in 
such cases, decision-makers rely heavily on the expertise of 
others.  Scientific and technical explanations can themselves 
become powerful vehicles for advocacy, the seeming objectivity 
often disguising the biases of the author.333  When those with 
expertise have a particular viewpoint, or only one viewpoint is 
represented in the technical material submitted to and 
                                                          
 332. Id. at 54-56. 
 333. See, e.g., Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and Political Conflict: 
Analyzing the Issues, in CONTROVERSY: THE POLITICS OF TECHNICAL 
DECISIONS 9, 17 (Dorothy Nelkin ed., 2d ed. 1984) (explaining that expert 
opinions in an area of controversy are often related to political values). 
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considered by the decision-maker, the impact can be 
substantial. 
People are more likely to participate in politics or court 
proceedings if their interest in the outcome is sufficiently high 
to make it worth the investment of time.  In the case of politics, 
perspectives are more likely to be presented and considered if 
represented by a group that is sufficiently active and 
collectively powerful to attract the interest of politicians.  When 
the members of a large, diverse group each have only a small 
interest in the outcome, generally only the intervention of a 
catalytic subgroup will create the momentum needed to 
facilitate political influence.334  When a majority becomes 
actively interested in an issue, however, its sheer size gives it 
significant political influence.335  Thus interest group 
participation can lead to minoritarian or majoritarian bias.336 
Because courts and legislators rely on different sources for 
information and ask different types of questions, they may 
reach different conclusions as to what the law ought to be.  
Because legislators are less confined in the range of 
considerations they may take into account, they can be strongly 
influenced by interest group pressures.  Political decisions will 
be biased towards groups that are organized and politically 
powerful.  Courts, on the other hand, will be strongly 
influenced by the position of the parties presenting the issue to 
the court.  Those with an interest in the outcome who are not 
parties to the proceedings in which an issue is raised are at a 
significant disadvantage in presenting information and 
arguments to the court.  Thus an embryo’s right to life is more 
likely to be taken account of in legislation in those jurisdictions 
where this right has political support than in a courtroom.  
Louisiana, for example, requires that unwanted embryos be 
donated to another couple, even if this is contrary to the wishes 
of the gamete providers.337  Some other states prohibit the 
destruction of embryos.338  Yet, although the courts in several 
                                                          
 334. KOMESAR, supra note 331, at 82-84. 
 335. Id. at 74. 
 336. Id. at 97. 
 337. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129-130 (West 2003).  The constitutionality of 
these provisions have not been tested. 
 338. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1.2 (West 2002) (prohibiting killing any 
unborn child, defined as an “individual of the human species from fertilization 
until birth”); MINN. STAT. ANN.. §§ 609.266–.2691 (West 2003) (providing for 
various offenses against unborn children, defined to be “the unborn offspring 
of a human conceived, but not yet born”);  N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 
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jurisdictions have considered the fate of frozen embryos, the 
rights of the gamete providers (who were parties to the action) 
have been controlling, not an embryo’s right to life.339  Thus, 
the existence of interest group conflict will have an effect on the 
choice of institutional response to technological change and the 
consequences of that choice. 
B.  GOAL-ORIENTED COMPARISON 
The existence of interest group conflict makes it essential 
that institutional comparisons be made in the context of a 
particular goal. Otherwise, disagreement about which 
institution ought to deal with a particular issue can mask 
disagreement about what the resolution ought to be. Where 
there is extensive controversy over ends, arguments about 
means play a justifiably minor role.  For this reason, it is best 
to refrain from comparing potential, different institutional 
means for achieving contested objectives. 
The comparison of institutions is likely to be more fruitful 
when there is relative consensus on the goals to be achieved; 
the performance of different institutions can then be measured. 
Yet complete agreement on goals is impossible.  Controversies 
continue over the extent to which patient autonomy should be 
sacrificed for the sake of health, safety, and consumer 
protection. 
 
V.  NEW REGULATORY MEASURES 
A.  TYPES OF REGULATION 
As discussed in Part II.D above, technological change can 
create reasons to enact new laws.  In the case of IVF, people 
may be concerned that the technology involves health and 
safety risks to practitioners, patients, or children-to-be, or 
undermines social values considered important, such as human 
                                                          
(Michie 2003) (requiring that embryos be transferred to a woman to avoid 
clinical experimentation restrictions); WIS. STAT. ANN.. § 940.04 (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2004) (prohibiting destruction of an unborn child, defined as a human 
being from conception until live birth). 
 339. See infra Part VI.D.  Although the embryo’s right to life was 
considered relevant by the trial court in Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 
140495, at *9, *11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), this approach was rejected 
on appeal. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 13, 1990);  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992). 
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dignity, family values, equality, and fairness. While this has 
not led to a ban, it has led in some jurisdictions to restrictions. 
There are various means (often used in combination) by 
which technology might be controlled: 
-Approval (technology): requiring that any new product 
or process in a particular category obtain advance approval or a 
license from a public or private body; 
-Approval (people): requiring that manufacturers, 
technologists, or users be approved or licensed by a public or 
private body; 
-Criteria340 (technology): requiring that a new product 
meet certain design specifications or a new process only be 
performed in a specific way; 
-Criteria (people): requiring that manufacturers, 
technologists, or users possess certain qualifications or 
characteristics; and 
-Criteria (performance): requiring that a new product or 
process meet certain performance indicators. 
Approval regimes can be used to regulate an established 
class of products or processes by requiring that new members of 
that class be approved by a designated body, usually an 
administrative agency.  For example, the UK Act requires that 
each entity performing a new procedure involving in vitro 
fertilization of human gametes or donated gametes for the first 
time obtain a license to do so from HFEA.341 However, approval 
regimes are only useful in regulating new members of a class of 
established technologies; by the time the UK Act was enacted 
in 1990, reproductive technologies were an established class. 
Where new types of technology enter the stage, there may be no 
approvals regime in place.  At that point, a decision must be 
made whether to ban or regulate the new technology and 
whether to impose a regime to govern future similar 
technologies.  Of course, new technologies might be included 
within broadly drafted existing approval regimes. In the United 
States, for example, the Food and Drug Administration invoked 
its authority over drugs, devices and biologics in order to 
                                                          
 340. The word “standards” is often used in place of the word “criteria.” The 
latter has been chosen here to avoid confusion with the use of the word 
“standard” as the opposite of “rule.” 
 341. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990, §§ 16, 17  
(U.K.); HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE 
1.5-1.19 (6th ed. 2003). 
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effectively ban human cloning.342 In the United Kingdom, 
HFEA was able to use its existing powers to consider whether 
to license clinics to perform genetic testing and tissue typing of 
embryos prior to transfer in order to determine which embryos 
would be both free of genetic disease and a suitable tissue 
match for a sick sibling.343 
Criteria requirements specify characteristics that the 
technology or persons associated with it must possess.  These 
requirements might be either rule-like, in that the content of 
the requirement is specified in advance, or standard-like, in 
that the content of the requirement remains vague until 
applied in a specific case.344  Rule-like restrictions on the 
technology itself offer precise guidelines to technologists, and 
the deterrence effect is strong.  The main drawback is the 
possibility that technology will become frozen in its current 
state of development, hindering further improvements in 
efficacy and safety.345 The extent of this problem will depend on 
the nature of the rule adopted; in some cases, benefits of 
technological advancement may not become available until the 
rules are amended.  Because lobbying for changes in the rule 
can be expensive, especially if the rule is legislative, the very 
existence of rule-like criteria creates a disincentive for those 
who otherwise would seek to advance the technology.  Rule-like 
performance criteria can place fewer constraints on 
                                                          
 342. Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D., Assoc. Comm’r, FDA, to 
multiple recipients (Oct. 26, 1998), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/irbletr.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005); Issues 
Raised by Human Cloning Research: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
107th Cong. 79-81 (2001) (statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir., Ctr. for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research, FDA), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/Hearings/03282001hearing141/Zoon205.
htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). See generally Richard A. Merrill, Human 
Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New Technologies Challenge FDA, 3 HOUS. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 52-78 (2002). 
 343.  For a history of HFEA’s decisions on this issue, see 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/PressReleasesbysubject/PGDandtissuetypi
ng. 
 344. On the distinction between rules and standards, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 21-22 (1996); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992). 
 345. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 115–16 (1982); 
Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A 
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1262, 1281 (1981); Murray 
Mackay, Liability, Safety, and Innovation in the Automotive Industry, in THE 
LIABILITY MAZE 220 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
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technological development than rules restricting the 
characteristics of a new product or process.  Because the control 
is over outputs, designers are free to choose different 
technological means of achieving mandated ends. 
In the case of standard-like criteria, the distinction 
between restrictions on the technology, its practitioners, and its 
performance may be blurred.  Compliance with a requirement 
that a process be carried out with “due regard to safety” might 
take account of design features of a product or the steps used in 
a process, the characteristics and qualifications of those 
making the product or carrying out the process, and the degree 
of harm ultimately caused.  Standards give less direction to 
technologists than rules as to what is required, but by the same 
token they allow technologists more flexibility in optimizing a 
design or procedure.346 
The relative advantages and disadvantages of rules and 
standards have been discussed extensively elsewhere.347  In a 
context of ongoing technological change, standards offer some 
additional advantages over rules.  Rule-like criteria as to how a 
new product is to be designed or a new process carried out may 
cease to be applicable or may constrain beneficial technological 
development.348  Standards are particularly efficient when a 
technology is in an early stage of development, with frequent 
adjustments and low uptake.349 
The deterrent effect of regulation is likely to depend on the 
whether it requires pre-approval or sets out rule-like or 
standard-like criteria as well as the consequences of non-
compliance.  Compliance with approval regimes or rule-like 
criteria is easy to check.  The deterrent effect of these 
mechanisms is therefore stronger than for standard-like 
criteria, where there may be disagreement or uncertainty as to 
what constitutes compliance.  Although harsher penalties will 
usually enhance compliance, they may also create an 
adversarial atmosphere between the regulator and the 
regulated, where compliance is minimal and forced, rather than 
                                                          
 346. Tech. Assessment Panel of the Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, Technology: 
Processes of Assessment and Choice (1969), in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 596-97 (1973). 
 347. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 344; Kaplow, supra note 344; Russell 
B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000). 
 348. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 344, at 131-32, 163; Kaplow, supra 
note 344, at 616. 
 349. See Kaplow, supra note 344, at 562-63. 
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co-operative and willing.350  Deterrence is rarely absolute; even 
clear rules with criminal consequences can be breached and no 
regulatory regime can guarantee the absence of unscrupulous 
or careless practices.351  Despite extensive IVF regulation in the 
United Kingdom, there have been cases of accidental errors352 
and even intentional foul play.353 
B.  THE REGULATORS 
It may be possible to impose at least some of these different 
types of regulation by alternative means. There are various 
potential “regulators” of new technologies, the most well-known 
of which are the market, courts relying on existing law 
(especially tort, contract, and criminal law), private groups 
(such as professional organizations), legislatures, and 
administrative agencies.354  Some of these will be limited in the 
types of regulation they can legitimately impose and some are 
dependent on the existence of others (for example, 
administrative agencies require empowering legislation).  This 
Part sets out some of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
regulator in controlling a technology in order to achieve 
relatively uncontroversial goals such as health, safety, and 
consumer protection. 
1.  The Market 
Markets do not regulate technologies directly. However, 
they do control health and safety to the extent that, in a perfect 
market, people will pay more for services that pose less risk.  A 
consumer-oriented patient population with adequate 
information could use market power to protect itself from harm 
                                                          
 350. Martin H. Johnson, The Art of Regulation and the Regulation of ART: 
The Impact of Regulation on Research and Clinical Practice, 9 J.L. & MED. 
399, 411 (2002). 
 351. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or 
Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 664 (1997). 
 352. See Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v A, [2003] E.W.H.C. 259 
(involving a sperm mix-up). 
 353. For example, in the United Kingdom, an embryologist was found 
guilty of assault causing actual bodily harm and false accounting to obtain 
money by deception after being accused of pretending to transfer embryos that 
in fact remained in storage. Embryologist Fooled IVF Patients, BBC NEWS, 
Dec. 11, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2562779.stm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 354. See infra note 428. 
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associated with IVF and related technologies.355 
There are, however, imperfections in the market.  
Consumers may be unaware of the nature and extent of the 
risks posed.  In a perfect market, consumers will spend 
resources to obtain information in proportion to the perceived 
benefit of that information (assuming of course that they are 
aware that useful information might exist and can estimate its 
value).356  However, information may have collective 
importance to consumers without any single consumer or 
provider being willing to spend the resources necessary to 
obtain it.  Further, consumers may be in a weak bargaining 
position or may be emotionally involved and therefore less 
willing to negotiate.357  Finally, a technology may have an 
adverse impact on people who are not parties to any 
transaction involving their use; in the case of IVF, the 
conceived child is in this position.  While hopeful parents will 
usually take the interests of a future child into account, there 
may be conflicts between their interests and those of the child-
to-be.358 
Some deficiencies in the market can be reduced without 
the need for broader regulation.  For example, professional 
organizations or administrative agencies might collect and 
distribute data to minimize information deficiencies.  In the 
United States, SART and ASRM and, later, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, under legislative mandate, 
have collected information about success rates at different 
clinics as well as other important statistics.359 
Identifiable market deficiencies are not the only concern 
with markets in sensitive areas such as IVF.  For some people, 
the very idea of a market in reproductive services, a market in 
                                                          
 355. Daar, supra note 351, at 664. 
 356. See generally ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND 
ECONOMIC THEORY 38-41 (1994). 
 357. Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
517, 535 (1997). 
 358. RESOLVE, a United States advocacy group for people with infertility 
problems, denies the existence of this conflict. See Letter from Vicki Baldwin, 
Chair of the Board of Directors of RESOLVE to Leon R. Kass, Chairman, 
President’s Council on Bioethics (Oct. 2, 2003), available at 
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/advocacy/letters/Presidents-Council-
Letter-20031002.doc (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
 359. See, e.g., Med. Research Int’l et al., supra note 200. Reports issued by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/art.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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embryos, or a market in gestational services is abhorrent.360  To 
the extent that new technologies create potential new markets 
that are seen as degrading, legislation can be enacted to 
prevent the market forming.  For example, some jurisdictions 
prohibit the sale of embryos.361 
2.  Existing Rules Enforced by the Courts 
a.  Problems with Existing Rules Following Technological 
Change 
Where conduct, including deceptive conduct or conduct 
threatening health and safety, will violate existing legal norms, 
the threat of litigation is one means of deterring that conduct.  
In the context of technological change, there is a risk that 
application of existing rules will appear uncertain (reducing 
their deterrent effect) or existing rules will, on their terms, be 
under-inclusive.  In either case, rules designed to address a 
particular problem may fail to prevent similar problems 
because they were not crafted in contemplation of future 
technological changes.  A few examples will illustrate both the 
potential regulatory effect of existing rules and their potential 
for failure following technological change. 
i.  Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital362 
In 1972, the Del Zios decided to undergo an IVF procedure, 
after having been advised that IVF had not yet been attempted 
in humans.363  On September 12, 1973, ova were removed from 
Mrs. Del Zio and taken to the Presbyterian Hospital, where Dr. 
Shettles mixed the ova with sperm from Mr. Del Zio in a test 
tube culture.364  The result was stored in an incubator at the 
Presbyterian Hospital, where it was to remain for four days.365  
On September 13, however, Dr. Shettles’s supervisor, Dr. 
                                                          
 360. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1849 (1987). But cf. Neil Duxbury, Do Markets Degrade?, 59 MOD. L. 
REV. 331 (1996) (arguing that objections to certain types of markets are in fact 
better expressed in terms of specific concerns, rather than as an objection to 
markets per se). 
 361. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 873.05 (2003). 
 362. No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
1978). 
 363. Id. at *2. 
 364. Id. at *3. 
 365. Id. 
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Vande Wiele, with the concurrence of the President of the 
hospital and the Dean of Columbia University Medical School, 
had the test tube removed from the incubator, brought to his 
office, and placed in the deep freeze.366  These actions destroyed 
the culture.367  Following these events, Mrs. Del Zio claimed to 
have suffered emotional distress.368  Mr. and Mrs. Del Zio sued 
the hospital, Dr. Vande Wiele, and Columbia University on 
theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
conversion.369  The jury, accepting the former claim only, 
awarded Mrs. Del Zio $50,000 and Mr. Del Zio $3.370 A motion 
to set aside the verdict or grant a new trial was dismissed.371 
Thus, even in the early days of an experimental new 
technology (these events took place even prior to the birth of 
Louise Brown), new forms of conduct were restricted.  Although 
there were no specific laws governing what could or could not 
be done with an in vitro embryo, the elements of the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress were broad enough 
to cover the destruction of an embryo in circumstances where 
the progenitors might be emotionally harmed. 
The same tale also reveals some weaknesses in the notion 
of courts as protectors.  Tort law operates retrospectively.372 
Mrs. Del Zio had already suffered emotional distress.  The 
money might offer a measure of vindication, but it did not make 
the harm go away.  Statutes, unlike tort law, can also operate 
prospectively by setting up a system of statutory requirements 
and monitoring compliance on a regular basis. 
ii.  Between Persons and Property 
Both statutory and common law rules are based on 
categories rooted in the state of the world at some time in the 
past.  When technological change creates entities that fall 
outside established categories, existing doctrine may be 
uncertain or ineffective.  In such cases, protections traditionally 
offered by tort, contract, property, or criminal law will not 
apply.  This problem is evident in cases involving conduct that 
                                                          
 366. Id. at *3-4. 
 367. Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14450, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978). 
 368. Id. at *4. 
 369. Id. at *5, *10. 
 370. Id. at *11. 
 371. Id. at *24. 
 372. Cohen, supra note 108, at 353. 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
2005] RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 571 
 
would constitute theft or conversion if embryos were treated as 
property, or manslaughter, kidnapping, or false imprisonment 
if embryos were treated as persons. 
Consider the case of Cora Creed.  She discovered that Dr. 
Parker, who had assisted in the performance of her IVF 
procedure, had transferred embryos created with her ova and 
her partner’s sperm into another woman.373  Mrs. Creed sued 
for malpractice, claiming not property conversion or harm 
against the embryo but her emotional injuries as damages.  
However, her malpractice action failed because the injuries 
claimed were not related to physical trauma to her.374  The tort 
of negligence proved insufficient to fill the gap caused by the 
absence of torts addressing harm to embryos, being neither 
property nor persons. 
Another case illustrating a similar problem is Doe v. Irvine 
Scientific Sales Co.375  In that case, human albumin used in the 
culture during an IVF procedure had been exposed to 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and the embryos had to be 
discarded.376  The progenitors based their claim against the 
manufacturer of the albumin on their emotional distress, the 
financial loss they had suffered in obtaining medical services 
that were now fruitless, and the loss of their potential child.377  
A federal district court held that there was no claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress because the harm was 
not related to a physical injury to them, no claim for negligence 
based on pure economic loss, and no claim for loss of life, 
because the embryo was not yet a person.378 
In Frisina v. Women and Infants Hospital the Superior 
Court of Rhode Island considered motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ 
suit based on the alleged negligent destruction of their embryos 
at defendant’s IVF clinic.379  The plaintiffs had alleged 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (which, under Rhode 
Island law, would require that the embryos be “victims”) and 
emotional distress following breach of contract.380  Defendant 
                                                          
 373. Creed v. United Hosp., 190 A.D.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
 374. Id. at 492. 
 375. 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 738 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 376. Id. at 739. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 740-42. 
 379. No. CIV. A. 95-4037, No. CIV. A. 95-4469, No. CIV. A. 95-5827, 2002 
WL 1288784 (Sup. Ct. R.I. May 30, 2002). 
 380. Id. at *2. 
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succeeded in dismissing the first claim because embryos could 
not be treated as persons (and thus were not “victims”), 
plaintiffs were not physically present to witness their 
destruction, and their emotional distress had no physical 
symptoms.381  The motion to dismiss failed on the second claim 
because Rhode Island law allows recovery for emotional 
distress based on the loss of “property” in some 
circumstances.382 
These cases are examples of conduct of which most people 
would disapprove (negligently transferring an embryo into the 
wrong woman, negligently exposing embryos to disease, and 
negligently destroying embryos) for which the tort system 
proves inadequate.  Various doctrinal areas of law provide 
remedies for damage to persons and property, and even 
sometimes gestating fetuses, but fall short of covering conduct 
related to in vitro embryos.  Where, as in Frisina, embryos are 
treated as property, the claims have some chance of success.383  
But so long as they fall outside the legal categories of property 
and persons, plaintiffs can be left without remedy.  Before the 
creation of in vitro embryos, there was no need for legal rules to 
protect them and their progenitors.  General legal rules offered 
protection against harm to persons and property.  However, 
courts may be unable to use such rules to protect an entity that 
falls outside established categories.384 
iii.  Scandal in California 
In May 1995, a lawsuit was filed by the University of 
California at Irvine against three directors of its Center for 
Reproductive Health.385 The suit alleged that the doctors stole 
eggs from some women and transferred them into others, 
administered unapproved fertility drugs, and performed 
research on patients without consent.386  The allegations 
followed complaints in 1994, internal investigations, and a 
threat by the National Institutes of Health to pull the 
                                                          
 381. Id. at *8. 
 382. Id. at *10. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See generally Freeman, supra note 39, at 6 (“Courts [in common law 
systems] find themselves constricted by policies, concepts and categories 
invented to deal with the issues of another age.”). 
 385. Weber & Marquis, supra note 171. 
 386. Id. 
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University’s funding.387 
The police and state district attorney investigated the 
matter, but were concerned that many of the alleged activities 
did not fall under any provisions of the penal code.388  Orange 
County prosecutors ended up concluding that they could not 
prosecute embryo theft because under theft and embezzlement 
laws, a value would need to be assigned to the embryo.389  In 
fact, California’s embezzlement statute contained no valuation 
language, but did require that the entity appropriated be 
property.390  In addition to these legal problems, prosecutors 
faced the practical problem that two of the directors had fled 
the country.391  The remaining director, whose involvement in 
the scandal was the least direct, was convicted for mail fraud in 
federal court as a result of misreported insurance claims.392 
This case offers an example from criminal law of the same 
types of problems discussed above.  Sometimes, alternative 
means of bringing an action exist (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in the Del Zio case and mail fraud in the 
California scandal), but this is not guaranteed.  When 
technological change creates the potential for harmful conduct 
that falls outside existing rules designed to deal with similar 
conduct, in other words, when existing rules are shown to be 
uncertain or under-inclusive, courts may not be effective 
regulators. 
b.  Problems with the Tort Law Generally 
Other problems faced by potential plaintiffs have less to do 
with the fact that the technology is new, and thus outside 
existing legal categories, and more to do with hurdles 
frequently faced by litigants.  For example, causation problems 
may prevent patients suing a clinic after failure to become 
pregnant even if they can prove that the clinic’s negligent 
practices resulted in a low success rate.393  The harm here is 
                                                          
 387. Id. 
 388. See id. 
 389. See Daar, supra note 351, at 646. 
 390. CAL. PENAL CODE § 503. See also Daar, supra note 351, at 646-47. 
 391. Nick Anderson & Esther Schrader, $10-Million Accord with UC 
Reported in Fertility Scandal, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1997, at A1. 
 392. Peter M. Warren, Fertility Doctor Vows to Win Back his Job; US 
Irvine: Sergio Stone, Who Was Linked to the Scandal that Closed the 
University’s Clinic, Says He Will Challenge his Firing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2000, at B8 (describing the doctor’s involvement). 
 393. See ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility 
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diffuse; many people suffered a reduced chance of success, but 
no one person can claim that they would otherwise have been 
successful.  Alternatively, numerous practitioners may have 
been involved in a single course of treatment, and it may be 
difficult to pinpoint the person responsible for causing harm.394  
Tort law itself may develop to eliminate such problems, but the 
process is slow.395 
Tort law also deals poorly with problems that involve 
multiple competing variables.396  Molding technology to satisfy 
safety and environmental standards is an example of such a 
problem; a technical modification that might be appropriate for 
avoiding one kind of accident might have other disadvantages.  
Tort law, which considers accidents on a case-by-case basis, 
tends to focus on the design feature leading to the injury in 
question without examining the effects of engineering decisions 
in their entirety.397  The overall effect of tort law and the 
technological modifications it engenders may thus be to 
increase the total risk of harm. 
c.  Problems with Courts 
The manner in which judges and juries gain expertise in 
the technology underlying a case is less than ideal.  When a 
case turns on technical information, courts usually rely on 
expert testimony to provide it.  When the evidence presented by 
each side differs, cross-examination is the primary vehicle by 
which each party tries to undermine the other’s position.  While 
useful for exposing bias, lies, minor inconsistencies, and 
unfounded assumptions, cross-examination will not necessarily 
                                                          
Techniques, 281 SCIENCE 651, 651 (1998). 
 394. I.R. Hill, Liability and In-Vitro Fertilization, 25 MED. SCI. L. 270, 270-
71 (1985). 
 395. See David L. Bazelon, Governing Technology: Values, Choices, and 
Scientific Progress, in BIOTECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY: PRIVATE INITIATIVES AND 
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 75, 77 (Joseph G. Perpich ed., 1986).  In some sense, 
significant movements in legal doctrine (in particular in areas of employer and 
manufacturer liability) can be attributed to technological change. 
 396. See Thomas Barton, Justiciability: A Theory of Judicial Problem 
Solving, 24 B.C. L. REV. 505, 550 (1983); Thomas D. Barton, Common Law and 
Its Substitutes: The Allocation of Social Problems to Alternative Decisional 
Institutions, 63 N.C. L. REV. 519 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the 
Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1 (1960); see also RICHARD A 
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 238 (1995); STEPHEN BREYER, 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 57 (1993). 
 397. See Bazelon, supra note 395, at 75-76 (discussing trade-offs involving 
technology). 
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place the judge or jury in a position to understand the bases for 
different expert views.398  It is easier to trip up the bad scientist 
than to resolve legitimate differences in scientific or technical 
opinion. The information that goes into crafting a statute or 
rule generally comes in more varied and useful forms.  Cost-
benefit analyses and risk assessments can provide a sensible 
basis for policy formation, and differences of opinion between 
experts can be resolved in more informal settings.  Policy-
makers also have greater means of understanding the 
information presented to them than do judges and juries.  Even 
with the assistance of parties’ experts or court-appointed 
ones,399 judges and juries may be compelled to rely on their own 
technically inexpert understandings. 
3.  Professional Societies 
The law of negligence operates best as a deterrent when 
potential defendants know what conduct they should avoid.  
Acting alone, the law of negligence only deters conduct that 
people think a court will find to be unreasonable.  The existence 
of guidelines can ensure that practitioners are aware of what is 
expected of them, and can simultaneously educate judges and 
juries.  For example, the ASRM issues guidelines of relevance 
to IVF clinics.400 Thus many scholars are of the view that tort 
law, when viewed against the background of these professional 
guidelines, provides a suitable means of reducing unsafe 
practices in the medical arena, including IVF.401 
Some authors question whether professionals are the 
                                                          
 398. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private 
Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1461 (1983) (pointing out that cross-
examination can reveal underlying biases, unstated assumptions, and 
methodological shortcomings in expert evidence); Joseph Sanders, From 
Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 47–51 (1993) (describing how the focus on credibility, putative 
biases, and minor inconsistencies can make cross-examination less useful for 
the fact finder); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR 211 (1995). 
 399. Obviously, court-appointed experts are limited to jurisdictions in 
which this option is available. 
 400.  ASRM Website, at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Practice/practice.html 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 401. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION 70 
(1982); Harry D. Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 
FAM. L.Q. 185, 198 (1985); David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies in the United States, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
932, 938 (2002); Robertson, Decisional Authority, supra note 54; John A. 
Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 911, 921 (1996). 
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appropriate standard-setters for a technology.402  Although they 
are clearly well-placed to evaluate evidence regarding risks,403 
there is concern that professional interests, including the profit 
motive, might be placed ahead of patient and social interests.404  
Self-regulation may be effective at clarifying what constitutes 
good conduct and marginalizing incompetent practitioners, but 
it may not take account of broader concerns.  Much depends on 
the nature of the body preparing guidelines.  For example, 
RTAC, which creates guidelines for the practice of IVF in 
Australia, includes seven consumer representatives.405  
However, the members are not democratically elected and thus 
cannot claim to reflect broader social values.  Issues of 
importance to the public, that do not coincide with the concerns 
of professionals and their patients, may be better addressed in 
a democratic forum. 
Another difficulty with professional regulation is the 
relative lack of transparency.406  For example, many ASRM 
practice guidelines are only available to members or at a fee.407  
Legislation is more readily available and is subject to greater 
public scrutiny.  Professional codes of conduct may also lack a 
direct enforcement mechanism.  Violation of the rules is only 
deterred if either there are legal consequences or consumers 
are generally aware of the infraction.  Professional 
organizations can encourage compliance by educating 
consumers on the existence and importance of the rules.  
Legislation can also increase observance of professional codes 
by mandating or encouraging compliance. 
Where the pressure to conform to a professional code of 
conduct is sufficiently great, they can be a useful means of 
regulation.  Because organized professional groups are usually 
aware of ongoing technological developments, professional 
                                                          
 402. See, e.g., Hilary Rose, Victorian Values in the Test-Tube: The Politics 
of Reproductive Science and Technology, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: 
GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 151, 172 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 
1987). 
 403. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 350, at 408. 
 404. Cohen, supra note 108, at 349-50. 
 405. Website of the Fertility Society of Australia, RTAC – Composition of 
Committee, at  http://www.fsa.au.com/rtac/committee.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
 406. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 350, at 409. 
 407. For example, ASRM charges for copies of most Practice Committee 
guidelines. See ASRM Website, at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Practice/practice.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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standards are likely to be up to date. 
4.  Legislators 
Legislation is required to institute in any state regulatory 
regime, although varying amounts of discretion are conferred 
on an administrative agency or other body to interpret and 
implement the law.  Generally speaking, greater legislative 
control ensures greater democratic legitimacy and visibility.408  
Legislation speaks “with greater force and authority in the 
public eye” than judicial, professional, or administrative 
regulation.409  However, where technological change is ongoing, 
legislation may be insufficiently flexible.  As discussed in Part 
II.G, statutory rules risk being over-inclusive or under-
inclusive with respect to future incarnations of a technology.  It 
is generally harder (and more expensive) to have legislation 
amended to take into account further technological change than 
to have similar changes made by a professional organization or 
administrative agency.  Even where legislation delegates power 
to an agency, the empowering legislation may become outdated 
and prove difficult to amend. 
The history of IVF legislation in Victoria provides a good 
example of this problem. Not only did the original 1984 Act 
hinder the use of embryo biopsy for six years,410 but it was 
drafted in such a way that it prohibited GIFT.411  This was 
amended in 1987.412  The current Act regulates fertilization 
procedures, defined as any of: 
(a)the medical procedure of transferring to the body of a woman a 
zygote formed outside the body of any woman; or 
(b)the medical procedure of transferring to the body of a woman an 
embryo formed outside the body of any woman; or 
(c)the medical procedure of transferring – 
(i)an oocyte,413 without also transferring sperm, to the body of a 
                                                          
 408. Of course, much depends on operation of the democratic process. 
 409. REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 189. 
 410. See Karen J. Dawson & John F. Leeton, The Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in Australia: Issues and Solutions, 163 MED. J. 
AUSTL. 204, 204 (1995). Embryo biopsy is the removal of cells from an early 
IVF embryo in order to carry out genetic testing to evaluate the suitability of 
the embryo. 
 411. See, e.g., Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, No. 10,163, 1984, §§ 3, 5 
(Austl., Vic.). 
 412. See Infertility (Medical Procedures) (Amendment) Act, 1987, § 13A 
(Austl., Vic.). 
 413. This is defined in the Infertility Treatment Act, 1995,  § 3 (Austl., Vic.) 
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woman; or 
(ii)sperm (other than by artificial insemination) to the body of a 
woman; or 
(iii)an oocyte and sperm to the body of a woman.414 
Yet it is always possible that the technology will mutate 
further, rendering even this relatively broad definition obsolete.  
For example, if prior to 2003 it had become possible to incubate 
an embryo in an artificial womb for an extended period of time, 
this conduct would not have been regulated.  Since 2003, such 
conduct has been prohibited.415  Yet it is still possible that 
technological change will create loopholes in the regulatory 
regime.  Language cannot be completely technology-neutral; it 
is impossible to draft legislation with sufficient precision and 
clarity that addresses every possible future technical 
variation.416 
Similar problems have arisen in the United Kingdom.  The 
legislation prohibited one cloning technique, replacing the 
nucleus of a cell of an embryo with another nucleus.417  
However, another technique involving transplanting a nucleus 
from a human cell and placing the nucleus in an unfertilized 
ovum, did not fall within that prohibition.  This newer cloning 
technique was not within the contemplation of the British 
Parliament in 1990 when it passed the UK Act.  There was 
some initial uncertainty as to whether the UK Act even 
required a license for the newer technique.418  Section 3(1) of 
the Act requires a license to “bring about the creation of an 
embryo” or to “keep or use an embryo.”  The procedure 
described above would only require a license if the entity 
created were an “embryo” for the purposes of the Act.  The 
rather confusing and self-referential definition of an “embryo” 
in the Act is found in section 1(1): 
In this Act, except where otherwise stated – 
(a)embryo means a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete, 
                                                          
as an ovum from a woman not including a parthenogenetic oocyte. 
 414. Infertility Treatment Act, No. 63, 1995, § 3 (Austl., Vic.). 
 416. See Colin Tapper, Judicial Attitudes, Aptitudes and Abilities in the 
Field of High Technology, 15 MONASH U.L. REV. 219, 228 (1989). 
 417. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990,  § 3(3)(d) 
(U.K.). 
 418. Placing a human embryo created by means other than fertilization 
has since been banned in the United Kingdom. See Human Reproductive 
Cloning Act, 2001, c. 23, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
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and 
(b)references to an embryo include an egg in the process of 
fertilisation, 
and, for this purpose, fertilisation is not complete until the 
appearance of a two cell zygote.419 
In standard IVF, a human egg is fertilized with human 
sperm; the Act is clear that the product of this process, as well 
as the entity in transition, is an embryo.  But although the 
entity created by the cloning process is similar (except that it is 
almost genetically identical to the human from whose cell the 
nucleus was extracted), the process of fertilization is not 
involved.  The question of whether an embryo produced by 
cloning was an “embryo” came before the House of Lords in the 
case of R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of 
State for Health.420  The House of Lords held that, on a proper 
interpretation of the statute, the product of the cloning process 
was an embryo.  The word “where” in the definition of embryo 
was held to create a temporal restriction, rather than to refer to 
a particular process.  However, prior to this case, the new 
cloning technique generated uncertainty. 
Because the legislature often lacks foresight as to ongoing 
technological change, the question is often raised as to when 
legislative regimes ought to be established.  Perhaps we need to 
wait until we have a good understanding of the technology and 
its risks and benefits.421  On the other hand, there may be 
advantages to intervening at a stage when a technology is still 
developing so that lawmakers can influence the 
development.422  Delay may allow the choices made by 
professionals to become fixed as a result of material equipment, 
economic investment, and habit.423  In some cases, it may even 
lead to irreversible harm to the entities or values that would 
                                                          
 419.  UK Act, § 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 420. [2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 WLR 692. 
 421. See generally REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142. See 
also Comments by George Annas, quoted in Anne Taylor Fleming, New 
Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1980, § 6, at 14. 
 422. See TRIBE, supra note 346, at ch. II; Sørensen, supra note 30, at 19, 
23; Stewart Russell & Robin Williams, Social Shaping of Technology: 
Frameworks, Findings and Implications for Policy, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, 
GUIDING POLICY 37, 62 (Sørensen & Robin Williams eds., 2002). For similar 
comments in the specific context of IVF, see BONNICKSEN, supra note 91, at 6, 
9. 
 423. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE FUTURE 148, 155 (Albert H. Teich ed., 9th ed. 2002); MAZUR, supra note 
91, at 123; WESTRUM, supra note 24, at 77-78. 
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otherwise have been protected.424 
The question of when to intervene need not be absolute.  
Andrea Bonnicksen, for example, argues in favor if 
incrementalism; laws should be created as harms are 
anticipated, but cautiously, so as not to outpace society’s 
experience of a technology.425  The slower approach also allows 
the government time to assess the success and limitations of 
other means of regulation, including the market, general tort 
and criminal laws, and professional control.  In New South 
Wales, for example, the new draft legislation on ART assumes 
the existence of professional regulation and focuses only on 
issues going beyond RTAC’s mandate.  The incremental 
approach can also be criticized as creating a makeshift system 
of regulation and risking political avoidance of important 
issues.426  An alternative approach is to create mechanisms 
that increase the likelihood that legislation will be kept up to 
date.427 
5.  Administrative Agencies428 
Agencies are better able to keep the law abreast of new 
developments, because they are focused on a narrower range of 
issues than are legislatures.  Thus, even though administrative 
regulations, like legislation, are textual they are more easily 
adapted to ongoing technological change.429 
Government agencies are diverse even within a single 
jurisdiction, and differences between jurisdictions can make 
comparison seem a futile exercise.  Thus it has been said that 
                                                          
 424. See WESTRUM, supra note 24, at 13-16 (discussing the ability of society 
to manage its technology). 
 425. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 91, at 112-13. 
 426. See, e.g., Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A 
Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 
25 GA. L. REV. 625, 667, 692 (1991). 
 427. This will be easier in some jurisdictions than in others because the 
speed of legislative response varies. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Problems with 
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1005-06 (1995). 
 428. United Kingdom and Australia have a different government structure 
than the United States and the term “administrative agencies” might in some 
contexts be misleading.  However, in the context of IVF regulation, the U.K. 
and Australian authorities to which power has been delegated are relatively 
similar to U.S. administrative agencies.  The references to administrative 
agencies throughout include these bodies. 
 429. See Kerry Petersen, The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: A Comparative Study of Permissive and Prescriptive Laws and 
Policies, 9 J.L. & MED. 483, 497 (2002). 
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an agency like HFEA could not operate in the United States,430 
although a Hastings Center Report is in favor of establishing a 
similar entity here.431  What administrative bodies do have in 
common is expertise and flexibility advantages over 
legislatures.  In particular, they have greater access to 
information about particular cases, clinics, and technologies 
and face fewer procedural hurdles in making or changing 
rules.432 
A statute coupled with administrative regulation is thus 
more flexible than a statute that attempts to cover the field, 
but less flexible than professional regulation.  The more power 
delegated to the agency to make and interpret law, the more 
flexible the resulting regime.  Goal-oriented statutes that set 
out the goals considered important to the legislature, allowing 
the agency to decide how those goals might be achieved in 
regulation is the most flexible.433  Similarly, legislation that 
prescribes standard-like criteria, leaving the development of 
rules and application of the standards to an administrative 
agency, is more flexible than legislation prescribing rule-like 
criteria.  However, because the enabling statute must define 
and limit the agency’s power in some ways, the inflexibility 
problems of legislation are never fully solved.  If too much 
power is delegated (for example, delegating power to make any 
law without limit), the process loses democratic legitimacy. 
Unlike professional organizations, agencies are not directly 
associated with an interest group. However, they are 
susceptible to “capture” by such groups.434  In particular, they 
have little incentive to publicize broad criticisms of the 
technology being regulated,435 especially if their funding 
structure is linked to license fees.436  Whether or not there are 
                                                          
 430. See REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 189. 
 431. THE HASTINGS CTR., REPROGENETICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS S18 (July-Aug., 2003). 
 432. In the United States, administrative agencies must satisfy the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000) 
in making rules. Regulations made under the UK Act must in some 
circumstances be approved by parliament, UK Act, § 45(4), and there is a 
procedure set out for approval of the Code of Practice, UK Act, § 26. 
 433. See Rubin, supra note 322, at 411-15 (discussing the effectiveness of 
goal-oriented legislation). 
 434. See, e.g., S. SMITH & A. SUTTON, THE HUMAN FERTILISATION & 
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS FIRST REPORTS (1992-94) 9-11 
(1995) (criticizing HFEA). 
 435. See MAZUR, supra note 91, at 126-27. 
 436. See, e.g., SMITH & SUTTON, supra note 434, at 10, 21. But see Hagger, 
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issues of capture, administrative agencies, like professional 
organizations, may not be the most appropriate arbiter of 
controversial ethical and moral issues.437  Such issues are best 
left to elected representatives. 
6.  Combined Response 
This Part has set out the advantages and disadvantages of 
various regulators―the market, courts, professional 
organizations, legislative bodies, and administrative agencies.  
Any particular goal might be achieved through one or more of 
these mechanisms.  Two of the mechanisms (the market and 
courts) operate in the background and do not require any steps 
to implement.  Professional regulation can be encouraged, but 
is difficult for an outsider to set in motion. 
Interested citizens and scholars are therefore most likely to 
press for legislative change, either alone or facilitated by a new 
or existing agency.  Such proposals, however, should take 
account of background mechanisms and, if relevant, 
professional regulation or the potential for professional 
regulation.  It is possible that certain types of regulation, 
otherwise desirable, can be omitted from legislation because 
existing mechanisms are adequate.  Thus the draft New South 
Wales bill on assisted reproduction does not duplicate the 
functions of RTAC.438 
C.  AN EXAMPLE: THE PROBLEM OF MULTIFETAL PREGNANCY 
In order to illustrate the benefits of alternative forms of 
regulation, this Section compares how different institutions in 
different jurisdictions have responded to one problem generated 
by IVF, high rates of multifetal pregnancies (twins, triplets, 
etc.).  Such pregnancies pose risks to the health of both mothers 
and their children-to-be.  While multiples do occur naturally, 
there is a strong correlation between multifetal pregnancies 
and the use of ART, including IVF.439  This fact gives rise to 
arguments that certain practices ought to be prohibited, 
restricted, or discouraged, and hence leads to calls for 
regulation.  Like all such arguments, they are contestable.  
                                                          
supra note 239, at 17-18. 
 437. See SMITH & SUTTON, supra note 434, at 26. 
 438. See generally Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 2003 (N.S.W.). 
 439. See generally Anne Lynch et al., Assisted Reproductive Interventions 
and Multiple Birth, 97 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 195 (2001). 
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Altering the way in which IVF is practiced may decrease the 
effectiveness of the procedure in terms of its primary goal, 
achieving pregnancy and live birth.  Further, direct restrictions 
on what IVF practitioners may do affects the procreative liberty 
of their patients, and may therefore be undesirable or even 
contrary to international or constitutional norms.440 
Consider the goal of reducing the risk of high order 
multifetal pregnancies (triplets and higher-order) without 
significantly affecting IVF success rates and without 
preventing patients from making use of these techniques in 
order to have children, except where their interest in 
procreating is outweighed by the risks to their offspring.  
Individuals may differ in articulating the circumstances in 
which the risk of harm is sufficiently severe to trump 
procreative liberty.  Nevertheless, there is wide agreement on a 
goal such as this.  One could craft alternative goals that might 
give more or less weight to considerations of procreative liberty 
as against the risk of harm to future children, or that reduce 
the rate of twins as well as triplets.441  In such a case, the 
conclusions may be different, but the analysis would be similar.  
Having chosen a goal, it is possible to analyze how different 
types of regulation and different regulators might work to 
achieve it. 
1.  The Nature of the Problem 
Multifetal pregnancy poses risks to the woman carrying 
the pregnancy as well as the fetuses she carries.  It increases 
the risk of complications in pregnancy including pre eclampsia, 
gestational diabetes, and maternal anemia.442  Children who 
were born as one of a multiple may suffer problems as a result 
of the higher probability of being born prematurely and with 
lower birth weight.443  For example, one study showed that 
“more than half of all twins and [more than] 90% of triplets are 
born preterm or [of low birth weight].”444  This increases the 
                                                          
 440.  See supra Part IIB. 
 441. See generally François Olivennes, Double Trouble: Yes a Twin 
Pregnancy is an Adverse Outcome, 15 HUM. REPROD. 1663 (2000). 
 442. VIRGINIA J. BALDWIN, PATHOLOGY OF MULTIPLE PREGNANCY 355-56 
(1994). 
 443. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MED., FACT SHEET: MULTIPLE 
GESTATION AND MULTIFETAL PREGNANCY REDUCTION, available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/Multiple_Gestation-Fact.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 444. Elizabeth Arias et al., Annual Summary of Vital Statistics – 2002, 112 
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odds of infant mortality and disability.445  In 1996, for example, 
16% of all neonatal deaths were multiples, and multiples “were 
seven times more likely than were singletons to die within the 
first year of life.”446  Newborns in high order multiple 
pregnancies may suffer from respiratory distress, 
intraventricular hemorrhage, motor and speech delay, and 
other problems associated with premature birth.447  Later in 
life, there is a correlation between multiple birth and 
behavioral problems and reduced cognitive function.448 
In addition to health problems, parents face additional 
financial burdens.449  Costs relating to delivery are higher for 
multiple births and will be borne either by the parents or else 
by society as a whole in the form of insurance premiums or 
taxes.450  There are also psychological consequences from 
multiple births for parents, siblings, and the children 
themselves.451  Financial and psychological risks are 
compounded if one or more of the children suffers from a 
significant disability.  In addition, because the link between 
multiple births and ART is well-known, parents may face social 
stigma or be questioned about their fertility status and whether 
their children were conceived “normally.”452 
One “solution” to the problems of multifetal pregnancy is 
                                                          
PEDIATRICS 1215, 1221 (2003). 
 445. See Barbara Luke & Louis G. Keith, The Contribution of Singletons, 
Twins, and Triplets to Low Birth Weight, Infant Mortality and Handicap in 
the United States, 37 J. REPROD. MED. 661, 662 (1992). 
 446. Bernard Guyer et al., Annual Summary of Vital Statistics – 1997, 102 
PEDIATRICS 1333, 1339 (1998). 
 447. See Schlomo Lipitz et al., High-order Multifetal Gestation – 
Management and Outcome, 76 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 216-17 
(1990). 
 448. See Adnan T. Bhutta et al., Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes of 
School-Aged Children Who Were Born Preterm: A Meta-Analysis, 288 JAMA 
728, 735-36 (2002); L. John Horwood et al., Cognitive, Educational and 
Behavioral Outcomes at 7 to 8 years in a National Very Low Birthweight 
Cohort, 79 ARCH. DIS. CHILD FETAL NEONATAL ED. F12 (1998). 
 449. See Nanette Elster & Institute for Science, Law, and Technology 
(ISLAT) Working Group on Reproductive Technology, Less is More: The Risks 
of Multiple Births, 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 617, 620 (2000). 
 450. See generally, e.g., Tamara L. Callahan et al., The Economic Impact of 
Multiple-Gestation Pregnancies and the Contribution of Assisted-Reproduction 
Techniques to Their Incidence, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 244 (1994). 
 451. See Elster & ISLAT Working Group, supra note 449, at 621. 
 452. Marcia A. Ellison & Janet E. Hall, Social Stigma and Compounded 
Losses: Quality-of-life Issues for Multiple Birth Families, 80 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 405, 407-08 (2003). 
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multifetal pregnancy reduction, in which one or more fetuses 
are terminated in order to increase the chances of survival of 
the remaining fetuses.453  Even disregarding anti-abortion 
arguments, there are reasons why prevention is better than 
cure.  Reduction can create a risk of miscarrying the entire 
pregnancy and may lead to feelings of loss and guilt.454 As a 
practical matter, women may refuse to undergo selective 
reduction. 
High multiple birth rates are not an inevitable 
consequence of reproductive technologies.  There are choices 
that can be made to reduce rates of multiple birth.  In the case 
of IVF, the probability of multiple gestation increases with the 
number of embryos transferred into a woman’s uterus in a 
single cycle.455  When forty countries in America, Europe and 
Asia were classified into “[three] groups depending on the 
number of transferred embryos (<2.5, 2.5-3, >3), the percentage 
of triplets increased from 1.1% to 3.2% to 5.0%” respectively.456  
Reducing the number of embryos transferred thus reduces the 
risk of multiple pregnancy.  In addition, studies suggest that, 
at least for patients with a good prognosis, transfer of more 
than two embryos does not increase the chances of success.457  
                                                          
 453. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MED., supra note 443. 
 454. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Multifetal Pregnancy 
Reduction, in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 43 (2d ed. 2003) (based 
on the AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, 
SELECTIVE EMBRYO REDUCTION: ETHICAL GUIDANCE FOR THE OBSTETRICIAN-
GYNECOLOGIST, ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION 215 (1999)). 
 455. See Allan Templeton & Joan K. Morris, Reducing the Risk of Multiple 
Births by Transfer of Two Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization, 339 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 573 (1998). 
 456. J. De Mouzon, Incidence of High Order Multiple Gestation Associated 
with ART: Registry Data Past and Present, paper presented at Bertarelli 
Foundation, First Global Conference, Nov. 20-21, 1999, Bethesda, Md., 
available at http://www.bertarelli-foundation.ch/docs/GC_1999_abstracts.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 457. See F. Devreker et al., Comparison of Two Elective Transfer Policies of 
Two Embryos to Reduce Multiple Pregnancies Without Impairing Pregnancy 
Rates, 14 HUM. REPROD. 83, 87-89 (1999); Ozkan Ozturk & Allan Templeton, 
Letter, In-Vitro Fertilisation and Risk of Multiple Pregnancy, 359 LANCET 232 
(2002); C. Staessen et al., Avoidance of Triplet Pregnancies by Elective 
Transfer of Two Good Quality Embryos, 8 HUM. REPROD. 1650, 1652 (1993); 
Murat Tasdemir et al., Two Instead of Three Embryo Transfer in In-Vitro 
Fertilization, 10 HUM. REPROD. 2155, 2157-58 (1995); Templeton & Morris, 
supra note 455, at 576-77.  Previously, it had been suspected that the transfer 
of more embryos increased the chance that an embryo would implant.  See 
R.G. Edwards, In-vitro Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement: Opening 
Lecture, 442 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 17 (1985). 
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Although the requirements for a patient to be treated as having 
a good prognosis differed between studies, all would include 
patients less than thirty-five years old who had not previously 
attempted ART where at least four embryos were created (one 
study required that at least one embryo be of good quality).  As 
a result, many experts recommend transfer of either one458 or 
two459 embryos in such patients.  These recommendations 
depend on the ability to obtain a sufficient number of high 
quality embryos and accurately assess their chance of 
implantation.460 
The numbers of embryos461 transferred in IVF procedures 
in the United States are shown in the following chart (Figure 
1). 
 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF EMBRYOS TRANSFERRED DURING ART 
CYCLES USING FRESH NON-DONOR EMBRYOS IN THE UNITED 
                                                          
 458. See, e.g., T. Coetsier & M. Dhont, Avoiding Multiple Pregnancies in In-
Vitro Fertilization: Who's Afraid of Single Embryo Transfer?, 13 HUM. 
REPROD. 2663 (1998); David Gardner et al., Single Blastocyst Transfer: A 
Prospective Randomized Trial, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 551 (2004); Jan 
Gerris & Eric Van Royen, Avoiding Multiple Pregnancies in ART – A Plea for 
Single Embryo Transfer, 15 HUM. REPROD. 1884 (2000); Jan Gerris et al., 
Prevention of Twin Pregnancy After In-Vitro Fertilization or Intracytoplasmic 
Sperm Injection Based on Strict Embryo Criteria: A Prospective Randomized 
Clinical Trial, 14 HUM. REPROD. 2581, 2583-86 (1999); H.G.M. Lukassen et 
al., Two Cycles with Single Embryo Transfer Versus One Cycle with Double 
Embryo Transfer: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 20 HUM. REPROD. 702 
(2005); B. Stromberg et al., Neurological Sequelae in Children Born After In-
Vitro Fertilisation: A Population-Based Study, 359 LANCET 461, 464 (2002). De 
Sutter et al., Single Embryo Transfer and Multiple Pregnancy Rate Reduction 
in IVF/ICSI: A Five Year Appraisal, 6 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE, 
available at http://www.rbmonline.com/Article/836 (May 30, 2003); Single 
Embryo Transfer, A New Understanding of Factors for Success, MED. NEWS 
TODAY, June 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/newssearch.php?newsid=10107 (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 459. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Fisk & Geoffrey Trew, Two's Company, Three's a 
Crowd for Embryo Transfer, 354 LANCET 1572 (1999); Brian Lieberman, An 
Embryo Too Many?, 13 HUM. REPROD. 2664, 2666 (1998); Jan Roest et al., A 
Triplet Pregnancy After In Vitro Fertilization Is a Procedure-Related 
Complication That Should Be Prevented by Replacement of Two Embryos Only, 
67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 290, 294 (1997). 
 460. See generally Gerris & Royen, supra note 459; Helen Pearson, Test 
Could Boost IVF Success, NATURE.COM, May 13, 2004, at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040510/full/040510-7.html (subscription 
service) (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
 461.  The statistics also include eggs transferred in GIFT procedures.  In 
2002, GIFT accounted for only 0.2 percent of transfers. CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 37. 
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In light of the risks outlined above, the numbers of 
transferred embryos seem unjustifiably high.  Although it is 
possible that the high numbers of embryos transferred could be 
due to large numbers of poor prognosis patients, this seems 
unlikely.  Age and number of previous attempts are two strong 
indicators of success,463 and were two of the factors taken into 
account by studies considering the effectiveness of two embryo 
transfer.464  In 2002, women less than thirty-five years old 
accounted for approximately 44% of fresh non-donor embryo 
transfers (transferring an average of 2.7 embryos per cycle) and 
55.5% of cycles were commenced by women undergoing their 
first treatment.465 While transfer of more embryos may be 
necessary in some patients, the transfer of more than two in 
the majority of cases more likely reflects clinic failure.  Some 
                                                          
 462.  Uses data from reports issued by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, available at http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/art.htm (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 463. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 
22, 32. 
 464. See supra note 457 and accompanying text. 
 465. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 
25, 31. 
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clinics with poor laboratory culture conditions and ineffective 
protocols attempt to compensate by transferring large numbers 
of embryos to increase their success rate.466  
This is unlikely to be resolved by patient pressure for safer 
outcomes.  In fact, patients may place pressure on clinics to 
transfer more embryos than might be appropriate.  Infertile 
couples often prefer, or at least have no objection to, multifetal 
pregnancies.467  In some cases, this may be the result of lack of 
information about the risks of multifetal pregnancy, but there 
are other factors.  Patients who have been unable to conceive 
may be looking for a two-child or three-child family.  They may 
be aware of, but reluctant to contemplate, the difficulties of 
raising multiples.  Patients are also concerned about the time 
taken to achieve pregnancy and the costs of treatment, which 
are incurred on a per cycle basis.468  These costs, as opposed to 
the costs of pregnancy and birth, which are usually covered by 
insurance, are usually incurred by the patient themselves.  
Thus, although single embryo transfer for some patients may 
be as cost-effective as double embryo transfer in the short term 
and more cost-effective over the long term,469 the patient’s 
                                                          
 466. See Richard Bronson, How Should the Number of Embryos 
Transferred to the Uterus Following In-Vitro Fertilization Be Determined to 
Avoid the Risk of Multiple Gestation?, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1605, 1606 (1997); 
Kenneth Faber, IVF in the US: Multiple Gestation, Economic Competition and 
the Necessity of Excess, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1614, 1615 (1997). 
 467. See N. Gleicher et al., The Desire For Multiple Births in Couples with 
Infertility Problems Contradicts Present Practice Patterns, 10 HUM. REPROD. 
1079 (1995) (recommending modifying clinical practice rather than altering 
patient opinion); G.M. Hartshorne & R.J. Lilford, Different Perspectives of 
Patients and Health Care Professionals on the Potential Benefits and Risks of 
Blastocyst Culture and Multiple Embryo Transfer, 17 HUM. REPROD. 1023 
(2002) (many infertile patients were aware of and prepared to accept risks of 
multiple pregnancy); Ginny L. Ryan et al., The Desire of Infertile Patients for 
Multiple Births, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 500 (2004) (study showed that one 
in five women listed a multiple birth as their most desired outcome of fertility 
treatment); see also Gardner, supra note 458, at 554 (discussing difficulty of 
recruiting for a study on single blastocyst transfer); James Goldfarb et al., 
Attitudes of In Vitro Feritlization and Intrauterine Insemination Couples 
Toward Multiple Gestation Pregnancy and Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction, 65 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 815 (1996) (finding that couples tend to have a 
favorable attitude to twins and triplets but less so toward quadruplets). 
 468. See Christopher J. De Jonge & Don P. Wolf, Editorial, Embryo 
Number for Transfer Should Be Regulated, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 784, 785 
(1997). 
 469. See Paul De Sutter, A Health-Economic Decision-Analytic Model 
Comparing Double with Single Embryo Transfer in IVF/ICSI, 17 HUM. 
REPROD. 2891 (2002); P. Wolner-Hanssen & H. Rydhstroem, Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis of In-Vitro Fertilization: Estimated Costs Per Successful Pregnancy 
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perspective may be skewed. 
2.  Common Law Does Not Create Sufficient Incentives 
As discussed in Part V.B.2 above, existing rules enforced 
by courts can create incentives to eliminate or modify risky 
behavior.  As discussed below, existing rules have not created a 
sufficient incentive to deter the transfer of unsuitably high 
numbers of embryos. 
a.  Contract 
If patients are aware of the risks of multifetal pregnancy, 
and limit the scope of their consent to the transfer of a small 
number of embryos, they can be compensated for damages 
incurred if more than the agreed number of embryos are 
transferred.  In the United Kingdom, Peter and Patricia 
Thompson signed a consent form after their initial consultation 
at the Sheffield Infertility Centre, agreeing to have two 
embryos transferred.470  Defendant argued that the Thompsons 
orally communicated a change of heart (though the judge did 
not find this credible), and three embryos were transferred.471  
Triplets were born in March 1997.472  The Thompsons 
succeeded against the infertility center in a suit for breach of 
contract.473 
Such cases do not, however, address the broader problem.  
The Thompsons were either well-informed or lucky signing a 
consent form that provided for the transfer of two embryos.  
Other couples, due to poor information or emotional and 
financial factors, will agree to transfer more embryos than may 
be appropriate.  Even couples who prefer to transfer fewer 
embryos are unlikely to limit their consent explicitly.  There 
may also be limited opportunities for most patients to assess 
the risks of multifetal pregnancy when giving consent; indeed, 
women are sometimes required to decide how many embryos to 
transfer at the time of the procedure.474 
                                                          
After Transfer of One or Two Embryos, 13 HUM. REPROD. 88 (1998). 
 470. Clare Dyer, Triplets’ Parents Win Right to Damages for Extra Child, 
321 BRIT. MED. J. 1306 (2000). 
 471. Id. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. 
 474. See Ellison & Hall, supra note 452, at 411. 
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b.  Tort 
Tort actions against practitioners for harm suffered due to 
multifetal pregnancy following the transfer of too many 
embryos are unlikely to be successful.  There are significant 
causation problems.  The transfer of six embryos carries with it 
a high risk of conceiving triplets.  If six embryos are 
transferred, and triplets result, the defendant will be able to 
argue that the same result could have followed from a transfer 
of fewer embryos.  The difference in risk is difficult to measure 
because it depends on the patient’s age, the number of previous 
failed IVF attempts, the quality of the embryos used, and the 
nature of the patient’s infertility. 
Because tort actions following a multiple pregnancy are 
unlikely to succeed, the risk of litigation is unlikely to deter 
practitioners from transferring more embryos than might be 
appropriate.  Nevertheless, tort law may create an incentive for 
practitioners to advise patients of the risks of multiple 
pregnancy.  This reduces one of the market failures (lack of 
information) but may not affect the patient’s willingness to 
take risks as a consequence of their desperation or financial 
circumstances.475 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Attempting to Address Market Flaws – United States 
The introduction of ARTs, including IVF, into the United 
States has had a significant impact on the proportion of births 
involving multiples.  The rates of triplet and higher order 
multiples per 100,000 births increased from 29 in 1971 to 37 in 
1980 (following FDA approval of two ovulation-inducing drugs) 
                                                          
 475. See Hartshorne & Lilford, supra note 467, at 1027-28 (noting that 
patients are more willing to accept the risks of multiple pregnancy than their 
doctors and clinicians); Ryan et al., supra note 467, at 502-03 (It was found 
that the desire for multiple births was significantly associated with lower 
family income and longer duration of pregnancy, but not associated with 
knowledge about triplet gestation outcomes.  However, the desire for multiple 
births was also associated with limited knowledge about the outcomes of twin 
gestation.). 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
2005] RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 591 
 
and then to 193.5 in 1998 (following the introduction of IVF).476  
The three biggest contributors to the triplet and higher order 
birth rate are IVF and related technologies, ovulation-inducing 
drugs, and increasing maternal age.477  In 1998, for example, 
56% of the infants born in the United States using IVF and 
related procedures were one of multiples as compared with the 
national average of 3%.478 
There is currently no mandatory limit on the number of 
embryos that can be transferred in the United States.  Many 
practitioners oppose mandated restrictions on the grounds that 
individual patient factors, including age, need to be taken into 
account in determining how many embryos to transfer.479  
While some practitioners favor at least a professionally 
recommended limit,480 legislatively mandated limits on embryo 
transfer are generally opposed.481  The New York State Task 
                                                          
 476. Centers for Disease Control, Contribution of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology and Ovulation-Inducing Drugs to Triplet and Higher-Order 
Multiple Births – United States, 1980-1997, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 535, 536 (2000); Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 
2000, 50 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 19 (2002). 
 477. See Martin, et al., supra note 476, at 19. 
 478. Centers for Disease Control, Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
– United States, 1996 and 1998, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 97, 
99 (2002). 
 479. See, e.g., Foad Azem et al., Transfer of Six or More Embryos Improves 
Success Rates in Patients with Repeated In Vitro Fertilization Failures, 63 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1043, 1045-46 (1995) (recommending transfer of six or 
more embryos for women with repeated IVF failures); Maria Bustillo, 
Imposing Limits on the Number of Oocytes and Embryos Transferred: Is It 
Necessary/Wise or Naughty/Nice?, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1616, 1617 (1997); Ian 
Craft & Talha al-Shawaf, Correspondence, Limiting the Number of Oocytes 
and Embryos Transferred in GIFT and IVF, 303 BRIT. MED. J. 185 (1991); 
Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Jean Cohen, ART – The Number to Transfer, 76 
FERTILITY & STERILITY S12, S13 (2001); Roelof J. van Kooij et al., Age-
Dependent Decrease in Embryo Implantation Rate After In Vitro Fertilization, 
66 FERTILITY & STERILITY 769, 774 (1996) (recommending three embryos in 
women over 38); Laura A. Schieve et al., Live-Birth Rates and Multiple-Birth 
Risk Using In Vitro Fertilization, 282 JAMA 1832 (1999); Eric A. Widra et al., 
Achieving Multiple-Order Embryo Transfer Identifies Women over 40 Years of 
Age with Improved In Vitro Fertilization Outcome, 65 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
103, 107 (1996) (recommending transfer of four or more embryos in women 
over 40). But see Selim Senoz et al., An IVF Fallacy: Multiple Pregnancy Risk 
is Lower for Older Women, 14 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 192 (1997). 
 480. See, e.g., Howard W. Jones, Jr., Multiple Births: How Are We Doing?, 
79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 17 (2003); Howard W. Jones, Jr. & John A. Schnorr, 
Multiple Pregnancies: A Call for Action, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 11 (2001); 
Jonge & Wolf, supra note 468. 
 481. See generally, e.g., Mina Alikani & Klaus Wiemer, Embryo Number for 
Transfer Should Not be Strictly Regulated, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 782 
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Force on Life and the Law considered recommending a limit on 
the number of embryos transferred, but opted for professional 
standards instead.482  Its reasoning (which is fairly typical) was 
as follows: 
In general, legislation is an inappropriate vehicle for making medical 
treatment decisions, particularly those involving complex and 
evolving clinical variables.  In the context of ARTs, the appropriate 
number of embryos and/or oocytes to transfer may vary considerably 
from case to case, depending on the patient’s age, the number of 
previously failed attempts, the condition of the embryos, or other 
factors.  The optimum number is also subject to change as clinicians 
develop better methods for evaluating embryo condition prior to 
transfer and for improving the likelihood of implantation.  Limits set 
by legislation are unlikely to keep pace with these developments.483 
The ASRM Practice Committee has consistently sided with 
those seeking flexibility.  In 1994, it chose not to impose any 
limit on the number of embryos that could be transferred, 
however, it recommended that the number be chosen so that no 
quadruplets and no more than 1% to 2% triplet pregnancies 
were anticipated.484  In 1998, it repeated its conclusion that 
there should be no limit on the number of embryos that could 
be transferred.485  Instead, it suggested that clinics create their 
own guidelines based on internally generated statistics.486  In 
the absence of sufficient data at a clinic, it suggested that 
between three and five good embryos be transferred, depending 
on the patient’s profile, taking into account factors such as age 
and prior treatment history.487  This was revised in November 
1999, when the recommendation was changed to between two 
                                                          
(1997); David Adamson & Valerie Baker, Multiple Births from Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies: A Challenge that Must Be Met, 81 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 517, 522 (2004); Bronson, supra note 466, at 1606; Faber, supra 
note 466, at 1616; Larry I. Palmer, In-Vitro Fertilization as a Social 
Experiment, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1617 (1997); Jamie Grifo et al. (on behalf of 
SART), Commentary, We are Due for a Correction… and We are Working to 
Achieve One, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 14 (2001); see also Andrea L. 
Bonnicksen & Robert H. Blank, The Government and In Vitro Fertilization 
(IVF): Views of IVF Directors, 49 FERTILITY & STERLITY 396 (1988). 
 482. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 191, at 170. 
 483. Id. But see ISLAT Working Group, supra note 393, at 652 
(recommending a mandatory limit of four embryos). 
 484. Ethics Comm. of the American Fertility Soc’y, Ethical Considerations 
of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 62  FERTILITY & STERILITY 1S, 37S 
(1994). 
 485. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., GUIDELINES ON NUMBER OF EMBRYOS 
TRANSFERRED (1998). 
 486. Id.  
 487. Id.  
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and five embryos.488  These guidelines were flexible and 
standard-like, allowing adjustment for “individual clinic 
conditions”.  The guidelines used terms such as “usually” and 
addressed only “good quality” embryos, thus allowing for 
deviation.489  The most recent version of the guidelines was 
published in 2004 and uses less flexible language.490  ASRM 
also seeks to educate patients about the risks of multiple births 
and publishes a patient information guide on the issue.491  The 
ACOG Committee on Ethics basically agrees with the ASRM 
Practice Committee, although it is working towards the goal of 
single embryo transfer.492   
Perhaps because of the weak preferences expressed until 
recently in professional guidelines, they have not been followed 
by all practitioners.  In response to criticism regarding the high 
rates of non-compliance, SART has threatened loss of 
membership,493 although it has not carried out this threat.494 
The United States has not relied solely on professional 
mechanisms to alleviate the problems of multiple births.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention publish statistics 
pursuant to the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification 
Act that include indicators of the performance of each clinic.  
For the first time, the 2001 statistics (published in 2003) 
showed the number of singleton births per cycle for each 
reporting clinic as a measure of success.495  If this becomes a 
                                                          
 488. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., GUIDELINES ON NUMBER OF EMBRYOS 
TRANSFERRED (1999), available at 
http://www.fertilityoregon.com/forms/NoEmbryosTransferred.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2005). 
 489. Id.; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 191, at 
170. 
 490. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines on the Number of Embryos 
Transferred, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 733 (2004) [hereinafter Embryo 
Transfer Guidelines], available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Practice/NoEmbryosTransferred.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2005). 
 491. See AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., MULTIPLE PREGNANCY AND BIRTH: 
TWINS, TRIPLETS & HIGHER ORDER MULTIPLES: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS (2004), 
available at http://www.asrm.org/Literature/patient.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2005). 
 492. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 454, at 
42. 
 493. Grifo, et al., supra note 481, at 14. 
 494. Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A 
Call for New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 276-77 (2003). 
 495.  See CDC Website, at http://www.cdc.gov/node.do/id/0900f3ec8000ec28 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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common basis for comparing the performance of different 
clinics, it is likely to reduce the pressure on poorly performing 
clinics to transfer more embryos in order to increase their 
success rate.  Information disclosures may thus serve to 
enhance appropriate competition and improve performance.496 
Increased insurance coverage for IVF and related services 
may also decrease patient pressures to risk multifetal 
pregnancies.497  This is because, unless covered by insurance, 
couples must bear the cost of multiple IVF attempts but not the 
costs associated with multifetal pregnancy.498  This hypothesis 
is borne out in surveys on the link between insurance coverage 
and multiple births.  One survey suggests that mandated 
insurance coverage for IVF leads to a decreased number of 
embryos transferred and hence a lower multiple birth rate per 
cycle.499  A more recent survey indicates that this may only 
apply in states with mandatory insurance requirements that do 
not restrict the number of IVF cycles covered.500  Thus, state 
legislation mandating insurance coverage for IVF may reduce 
multiple births. 
It will take time to see whether these federal and state 
measures reduce the rates of multiple pregnancies by reducing 
the number of embryos practitioners are willing to transfer.  
Thus far, there are signs that the situation is improving, if 
slowly.  Figure 1 reflects a slow decline in the number of 
embryos transferred per cycle.  The average number of embryos 
transferred per cycle began decreasing in 1997, with the 
steepest decline (an 11.1% decrease) between 1998 and 1999.501 
This coincides with the publication of the 1998 ASRM 
guidelines, which for the first time specified how many embryos 
                                                          
 496. See generally Sage, supra note 320. 
 497. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 498. Faber, supra note 466, at 1615. 
 499. D. Frankfurter et al., Insurance Mandates for IVF Coverage Effectively 
Lower Multiple Births Per Embryo Transfer, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 51S 
(1998). 
 500. Meredith A. Reynolds et al., Does Insurance Coverage Decrease the 
Risk for Multiple Births Associated with Assisted Reproductive Technology?, 80 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 16 (2003). See generally Tarun Jain et al., Insurance 
Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 
(2002); William D. Schoff, Impact of Insurance Coverage on In Vitro 
Ferilization Practice Patterns: A Complex Relationship, 80 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 30 (2003). 
 501. Tarun Jain, Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of 
the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 NEW. 
ENG. J. MED. 1639, 1641 (2004). 
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ought to be transferred for particular classes of patients, 
although other factors may also have played a role.502  There 
are not yet any data on the effect of the more strongly worded 
and precise 2004 guidelines.503 
In part as a consequence of these changes in practice, the 
number of triplets and other higher order multiple births per 
100,000 in the United States declined from 193.5 in 1998 to 
180.5 in 2000.504  The percentage of live-born infants conceived 
using ARTs that were triplets or higher order decreased from 
13.5% in 1997 to 9.9% in 2000.505  The reports issued by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show a similar 
trend, especially for triplets (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: PROPORTION OF ART BIRTHS USING FRESH NONDONOR 
EGGS OR EMBRYOS THAT ARE SINGLETONS, TWINS, OR HIGHER 
ORDER: 1998-2002506 
                                                          
 502. Id. at 1641, 1643-44. 
 503. See Embryo Transfer Guidelines, supra note 490. 
 504. Martin et al., supra note 476, at 19. 
 505. Meredith A. Reynolds et al., Trends in Multiple Births Conceived 
Using Assisted Reproductive Technology, United States, 1997-2000, 111 
PEDIATRICS 1159, 1160 tbl.1 (2003). 
 506. The information is taken from the reports available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/art.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). Note 
that the large difference in these figures compared to those above is due to the 
differences in what is being measured (proportion of live infants versus 
proportion of live births). 
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The United States preference for slow improvement in 
reducing the incidence of multiples is partly cultural and partly 
pragmatic.  There are political forces, in addition to 
professional groups, opposing regulation as a means of reducing 
the number of multifetal pregnancies.  RESOLVE, a patient 
advocacy group, is against imposition of mandatory limits on 
the number of embryos transferred.507  The current approach is 
seen as reducing the number of multifetal pregnancies without 
limiting the ability of medical practitioners to make a decision 
to transfer greater numbers of embryos when appropriate.  At 
least according to SART’s website, this approach has some 
supporters in Europe, too.508 
4.  Strong Professional Regulation – Australia 
In most states of Australia509 and in New Zealand, there is 
                                                          
 507. Letter from Bonnie Gilbert, Acting Executive Director, RESOLVE, to 
Mr. O. Carter Snead, General Counsel, President’s Council on Bioethics (Apr. 
15, 2003). 
 508. See SART Website, at http://www.sart.org/whatis.html (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2005). 
 509. In South Australia, no more than three embryos may be transferred in 
a single cycle. Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) 
Regulations, 1995, § 5 (S. Austl.).  Approximately 6 % of cycles are carried out 
on patients resident in South Australia.  JISHAN H. DEAN & ELIZABETH A. 
SULLIVAN, AUSTL. INST. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, ASSISTED CONCEPTION 
SERIES NO. 7, ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: 2000 
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no mandatory limit on the number of embryos that may be 
transferred.  However, the number of embryos transferred per 
cycle is on average significantly less than in the United States, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF EMBRYOS TRANSFERRED DURING FRESH 
NON-DONOR ART CYCLES IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AS 
COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES IN 2002.510 
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There are various possible explanations for the difference, 
other than cultural factors.  Like ASRM, RTAC has issued 
guidelines on the transfer of multiple embryos, but its 
recommendations are more rule-like than the 1999 ASRM 
guidelines.511  The RTAC Code of Practice provides: 
RTAC requests that Centres consider very carefully the need to 
transfer more than two oocytes or embryos in each treatment cycle.  
Exceptional clinical circumstances may justify more than two 
oocytes/embryos to be transferred but there should be good 
documentation to support such decisions.  Despite all care multiple 
                                                          
AND 2001, at 25 tbl.21 (2003), available at 
http://www.npsu.unsw.edu.au/ac7.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
 510. See supra Part V.C.2 fig.1; JOANNA BRYANT ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ASSISTED CONCEPTION SERIES NO. 8, SUPPLEMENT TO 
ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: 2002, at 6 tbl.W3 
(2004), available at http://www.npsu.unsw.edu.au/art8high.htm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2005).   
 511. It is not yet known whether the more rule-like 2004 ASRM guidelines 
will reduce the number of multiple births in the United States. 
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births may occur and the patient(s) should be warned of this 
possibility together with attendant risks of multiple pregnancy.  The 
availability (or otherwise) of selective reduction should be discussed 
as clinically appropriate.512 
This provision is clarified in Attachment F to the 
Guidelines, which explains: 
The phrase in exceptional circumstances must not be interpreted 
liberally.  For women 40 years and older the higher genetic 
abnormality rate may make it permissible to transfer three embryos 
or oocytes.  Each case should be considered on its merits and patients 
must be warned that high order multiple pregnancies can 
occasionally occur at any age . . . .  RTAC will request additional 
information from clinics reporting unacceptably high numbers of 
multiple pregnancies.513 
RTAC regards as “unacceptable” twin rates of more than 
20%.514  RTAC may reduce the recommended number of 
embryos for transfer.515 
There are also greater incentives for clinics in Australia to 
heed RTAC’s advice than for clinics in the United States to 
follow ASRM guidelines.  In particular, participation in 
government drug subsidies and research grants depend on 
RTAC membership.516  RTAC also inspects clinics and monitors 
performance to ensure compliance with its Code of Practice, 
whereas SART allows its members to ignore guidelines without 
consequence.  In Victoria, which accounts for about 22% of IVF, 
ISCI, and GIFT cycles, collectively,517 RTAC membership is 
mandatory.  In addition, licensed centers in Victoria are 
required to put a notation on a patient’s medical record of the 
number of oocytes or embryos transferred and, if more than 
two, the reasons for the decision.518 However, although there 
are few available data for comparison, it does not seem that 
Victoria is achieving more than New South Wales in reducing 
the number of high order pregnancies.519 
                                                          
 512. FERTILITY SOC’Y OF AUSTL., supra note 268, at 5.1. 
 513. Id. Attachment F. 
 514. INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTH., CONDITIONS FOR LICENCE 2.5.4 (5th 
ed. 2004). 
 515. Michael Bradley, Push to Curb Multiple IVF Births, THE AGE, Mar. 8, 
2004, available at 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/07/1078594239255.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 516. See supra notes 284, 285 and accompanying text. 
 517. Dean & Sullivan, supra note 509, at 25 tbl.21. 
 518. See INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTH., supra note 514; FERTILITY SOC’Y 
OF AUSTL., supra note 268, Attachment F. 
 519. In 2000, 0.8% of all births of at least 20 weeks gestation in New South 
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Perhaps as a result of the reduced number of embryos 
transferred, Australia has less of a problem with high order 
multiples than the United States.  In 2002, 0.6% of all 
Australian ART deliveries were triplets (there were no higher 
order deliveries), whereas in the United States, 3.8% of births 
following fresh nondonor IVF cycles, 2.3% of births following 
frozen nondonor IVF cycles, and 2.8% of births following fresh 
donor IVF cycles resulted in triplet or higher order 
deliveries.520  The data described here are insufficient to draw 
firm conclusions.  However, it would seem that professional 
regulation can help reduce the number of high order multifetal 
pregnancies, especially when there are strong incentives for 
compliance.521  Both the United States and Australia have 
reduced the number of multifetal pregnancies without 
preventing practitioners from making an individualized 
decision to transfer greater numbers of embryos when the 
chance of pregnancy is otherwise poor. 
5.  State Regulation – United Kingdom 
As in Australia and the United States, the introduction of 
ART caused an increase in the numbers of multiple births in 
the United Kingdom  The rates of triplet and higher order 
multiples per 100,000 births increased from 31 in 1966-1970 to 
42 in 1985 and then to 81 in 1989.522  In 1988, over half of all 
pregnancies and births in the United Kingdom involving 
triplets or more were attributed to IVF and GIFT.523 
                                                          
Wales were triplets or higher order, as compared to 1.2% for Victoria.  Dean & 
Sullivan, supra note 517, at 44 tbl.70.  However, the triplet rate in Victoria 
had by 2002 decreased to 0.3%; there are no later data for New South Wales. 
INFERTILITY TREATMENT AUTH., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2003), available at 
http://www.ita.org.au/_documents/reports/ITA_annualreport03.pdf. 
 520. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 
20, 46, 50; Bryant et al, supra note 510, at 22. 
 521. There was a significant reduction in the number of high order 
multiple births in Australia soon after RTAC introduced its recommendation 
on the number of embryos to transfer.  See Helen A. Jonas & Judith Lumley, 
Triplets and Quadruplets Born in Victoria Between 1982 and 1990, 158 MED. 
J. AUST. 659, 663 (1993). 
 522. Beverley J. Botting et al, Background, in THREE, FOUR, AND MORE: A 
STUDY OF TRIPLET AND HIGHER ORDER BIRTHS 19-21 (Beverley J. Botting et 
al. eds., 1980). 
 523. GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY AND REPRODUCTION 114-15 (1991). 
A separate study found the figure to be 24% for IVF and 11% for GIFT.  
Malcolm I. Levene et al., Higher Multiple Births and the Modern Management 
of Infertility in Britain, 99 BR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 607, 608 
(1992). 
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The issue of transferring multiple embryos was debated in 
the United Kingdom from the mid-1980s.524  Prior to that, 
multiple pregnancy was accepted by organizations such as the 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists as justifiable 
when balanced against the benefits of transferring multiple 
embryos.525  The Voluntary Licensing Authority had initially 
recommended transfer of up to three or four embryos.526  In 
1986, the Voluntary Licensing Authority recommended that no 
more than three embryos or eggs should be transferred in any 
single cycle unless there were exceptional circumstances 
justifying the transfer of four;527 in 1987, this became part of 
the guidelines.528  The decision was controversial.529 One clinic, 
the infertility unit at Humana Wellington Hospital, refused to 
agree in writing to abide by the guideline and consequently lost 
its license, although it later agreed.530  Nevertheless, by 1990, 
compliance was not universal.531 
In 1991, HFEA imposed a legal restriction limiting the 
maximum number of embryos that could be transferred in the 
course of an IVF procedure to three.532  This was done by 
introducing a requirement into the Code of Practice that, if 
breached, could result in loss or variation of a license.533  It has 
been suggested that the Voluntary Licensing Authority would 
                                                          
 524. See Price, supra note 216, at 43. 
 525. ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, REPORT OF 
THE RCOG ETHICS COMMITTEE ON IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO 
REPLACEMENT OR TRANSFER 2.5 (Mar. 1983) 
 526. GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 53. 
 527. See generally Jeremy Laurance, The Test-Tube Dilemma, 82 NEW 
SOC’Y 19 (1987). 
 528. Price, supra note 216, at 43-44. 
 529. See Ian Craft et al., Letter, Voluntary Licensing and IVF/ET, 1 
LANCET 1148, 1148 (1987); Ian Craft et al., Letter, Licensing Work on IVF and 
Related Procedures, 1 LANCET 1373, 1373 (1987); David C. Anderson, Licensing 
Work on IVF and Related Procedures, 1 LANCET 1373, 1373 (1987); Martin 
Richards and Frances Price, Letter, Licensing Work on IVF and Related 
Procedures, 1 LANCET 1373, 1373 (1987); Ian Craft et al., Letter, How Many 
Oocytes/Embryos Should be Transferred, 2 LANCET 109, 109 (1987); Paul A.L. 
Lancaster, Letter, How Many Oocytes/Embryos Should be Transferred, 2 
LANCET 110, 110 ((1987). 
 530. GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 56; see also Laurance, supra 
note 527, at 19. 
 531. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2 
(1992). 
 532. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE 
7.6 (1st ed. 1991). 
 533.  Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990,  § 25(6) 
(U.K.). 
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have taken the same step had it continued in operation.534  
Although there are no reports of clinics defying the HFEA 
limit, there is evidence to suggest that this measure failed to 
reduce the rates of multiple births in women undergoing 
IVF.535  This was perhaps due to the improvements in 
technique that lead to higher rates of implantation.536  
According to professional opinion at the time, it would have 
been preferable to reduce the number of embryos to two in 
younger women, but allow for up to four in older women.537 
In 2000, the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists recommended the transfer of no more than two 
embryos; this recommendation was adopted by HFEA in 2001, 
which stated that exceptional circumstances should be 
documented before three embryos are transferred.538 HFEA has 
since restricted multiple embryo transfer further. Paragraph 
5.5(vi) of the current Code of Practice requires that information 
about the risks of multiple pregnancy be provided to 
individuals seeking treatment.539  Paragraphs 8.20 and 8.21 
require that IVF centers ensure that that women under 40 or 
those using donated ova receive no more than two embryos, and 
that other women receive no more than three.540  There are no 
exceptions based on individual circumstances.541 
The change in professional and HFEA recommendations 
seems to have had a positive effect on the rate of triplets in the 
United Kingdom. The rate of triplets and higher order 
                                                          
 534. GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 3, at 119. 
 535. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., SECOND ANNUAL 
REPORT 19 (1993). 
 536. Id. 
 537. Lieberman, supra note 243, at 1781. 
 538. ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, THE 
MANAGEMENT OF INFERTILITY IN TERTIARY CARE 10 (2000); Press Release, 
Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, HFEA Reduces Maximum 
Number Of Embryos Transferred in Single IVF Treatment from Three to Two 
(Aug. 8, 2001), available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive/HFEAreducesmaximumnumberof
embryostransferredinsingleIVFtreatmentfromthreetotwo (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
 539.  See HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF 
PRACTICE, supra note 532, at para. 5.5(vi).  HFEA has published a leaflet for 
this purpose.  Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, Avoiding 
Multiple Births: Deciding How Many Embryos to Transfer, available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/HFEAPublications/HFEAleaflets (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
 540.  Id. at paras. 8.20-.21. 
 541.  See id. 
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multiples per 100,000 births (including stillbirths) went from 
132.0 in 2000, to 109.2 in 2001, to 90.4 in 2002 to 63.9 in 
2003.542  This reversed a fairly consistent uptrend (Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4: U.K. BABIES PER 100,000 BORN ONE OF TRIPLETS OR 
MORE543 
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The rigidity of HFEA’s approach, while creating general 
benefits by reducing the rate of multiple births, significantly 
restricts the freedom of individual patients and their clinicians.  
The case of R (on the application of the Assisted Reproduction 
and Gynaecology Centre) v HFEA544 is illustrative.  Between 
June 1996 and July 2000, Mrs. H underwent eight IVF 
treatment cycles, in each of which three embryos were placed in 
her uterus.545  The medical director at the clinic treating her, 
Mr. Taranissi, was of the view that the risk of multiple 
                                                          
 542. Based on data available from the Office of National Statistics in the 
United Kingdom; OFFICE FOR NAT'L STATISTICS, DATASET PBH61, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/xsdataset.asp?vlnk=4793&More=Y (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). The difference between the U.S. and U.K. data cannot be 
explained by differences in the proportion of births following ART procedures, 
which is about 1% in both countries. See HUMAN FERTILIZATION & 
EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., FACTS AND FIGURES, available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Factsandfigures (last visited Apr. 7, 2005); 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 13. 
 543.  OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 542. 
 544. [2002] EWCA Civ 20. 
 545. Id. at [17]. 
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pregnancy was non-existent and believed that it was necessary 
to transfer more than three embryos to have a reasonable 
chance of achieving pregnancy.546  HFEA rejected Mr. 
Taranissi’s request to transfer more than three embryos, and 
judicial review of its decisions was unsuccessful.  Restrictions 
on the freedom of clinicians to determine what is best for each 
individual patient in the context of multiple embryo transfer is 
the most common criticism of HFEA by clinics.547 
Interestingly, while the United Kingdom restricts how 
many embryos may be transferred in the course of IVF, HFEA 
has no power to limit the number of eggs transferred in a GIFT 
procedure unless donor gametes are used.548  The irony of this 
was observed by Mr. Taranissi in the course of his 
correspondence with HFEA: “[S]hould [Mrs. H’s] tubes been 
patent, GIFT procedure with the replacement of an unlimited 
number of eggs would have been an accepted medical 
practice.”549  Biological circumstance thus affects a patient’s 
ability to increase her chance of pregnancy where the need for 
more than three eggs is considered clinically necessary.  By the 
same token, HFEA is unable to directly influence the number of 
multifetal pregnancies arising in the context of GIFT, although 
it can give guidance.550  While there is no data on the statistical 
effect of this loophole, anecdotal evidence suggests that, 
although GIFT is rarely used in the United Kingdom, some 
practitioners do transfer far more than two eggs per cycle.551  
This is despite the fact that GIFT is mostly carried out in 
HFEA licensed clinics and that, according to a survey 
conducted by HFEA in 1994, there is no evidence of 
“inappropriate” use.552 
                                                          
 546. Id. at [18]. 
 547. SECOND QUINQUENNIAL REVIEW OF THE HUMAN FERTILISATION AND 
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, REPORT TO UK HEALTH MINISTERS 5.33 (Oct. 1, 
2000). 
 548. GIFT is only subject to the UK Act if donor gametes are used.  Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990,  § 4(1)(b) (U.K.).  This could be 
altered by regulation. Id. § 4(3). 
 549. R v. HFEA at [20] (quoting July 9, 2000 letter from Mr. Taranissi to 
HFEA). 
 550. UK Act § 25(3). 
 551. R. Winston, The UK National Policy Towards the Prevention of High 
Order Multiple Gestation, paper presented at Bertarelli Foundation, First 
Global Conference, November 20-21, 1999, Bethesda, MD, available at 
http://www.bertarelli-foundation.ch/docs/GC_1999_abstracts.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2005). 
 552. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., FOURTH ANNUAL 
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6.  Conclusions 
This Part looked at four different regulatory approaches: 
professional guidelines supplemented by government 
intervention (United States), professional guidelines with 
strong incentives to comply (New South Wales), professional 
guidelines with mandated compliance (Victoria), and regulation 
by a government authority using a clear rule (United 
Kingdom).  The choice as to which regime is optimal in dealing 
with the problem of multiple gestation will depend on the goal.  
Generally speaking, codes of practice prepared by a 
professional organization are likely to offer more flexibility 
than those prepared by an administrative agency.  If one is 
concerned about procreative liberty and the importance of 
keeping decisions within a therapeutic relationship, the former 
course may be more attractive.  On the other hand, there are 
advantages in ensuring that guidelines are taken seriously, 
either by creating incentives in legislation (New South Wales) 
or by making compliance mandatory (Victoria).  Much will also 
depend on the content of the guidelines proffered (the ASRM 
guideline allows for the transfer of more embryos than the 
RTAC code of practice).  Government may be able to exercise 
some influence in encouraging professional organizations to 
tighten standards and adopt internal enforcement 
mechanisms.553  The United States approach has been 
successful at reducing rates of multifetal pregnancy, but is 
apparently less successful than the approaches in Australia 
and the United Kingdom.  If the goal is to reduce the numbers 
of multifetal pregnancies without unnecessarily reducing a 
patient’s likelihood of having a child, the Australian 
approaches seem best.  These  would also be less likely to run 
into constitutional difficulties than a strict limit on the number 
of embryos that can be transferred.554 
A decision to abstain from state regulation in order to 
assess the potential of professional regulation is not 
                                                          
REPORT 21 (1995). 
 553. The President’s Council on Bioethics recommended greater 
enforcement of existing professional guidelines.  See REPRODUCTION & 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 142, at 218-19. 
 554. See supra Part II.B.3.  Although the health of the mother and her 
future children could be compelling government interests, a limit that did not 
take into account the circumstances of the woman would likely be considered 
unduly burdensome because it may significantly reduce the ability of some 
women to bear a child. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 
(1992). 
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irreversible.  Legislation has been introduced in New South 
Wales that would control only those aspects of IVF that either 
are not dealt with by RTAC or are important politically.555  If 
the state decides to intervene, there may be advantages in 
some fields to allowing professional organizations to craft the 
rules (subject always to the possibility that they will be 
overridden by legislation or regulation).  Such rules are more 
likely to factor in professional concerns (such as the need for 
flexibility) and are easier to update with improvements in 
technology and scientific understanding.  On the other hand, 
there are some areas, particularly those that generate social 
controversy such as cloning, that are best left to a democratic 
forum.  What is important is that the benefits of alternative 
forms of regulation are considered before proposing new 
legislation. 
VI.  RESOLVING UNCERTAINTY 
As discussed in Part II.E above, technological change can 
bring about uncertainty in the law.  No state of uncertainty is 
irresolvable; the question might be answered if it arises in a 
legal case or the law might be changed by legislation or 
regulation..  If uncertainty arises in the context of a statutory 
scheme administered by an agency, the agency may have power 
to decide on an interpretation of the legislation.556  Of course, 
the resolution reached may be ambiguous, incomplete, or 
contain latent ambiguities that future technological change 
may reveal.   
There are two reasons why excess uncertainty might be 
thought undesirable: (1) litigation may be required to resolve 
disputes where the law is unclear; and (2) the fact of 
uncertainty may be problematic in itself, as it may, for 
example, impede the growth of a market.  If the second concern 
applies to a significant extent, so that the uncertainty itself has 
wide-ranging effects, the need for prompt action will trump 
most of the considerations raised here.557  That is not to say 
that these considerations are not relevant, only that they will 
usually be outweighed.  The focus in this Part is therefore on 
                                                          
 555. See supra notes 291-295 and accompanying text. 
 556. In the United States, an agency’s interpretation may be entitled to 
judicial deference.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 865 (1984). 
 557. This concern may also be overestimated.  See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort 
Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 154-56 (1995). 
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situations where the primary reason to resolve an uncertainty 
is to avoid disputes. 
A.  DISADVANTAGES OF LEGISLATION – THE LIMITS OF WORDS 
Fear of uncertainty is often a driver for legislation.  Thus 
both legal scholars and law reform organizations frequently 
move from the existence of uncertainty to the need for 
legislation without further analysis.  Sometimes, that jump can 
be justified because the uncertainty itself causes problems.  
However, when there is no specific need to resolve the 
uncertainty promptly, it is important to consider the 
disadvantages that are associated with pursuit of a legislative 
solution. 
The first factor to consider is the cost of pursuing 
legislation.  The time of political staff, legislators, committees 
and the parliament or congress itself is valuable.  The real 
question is whether the cost of legislation (or, where relevant, 
administrative action) exceeds the cost (for the parties and the 
government) of a judicial decision.  This is impossible to 
measure in the abstract, and will depend on predictions as to 
the likelihood of litigation and the number of cases it may to 
take to resolve the uncertainty.  Where a statutory rule is 
uncertain, there are no other factors to consider. 
When the uncertain rule is found in the common law, there 
are flexibility losses in taking the rule out of the judicial realm 
and placing it, reformed, into legislation.  In particular, a 
statutory rule risks greater over-inclusiveness or under-
inclusiveness in its application to new situations.558  A statute 
resolving uncertainty will only apply to those situations within 
the possible scope of the language used.  Each time the 
technology evolves beyond what the legislature had 
contemplated, it is possible that new uncertainties will surface 
or that the rule will become over-inclusive or under-inclusive.  
This is evident from the history of laws governing gamete 
donation; the legislation employed in many jurisdictions to 
resolve issues related to paternity did not apply to the use of 
egg donation.559  Thus a decision to move an uncertain common 
                                                          
 558. See supra Part II.G. 
 559. Thus, as of 2001, 42 states had laws regulating sperm donation 
whereas only five states had addressed oocyte donation.  NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GENETICS POLICY REPORT: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 9 (2001). See generally supra notes 134-135 and accompanying 
text. 
BENNETT_MOSES_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:41:19 PM 
2005] RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 607 
 
law rule to a certain statutory rule needs to take account of 
costs, not only the costs of the initial enactment, but also of 
future enactments following further technological change. 
It may seem as if an alternative solution would be 
technologically-neutral drafting.  The problem could be resolved 
if initial legislation used terms like vehicle instead of horse-
drawn carriage, gamete instead of sperm, and so forth.  
Drafters, however, are limited by foresight.  If technological 
change is unpredictable, it is difficult to allow for it in advance.  
It would have been prescient but surprising for legislation 
referring generally to assisted reproduction rather than to 
artificial insemination to have been enacted before the 1970s. 
There is another sense in which the common law is more 
flexible than legislation.  Such a rule can be altered or 
overturned by some courts and by legislation, whereas, unless 
unconstitutional, statutory rules can only be amended by 
legislation.  Of course, judges can interpret the words in a 
statute to accommodate advances in technology, including 
within the scope of a statute conduct that was not possible at 
the time it was drafted.  But judges are limited to the words; it 
would require a fair degree of judicial creativity to decide that 
an automobile is really a horse-drawn carriage, that an egg is 
the same as a sperm, or that a machine can be the “body of a 
woman.”  In such circumstances, a statutory rule must wait 
until the legislature has time to address the problem.  A 
common law rule can be adjusted or further clarified (if 
necessary) as soon as it becomes the subject of a formal dispute. 
B.  A POSSIBLE SOLUTION – DELEGATION 
The reason why many statutes fail to keep up with 
technological change is that the legislative process is 
cumbersome.  If rules are formulated in legislation, the limits 
inherent in the words used continue until the legislation can be 
amended.  However, legislation can be designed to give other 
institutions (such as agencies and courts) room to maneuver in 
interpreting legislation in light of technological change.  This 
can be done by (1) delegating to an administrative agency the 
power to resolve uncertainties, (2) employing broad language so 
as to allow maximum scope for interpretation, or (3) creating 
standards rather than rules, thus allowing the agency or courts 
to make adjustments.  While these mechanisms can reduce 
problems in legislation, they do not eliminate them entirely.  
Delegation is never complete, as some limits are inevitably 
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spelled out in the legislation. 
C.  DISADVANTAGES OF THE COMMON LAW –LIMITED  
POSSIBILITIES AND BURDENED LITIGANTS 
The common law seems to hold an advantage over 
legislation.  This advantage has to be weighed against possible 
objections to judicial resolution of uncertainty.  Most 
significantly, the common law is stuck within its own 
paradigms.  While legislatures are only restricted by the 
boundaries of any constitution and, in the case of a state, 
federal legislation, judges are more limited.  An area of 
uncertainty might allow a judge a choice between alternatives, 
but creative solutions that may be possible in a legislative 
context may not be possible judicially. 
When the manner of resolving the uncertainty will have 
important policy implications or may implicate community 
values, judges may not be the most appropriate decision-
makers.  For example, the status of an embryo may be a matter 
of legitimate community concern best resolved by democratic 
means. 
In addition, judges may be at a disadvantage because they 
consider one case at a time.  Statutes are typically drafted from 
a broader perspective despite the fact that politics will 
inevitably thrust some examples to the forefront of drafters’ 
minds.  Entire legal regimes, together with exceptions and 
transitional provisions can be enacted simultaneously.  The 
content of and exceptions to common law rules tend to evolve 
more slowly in response to specific scenarios.  This enables 
flexibility but can create problems of consistency.560 
In addition to these issues, a failure to legislate may lead 
to inequity in the burden of costs required to clarify the 
uncertainty.  If legislation is enacted, these costs are ultimately 
borne by taxpayers.  If the question is left to the common law, 
the cost of disputes falls on the litigants. 
D.  AN EXAMPLE: CONTROL OF EMBRYOS 
It is thus apparent that there are a number of factors to be 
considered in choosing to resolve uncertainty through 
legislation.  To illustrate how these factors play out in a specific 
context, consider the example of uncertainty related to the 
                                                          
 560. See, e.g., Heard, supra note 112, at 929; Lorne Elkin Rozovsky, Legal 
Aspects of Human and Genetic Engineering, 6 MANITOBA L.J. 291, 295 (1975). 
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control over cryopreserved (frozen) embryos in the event of a 
dispute between a man and a woman who, prior to separation 
or divorce, had commenced IVF treatment together.  The issue 
really involves two questions: (1) what is the status of an 
embryo and what decisions can be made regarding them, and 
(2) who is authorized to make such decisions.  The focus here is 
on the second question.  In the United Kingdom, this question 
was resolved by legislation through the requirement of 
unwithdrawn consent by the gamete sources for transfer or 
continued storage of embryos.  Victoria has similar legislation, 
except that the unwithdrawn consents of the spouses (or co-
habiting heterosexual partners) of the gamete sources and the 
woman being treated are also required for transfer and, in the 
absence of agreement, the embryos remain in storage for the 
statutory period.561  In the United States, the question was 
resolved by courts in those states where disputes arose.  New 
South Wales also has no legislation and there have been no 
proceedings in which the control of embryos has been in 
dispute.  The draft Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 2003 
(N.S.W., Austl.) would have a similar effect to the United 
Kingdom legislation.562  Because no different issues arise, the 
law in Victoria and New South Wales will not be discussed 
separately.   
1.  United Kingdom 
The control of an embryo’s fate when gamete sources wish 
to prevent its use is determined by the UK Act.  Section 12(c) 
provides that it is a condition of every license granted that the 
provisions of Schedule 3 to the Act be complied with.563  
Paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 3 provides that: 
An embryo the creation of which was brought about in vitro must not 
be received by any person unless there is an effective consent by each 
person whose gametes were used to bring about the creation of the 
embryo to the use for that purpose of the embryo and the embryo is 
used in accordance with those consents.564 
                                                          
 561. Infertility Treatment Act, 1995, §§ 8, 9, 12-15, 53 (Vic., Austl.). 
 562. Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 2003, §§ 16-18, 22, 28 (N.S.W., 
Austl.). 
 563. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act (UK Act), 1990, § 12(c) (U.K.).  
It is unclear to what extent either progenitor could maintain a private right of 
action against a clinic.  See Michael Freeman, Medically Assisted 
Reproduction, in PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL LAW 546, 582-83 (Ian Kennedy & 
Andrew Grubb eds., 1998). 
 564.  UK Act, sched. 3, para. 6(3). 
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“Effective consent” is defined in paragraph 1 to be a 
written consent that has not been withdrawn.565  Consent may 
only relate to one or more purposes listed in paragraph 2(1) of 
Schedule 3, namely (1) use in providing treatment services to 
the person giving consent or that person and another specified 
person together, (2) use in providing treatment services to 
persons not including the person giving consent, or (3) use for 
the purposes of any project of research.566  The written consent 
must specify the maximum period of storage (if less than the 
statutory maximum), must state what is to happen to the 
gametes or embryo if the person giving the consent dies or 
becomes incapacitated, and may also specify storage 
conditions.567  Consent may be amended or withdrawn by 
written notice to the person storing the embryo.568  However, 
the consent cannot be amended or withdrawn once the embryo 
has been “used” in providing treatment services or for the 
purposes of any project of research.569  A person giving consent 
must be informed of the right to amend or withdraw it at the 
time consent is given.570 
Essentially, either gamete provider can, acting alone, 
decide to destroy the embryos.  This effectively protects the 
right not to reproduce as against the right to reproduce.  This is 
a simple rule to follow―it has little uncertainty, but also little 
flexibility. 
Consider the following version of events.  Ms. Evans 
discovered in the course of seeking treatment for infertility that 
she had serious tumors in both her ovaries and needed to have 
them removed.571  Because she still wanted children, she and 
her partner, Mr. Johnston, agreed that she should first attempt 
to harvest some eggs.  Her eggs would be fertilized with Mr. 
Johnston’s sperm and frozen for use after the surgery.572  Ms. 
Evans, concerned that Mr. Johnston might leave her, raised the 
possibility of freezing her eggs, rather than the shared 
                                                          
 565.  Id. para. 1. 
 566. UK Act, sched. 3, para. 2(1). 
 567. Id. para. 2(2). 
 568. Id. para. 4(1). 
 569. Id. para. 4(2). 
 570. Id. para. 3(2). 
 571. Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd., [2004] 2 WLR 713, at [4]., aff’d 
[2004] EWCA Civ 727. 
 572. Id. at [4-6]. 
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embryos, with a nurse at the clinic.573  The nurse informed her 
that egg freezing was not offered at the clinic and that, if she 
wished to pursue this option, she would have to speak with the 
treating physician.574  At that point, her partner reassured her 
that egg freezing was unnecessary, that they were not going to 
split up and that he wanted to be the father of her children.575  
The consent forms signed by Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston 
consented to the use of the embryos for the treatment of the 
couple, but noted the right of either party to withdraw or 
amend the consent.576  The form contained no provision for 
either party to consent to the treatment of Ms. Evans alone.577  
Embryos using the gametes of  Ms. Evans and Mr. Johnston 
were thereafter used to create embryos, which were frozen as 
planned.578 The relationship between Ms. Evans and Mr. 
Johnston came to an end; Ms. Evans wished to have the 
embryos transferred to her uterus and Mr. Johnston wished to 
have them destroyed. 
In the case of Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd.,579 the trial 
judge and the court of appeal held that even on these facts 
(which in the actual case were subject to dispute), Ms. Evans 
could not use the frozen embryos because: (1) that use would 
not constitute treatment together with Mr. Johnston, which is 
the only use of the embryos to which Mr. Johnston had 
consented; and (2) the UK Act does not permit a gamete 
provider to give irrevocable consent in advance to the use of 
embryos derived in part from his gametes.580  Thus, any 
reassurances by Mr. Johnston cannot prevent him from 
withdrawing his consent.581  The court also concluded that the 
UK Act was not contrary to European law.582 
The Evans case itself could have been foreseen by 
Parliament.  The head of the section in the Department of 
Health that has responsibility for policy on assisted conception 
and embryology gave evidence in the Evans case that indicated 
                                                          
 573. Id. at [5]. 
 574. Id. 
 575. Id. at [5-6]. 
 576. Id. 
 577. Id. at [7-10]. 
 578. Id. at [12-14]. 
 579.  [2004] EWCA Civ 727. 
 580. Id. at [295-96]. 
 581. Id. 
 582. [2004] EWCA Civ at [57-74], [106]-[119]. 
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that the Secretary of State for Health preferred a bright-line 
rule to a fact-sensitive rule in the Act.583  Democratic 
institutions are entitled to give weight to the value of certainty 
in deciding how to craft a legal rule. 
However, the British parliament was limited in its ability 
to foresee the future.  We therefore do not know if it would have 
opted for the same bright-line rule had it thought of the 
possibility of the following case (which could not have arisen in 
1990 because the technology had not yet been developed).  Ms. 
X donates oocytes to Mr. and Mrs. Y, giving her consent.  Mrs. 
Y does not need the nuclear genetic material, but defects in her 
mitochondria mean that her eggs can only be fertilized through 
the technique of cytoplasm transfer.  A HFEA license is 
granted584 and the procedure is performed; some of the embryos 
produced are frozen.  If Ms. X withdraws her consent before the 
frozen embryos are used, Mr. and Mrs. Y will be unable to have 
a genetically-related child.585  Although completely 
hypothetical, this is an example of how technological change 
can cause statutory rules to operate in ways not contemplated, 
and perhaps ways not desired.  
2.  United States 
It was established in 1989 in the United States that a 
couple undergoing IVF treatment with their own gametes have 
a joint right to control the use of embryos.586  In Davis v. 
Davis,587 the Tennessee Supreme Court went on to state in 
more detail who would control frozen embryos, in the context of 
a dispute between a couple using their own gametes: 
In summary, we hold that disputes involving the disposition of 
preembryos [early embryos] produced by in vitro fertilization should 
be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors.  If 
their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their 
prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out.  If no 
prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in 
using or not using the preembryos must be weighed.  Ordinarily, the 
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the 
                                                          
 583. [2004] 2 WLR at [187-88]. 
 584.  HFEA is considering an application for research on this technique.  
See Alastair Dalton, UK Scientists Raise Specter of Babies with Three 
Parents, THE SCOTSMAN, Oct. 18, 2004, available at 
http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=1209592004 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2005). 
 585. This is because Ms. X’s gametes were used to produce the embryos. 
 586. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425-27 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 587. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by 
means other than use of the preembryos in question.  If no other 
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the 
preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.  However, if 
the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate 
them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater 
interest and should prevail.588 
The statement that the progenitors’ “prior agreement 
concerning disposition should be carried out” has been subject 
to some controversy in later cases.  In Kass v. Kass,589 a New 
York case, a prior agreement that the embryos would be 
donated for research was held to control the embryos’ fate.  The 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts refused to enforce a prior 
agreement in A.Z. v. B.Z.590  Although the court held for 
various case-specific reasons that the document stating the wife 
would receive the embryos in the event of a separation was 
deficient,591 it went further and stated it would not have 
enforced the agreement in any event.  The court determined it 
was against public policy to compel a person to become a parent 
against that person’s will, even if that outcome had been 
previously sought.592  Similar sentiments were expressed by the 
Supreme Court in New Jersey in J.B. v. M.B.593  Again, the 
agreement itself was insufficient, but the court indicated that 
any agreement would be subject to the right of either party to 
change his or her mind up to the point of either use or 
destruction of the embryos.594  The Iowa Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion in In re Marriage of Witten.595  The 
agreement in this case provided that the frozen embryos could 
only be transferred, released, or disposed of with the consent of 
both husband and wife.596  The court stated that judges should 
not enforce any agreement between a couple as to the future 
disposition of embryos when one of them has communicated a 
change of heart.597 
An agreement to destroy the embryos was upheld, 
                                                          
 588. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 589. 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998). 
 590. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 591. Id. at 1056-57. 
 592. Id. at 1057-59. 
 593. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 594. Id. at 714, 717-19. 
 595. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 596. Id. at 772. 
 597. Id. at 782-83. 
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however, in the Washington case of Litowitz v. Litowitz.598  In 
that case, the agreement with the clinic provided for the 
destruction of the embryos (made with the husband’s sperm 
and donated eggs) after five years unless extended “at our 
request.”599  In fact, neither party wanted the embryos 
destroyed; the wife wished to have the embryos transferred into 
a surrogate and the husband wished to donate them to another 
couple.600  Nevertheless, the majority of the court upheld the 
contract.601  Judge Chambers wrote a separate concurring 
judgment, in which he stated that it was important to consider 
equity and public policy in enforcing agreements, but noted 
that equity and public policy were in accordance with the 
parties’ original intentions.602 
There is no way to reconcile these cases, although there 
seems to be great reluctance to enforce agreements to become a 
parent when a party has later decided against it.  When the 
agreement provides for some other result (destruction or use for 
research), the results vary by state. 
When there is no agreement, or the agreement is not 
binding on the parties, courts have articulated different tests 
although the results are largely similar.  In Davis, the court, 
using a balancing test, held that the interest of one party in 
donating the embryos lost to the interest of the other in not 
becoming a parent.603  In A.Z. v B.Z., the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court indicated a court should not give an order that 
would force one party to become a parent against his or her 
will.604  In J.B. v M.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court stated 
that the party wishing to avoid parenthood would “ordinarily” 
prevail.605  Five of the seven judges, however, stated that they 
expressed no opinion on what would they would have decided if 
the party wishing to procreate had no other physiological 
means of doing so.606  In separate concurring opinions, Judge 
Verniero and Judge Zazzali stated that in such a situation, the 
                                                          
 598. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 599. Id. at 272. 
 600. Id. at 264. 
 601. Id. at 271. 
 602. Id. (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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party wishing to procreate ought to prevail.607  Thus it is likely 
that Ms. Evans would have had a better chance of success had 
she undergone the IVF procedure in the United States, though 
not in Iowa, where the Supreme Court has held that embryos 
can only be removed from frozen storage with the consent of 
both gamete providers.608 
Among clinics, the emphasis seems to be on requiring 
couples to consider in advance what they wish done with their 
embryos in the event of divorce or separation.  A 1989 survey of 
embryo cryopreservation in the United States found that 
twenty-three of the twenty-five SART member programs that 
reported offering embryo freezing required the patient to 
designate the disposition of frozen embryos in case of parental 
death or divorce.609  ARSM recommends that programs require 
couples contemplating embryo storage to give written 
instruction concerning disposition of embryos.610  The 
instructions should be amendable but only by both partners.611  
In the absence of an agreement, programs should be able to 
treat embryos as abandoned after five years and destroy them 
if diligent efforts to contact the couple fail.612 The Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical 
Association also recommends the use of advance agreements 
but does not believe they should be mandatory.613  
3.  Observations 
The main difference between the law in the United 
Kingdom and the law in the United States is the generality of 
the rules.  The UK Act creates a clear but inflexible rule that 
may apply to situations in which many would think it 
inappropriate.  Further, it may apply even where further 
technological change creates a situation beyond the 
contemplation of the legislature.  In the United States, 
clarification of the law was slow as cases raised new questions 
                                                          
 607. Id. at 720. 
 608. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003). 
 609. Fugger, supra note 14, at 987. 
 610. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc’y, supra note 484, at 58S-59S; 
ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., DISPOSITION OF 
ABANDONED EMBRYOS, available at http:// 
www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/abandon.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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 613.  COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 193, at E-
2.141 (1994). 
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unanswered by previous cases.  As a consequence, more 
litigation has arisen in the context of cryopreservation and 
relationship dissolutions in the United States than in the 
United Kingdom.  One advantage of the American approach is 
that the courts retain the ability to create new exceptions to the 
general rule as the facts of specific cases demand.  The Evans 
case would probably have gone the other way in the United 
States, and the cytoplasm transfer hypothetical would almost 
certainly be resolved in favor of the couple. 
Problems of uncertainty caused by technological change 
may be overemphasized.  Uncertainty as to the control of 
embryos following the breakdown of a relationship has few 
large-scale effects.614  Such uncertainty is unlikely to deter 
many couples from using IVF or alter the economics of the 
reproduction industry.615  Couples who stay together or reach 
agreement upon separation will not face any negative 
consequences as the result of uncertainty in this area.  Clinics 
are not greatly affected because they can maintain the status 
quo pending judicial resolution of a dispute.616  The persons 
most affected are couples who split up and are unable to agree 
on the disposition of the embryos.  In that context, the dispute 
will rarely create new litigation, as the parties are already 
likely to be in divorce proceedings, but may add to the existing 
litigation burden and reduce the likelihood of out-of-court 
settlement.  The amount of thought that has been put into the 
question of control of embryos in academia likely exceeds that 
in private practice.  The additional burden of litigation for 
these couples is slight, and the cost of bright-line rules can be 
significant, as is evident from the Evans case.  Reaching the 
best result seems more important than ensuring predictability. 
A decision to “wait and see,” observing the common law 
resolution of uncertainty and enacting a statute only if the 
resolution is undesirable or any residual uncertainty has 
undesirable consequences, has advantages.  First, if the 
                                                          
 614. See DWORKIN, supra note 328, at 69 (commenting that identifying 
parents of children conceived with donor sperm is a small social problem and 
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 615. See William A. Sieck, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization and the Right to 
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common law solution is similar to that what have been enacted 
in any event, the flexibility of the common law is retained.  In 
particular, the rule is likely to be more adaptable to future 
technological change.  Second, even if a change is sought 
through legislation, the statute can be crafted to reflect greater 
experience gained with the technology. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article has been to analyze the types of 
problems law faces as a consequence of technological change 
and the means for resolving them.  Notions of law struggling to 
keep up with technology or society facing a “legal vacuum,” 
while graphic, fail to identify the nature of the problem.  Worse, 
they can lead to the belief that “something” needs to be done, 
which can lead to a rush to legislate.  In fact, while technology 
can pose problems for law, there are mechanisms other than 
legislation to deal with these problems.  While these may be 
insufficient or inadequate in particular circumstances (at least 
in the view of some), they should not be ignored. 
Often, there may be advantages in adopting a “wait and 
see” approach, delaying the enactment of technology-specific 
solutions until other mechanisms have had a chance to respond 
to the challenges posed.  When the advantages of this approach 
outweigh the disadvantages, it is not enough to respond that 
leaving issues to the courts or a professional body is 
undemocratic.  A decision by a political body not to legislate is 
as democratic as any.  While leaving uncertainties to be 
resolved by courts and regulation to professional bodies in the 
absence of any monitoring or review might meet with 
disapproval, the fact that a legislature consciously decides not 
to take action, while monitoring other developments, is not 
necessarily an undemocratic result.  When uncertainties are 
satisfactorily resolved by courts or regulatory goals are 
achieved by professional guidelines, legislation may not be 
necessary.  Nevertheless, professional bodies may not step up 
to the plate and government encouragement or the threat of 
stringent legislation may be necessary to provoke them into 
action.  It was such a threat that led to the creation of the 
Voluntary Licensing Authority in the United Kingdom.617  To 
create stronger restrictions on multiple embryo transfer in the 
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United States than exist at present, one could either regulate 
the practice directly or threaten such regulation, hoping to 
encourage ASRM and SART to adopt more stringent 
restrictions with greater consequences for non-compliance.  
Direct regulation will remain as an option if the threat proves 
to be ineffective. 
In some cases, legislation will be the most effective means 
of achieving a desired result.  Looking at a more recent 
controversy, if one believes that reproductive cloning is 
unacceptable under any circumstances, a legislative prohibition 
backed by stringent sanctions is the best means of ensuring 
that it never takes place.  If, however, safety concerns were 
resolved and one believed that cloning was in principle 
acceptable, professional regulation could be sufficient to ensure 
that procedures were carried out responsibly.  Some 
uncertainties, such as whether the spouse of the person cloned 
has any rights in relation to a frozen cloned embryo upon 
divorce, could be left to the courts in the first instance.  Others, 
such as whether clones have one or two parents, might be best 
resolved by legislation, especially if it were felt that lack of 
certainty would itself cause harm to a cloned child. 
There is no single best response to problems posed by 
technological change.  The possible responses will depend on 
the nature of the problem, and in particular, whether it is the 
technology itself, lack of regulation, uncertainty, or 
obsolescence, over-inclusiveness, or under-inclusiveness of 
existing rules.  Legislation will sometimes, but not always, be 
the best response.  Accordingly, when setting out a proposal for 
law reform in light of technological change, it is necessary to 
ask not only how the law ought to be changed, but also by 
whom and when. 
 
